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I. NATURE OF THE CASE AND THE PARTIES! 
This appeal involves yet two more cases that trace their roots back to the extensive and 
ongoing corporate malfeasance and mismanagement of the respondent AIA Services Corporation 
("AIA Services") through the actions of the respondents R. John Taylor ("John"), Connie Taylor 
Henderson ("Connie"), James Beck ("Beck") and Michael W. Cashman Sr. ("Cashman") 
(collectively "Individual Defendants"). Rather than simply paying the appellant Donna J. Taylor 
("Donna") for her Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services as promised (which they should have 
done by December 2, 2003), AIA Services, through the Individual Defendants, chose to unlawfully 
use AIA Services' funds, assets and creditworthiness to fund other businesses and pay themselves 
millions of dollars in compensation-and they have decimated AIA Services in the process.2 
Indeed, not long after the Individual Defendants avoided liability for their corporate 
malfeasance in a lawsuit previously brought by Reed Taylor ("Reed"), 3 one would have thought 
that any rational person (not to mention a corporate fiduciary or an attorney like John or Connie) 
1 Citations in this Brief to "A." are citations to the attached Appendix. An example is seen below. 
2 For example, John recently unlawfully stipulated to a judgment against AIA Services and AIA Insurance 
in an amount in excess of $12,000,000 to settle a lawsuit that subjected him to claims of fraud and other torts. (R. 
1656-1728, 3141-42, 3585-3612 (A. 104-131).) In classic John style, he once again placed his interests above AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance to make them suffer before he did Uudgment was deferred against John). (R. 3590-91 (A. 
109-10).) AIA Services and AIA Insurance's illegal guarantee of that loan was unlawfully authorized by John, Beck, 
and Connie. (R. 3136-38 (A. 132-34) (the guarantee was later amended to be unlimited and those parties unlawfully 
executed another guarantee).) In order to know the guarantee was unlawful, this Court need not look farther than a 
pleading previously filed by former counsel in this lawsuit: "If the California Court ultimately determines that AIA 
guaranteed the CropUSA loan and the lender pursues the remedies that are available to it under the guaranty, then 
AIA will have incurred a prohibited indebtedness under subsection 4.2.9(c) [of the amended articles of 
incorporation]." (R. 2361 (referring to R. 726-28).) Dale Miesen, another AIA Services common shareholder (R. 
2225), is seeking to have those guarantees and the subsequent Settlement Agreement obligating AIA to pay over 
$12,000,000 declared illegal. (E.g., 2017 WL 2712998.) 
3 See Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011). This Court is well aware of that 
case, and the other cases that were spawned from the illegality of Reed's redemption, which have brought significant 
bread to many insurance defense attorneys in Idaho and Washington. E.g., Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 329, 336 
P.3d 256,261 (2014) ("Riley I"); Taylor v. Bell, 340 P.3d 951 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). 
1 
would have sought to put AIA Services' financial house in order, and start properly and legally 
operating the company. Instead, the opposite occurred-the Individual Defendants continued and 
even accelerated their tortious conduct oflooting millions of dollars from AIA Services in the form 
of cash, assets and loan guarantees to support themselves and other entities that they own. In 
addition, the Individual Defendants have illogically and spitefully spent more of AIA Services' 
money fighting Donna rather than it would have taken to simply pay her. This makes no sense at 
all. Indeed, the Individual Defendants' unlawful conduct has directly resulted in the filing of 
numerous lawsuits involving various parties around the country, which has left a trail of carnage. 4 
While apparently ignoring all of the corporate malfeasance and spiteful conduct towards 
Donna, the district court entered a number of convoluted, inconsistent and erroneous decisions. 
Specifically, the district court, without citing any authority, erroneously retroactively stripped 
away over $340,000 in Series A Preferred Shares from the elderly Donna, even though her 
redemption obligations had ironically been authorized under LC. § 30-1-6 (unlike Reed's). The 
district court also erroneously dismissed Donna's fraud claims based on the Economic Loss Rule 
(which should not apply to fraud) and dismissed her unjust enrichment claim for failure to state a 
claim (when her complaint more than met minimal pleading standards). There is simply no credible 
argument to dispute the fact that Donna should hold 41,651.25 Series A Preferred Shares (worth 
$10 each or $416,512.00, plus accrued interest), rather than the 7,110 Series A Preferred Shares 
4 E.g., GemCap Lending I, LLC v. CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc., et al. (R. 1656-1728, 3141-42, 3585-
3612); GemCap Lending I, LLC v. Quarles & Brady, et al. (R. 4246-67; 2015 WL 4914399); GemCap Lending I, LLC 
v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. (2017 WL 3252380); AJA Services Corp. v. Durant, et al. (R. 863-923, 1881-96); Missouri 
Crop, LLC v. CGB Diversified Services, Inc., et al. (2017 WL 67523); Miesen v. Henderson, et al. (Mr. Miesen took 
the laboring oar and is now the sole plaintiff) (R. 1967-2022; 2017 WL 1458191; 2017 WL 2712998). 
2 
(worth $71,110, plus interest) that the district court erroneously determined after "equitably" going 
back in time almost twenty years and retroactively redeeming more shares than were actually 
redeemed over that period. This Court should reverse, remand, and award fees and costs to Donna. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Donna is 77-years-old, has no high school diploma, and no way to earn a living. (R. 3466-
68.) The Series A Preferred Shares issued to Donna is the bulk of her retirement and her divorce 
settlement. (Id.) In the 1960s, Donna and Reed co-founded what is now known as AIA Insurance 
(f/k/a Agriculture Insurance Administrators), which later became the cash cow subsidiary of AIA 
Services that generated over $74 million in revenues from 1995 through 2013. (R. 3466-67, 3570-
71.) Donna worked hard with Reed building the business, while at the same time she helped raise 
their children (her children often played under her desk at work). (R. 3466-67.) 
On the other side of the equation are John, Beck, Cashman and Connie. John and Connie 
have both been attorneys for decades and have benefitted from over $2,700,000 in known cash 
compensation that AIA Services paid John from 1995 through 2013 (this excludes the millions in 
malfeasance discussed below). (R. 880, 3570.) John has purportedly served as an officer and 
director of AIA Services since well before 1995. (R. 958-76.) Contrary to what John likes to tell 
people, he was not a founder of AIA Insurance; rather, Donna and Reed helped pay for John's 
college and they hired him to work at AIA Insurance (unfortunately for them as they would later 
learn). (R. 3466-67.) Connie and Beck purportedly served as directors of AIA Services since 2007, 
and they received $5,000 per quarter, plus shares of common stock (for doing nothing other than 
assist in the malfeasance committed against AIA Services as will be described below). (R. 958-
3 
963, 1904, 1919-21, 1932, 1934, 1942.) Beck and Cashman are sophisticated insurance company 
investors from Minnesota. (Id.; R. 881, 1813-35, 1898, 2240-43, 3522-23.) 
Unfortunately, on September 1, 1984, Reed and Donna were separated. (R. 539.) On 
December 14, 1987, Donna and Reed executed a Property Settlement Agreement to resolve their 
divorce (though they remain friends to this day). (R. 532-600.) Under the terms of that Agreement 
(and to prevent AIA Insurance and AIA Services from being liquidated in the divorce), Reed and 
Donna contributed their 100% ownership interest in AIA Insurance (their children owned a small 
stake) and other entities to AIA Services in exchange for it issuing them 200,000 Series A Preferred 
Shares and 5,963 more common shares. (R. 525-26, 534-35, 564-65, 2350.) The 200,000 Series A 
Preferred Shares were transferred to Donna. (Id.) That Agreement also required that special 
redemption rights and restrictions pertaining to how AIA Services could conduct business to be 
included in AIA Services' Amended Articles oflncorporation in order to protect Donna, including 
the right to have her designee mandatorily appointed to AIA Services' board, that AIA Services 
could not guarantee loans for other entities, that certain related party transactions were barred and 
that AIA Services had to maintain certain financial covenants. (R. 574-88, 649-60 (A. 25-36).) 
On December 2, 1993, Donna exercised her mandatory right to require AIA Services to 
repurchase her Series A Preferred Shares; however, AIA Services, instead of making a lump sum 
payment, voluntarily elected to repurchase her shares over time at the price of $10 per share over 
15 years, with interest to accrue at the prime rate minus one and one-half percent (1.5%). (R. 525-
26, 652-53 (A. 28-29), 808.) At that time, AIA Services had $3,948,262 in earned surplus to 
authorize Donna's $2,000,000 redemption. (R. 3308.) J.C.§ 30-1-6 (repealed) (A. 151-52.) As a 
4 
result, AIA Services commenced making payments to Donna. (R. 808, 2557-59.) 
In early 1995, John, Beck and Cashman sought to take operational and financial control 
over AIA Services by redeeming Reed's shares in an effort (failed) to take the company public. 
(R. 1813-35, 1843, 1920-21.) AIA Services agreed, through John, to allow Beck and Cashman the 
right to approve the terms of Reed's redemption and required him to be bought out and that AIA 
Services obtain Donna's consent. (R. 1822, 1830.) John, Beck and Cashman also agreed to enter 
into a voting agreement to ensure that they controlled AIA Services. (R. 2240-43.) They all became 
the majority and controlling shareholders of AIA Services. (R. 1956, 2225-38, 2941-42.) 
In order to obtain Donna's consent to redeem Reed's shares, AIA Services agreed to 
accelerate the purchase of her Series A Preferred Shares by purchasing them over 10 years with 
interest accruing at prime plus 1/4%, and these terms would govern, irrespective of whether AIA 
Services raised enough funds to redeem Reed's shares. (R. 602 (A. 1 ), 3467-68.) At that time, AIA 
Services was authorized to use capital surplus under its articles of incorporation to purchase 
Donna's Series A Preferred Shares as provided in I.C. § 30-1-6, and Donna and AIA Services 
could agree to modify her terms under the articles. (R. 660 § 4.12 (A. 36), 681 (A. 41).) AIA 
Services' board of directors and shareholders expressly authorized both the increased interest rate 
and shorter amortization period (the reorganization plan specifically included Donna's modified 
redemption terms). (R. 3476-3565.) Notably, had AIA Services timely paid Donna as required, it 
would have actually saved over $100,000 even though it was paying a higher interest rate. 
(Compare R. 3328-33 with R. 3334-7.) 
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On March 22, 1995, the terms of the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement were oddly 
confirmed again by attorney Richard Riley (Donna's counsel seemed to not trust AIA's counsel, 
as seen from a dialogue in a board meeting). (R. 606 (A. 5), 3476.) There were other minor 
modifications to Donna's January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement as reflected in two additional letter 
agreements dated July 18, 1995 and August 10, 1995, respectively. (R. 608-15 (A. 7-14).) The 
foregoing three letter agreements dated January 11, 1995, July 18, 1995, and August 10, 1995 are 
collectively referred to below as the "Letter Agreements" or "January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement" 
(the amortization and interest rate remained the same). 
On July 1, 1996, after AIA Services defaulted on Reed's payment obligations, Donna, 
AIA Services and Reed executed a Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement. (R. 617-25 (A. 16-
24).) Donna was not represented by counsel while AIA Services was. (R. 623 (A. 22), 2350-51.) 
AIA Services, through John, confirmed the terms of the January 11, 1995 agreement and further 
agreed to accelerate payments to Donna through the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement 
by paying her an additional $100,000 every six months after Reed's $1.5 million down payment 
note was paid (which was paid in full in June 2001), but she never received a single additional 
$100,000 payment as required. (Id.; R. 526-27, 619 (A. 18), 806, 2290-91, 3577-83.) 
In the early 2000s, AIA Services launched a new subsidiary later known as CropUSA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") to market crop insurance and, in order to allegedly help fund 
CropUSA, John lied to Donna in order to get her to defer some of her monthly payments (he lied 
to Reed, too). (R. 385, 527-28, 627-28.) On May 27, 2004, John wrote back to Donna, after she 
had complained to him about not being paid as required, and represented to her (falsely again) that 
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AIA was having difficulties because it was launching CropUSA. (R. 528, 630-31.) The truth was 
that John already knew that an over $1.5 million bonus check was expected from Trustmark; 
however, instead of redeeming the last of Donna's shares (her shares should have been fully 
redeemed over a year earlier), John deposited that $1,510,693 into a checking accounting using 
John's home address. (R. 2343.) Part of that could have easily paid Donna in full. (R. 2132-36.) 
Unbeknownst to Donna or Reed ( or the other shareholders), the Individual Defendants had 
already implemented their plan to steal CropUSA, and this was just one of many unlawful 
transactions John and the other Individual Defendants would engage in to carry out that plan and 
to provide funds for themselves and other businesses. (E.g., R. 2342-47, 2846-72; 2017 WL 
2712998.) Moreover, John did not think twice about violating the non-compete or non-solicitation 
provisions in his Executive Officer's Agreement with AIA Services to carry out their plan. (R. 
1843-51.) 
After AIA Services refused to pay off Reed and Donna (and they began to learn of the 
malfeasance), she agreed to enter into a Subordination Agreement with Reed effective December 
1, 2006, which reversed the previous subordination between them. (R. 602-04 (A. 1-3), 608-12 (A. 
7-11), 1040-42.) Reed filed suit and attempted to make things right for him, Donna and the other 
minority shareholders of AIA Services, but the Individual Defendants were not interested in 
making things right for anyone but themselves. (R. 1809, 1853-60.) In April 2008, the Individual 
Defendants (except Cashman) raised the illegality defense to Reed's claims, which ultimately 
ended Reed's effort to make things right. (Id.) AL4 Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 558. 
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On May 30, 2008, AIA Services, through the Individual Defendants, made its last payment 
to Donna. (R. 528.) As of May 31, 2008, AIA Services' records showed that it owed Donna the 
principal sum of $416,512 (plus accrued interest) or she owned 41,651.25 Series A Preferred 
Shares ($416,512 divided by $10 per share), as later determined by the district court. (R. 2199, 
2427.) On June 24, 2008, John wrote to Donna stating that no more payments would be made to 
her. (R. 633.) Through the last payment, AIA Services had been redeeming Donna's Series A 
Preferred Shares based on the higher modified interest rate. (R. 2056-2213.) 
After the Individual Defendants stopped paying Donna, they accelerated their illegal 
activities. For example, AIA Services (with John, Beck and Connie as board members) lent Pacific 
Empire Radio Corp. ("PERC") over $1,900,000, when just a portion of those funds could have 
paid Donna in full and those loans violated the protective covenants of AIA Services' amended 
articles ofincorporation because no loans could be made to any entities that were not wholly owned 
subsidiaries (PERC is partially owned by John and Connie).5 (R. 689-91 (A. 49-51), 726-28 (same 
restrictions), 2870, 3567, 3614-22 (A. 135-43).) PERC was not even able to pay its employee 
withholding taxes and it had been sued by another lender for over $6,200,000 during the time that 
some of the loans were made. (R. 3089-3133.) PERC was not credit worthy. (Id.) 
Meanwhile, also unbeknownst to Donna, on November 21, 2011, the Individual 
Defendants also unlawfully had AIA Services and AIA Insurance guarantee a $5,000,000 loan for 
5 Hill v. Small, 183 S.E.2d 752, 753-754 (Ga. 1971) ('"a corporation has only the power conferred upon it 
by its charter,"' that "'[t]he charter ofa corporation is in effect its constitution ... [that] are to be strictly construed"' 
and affirming the trial court's order voiding the issuance of shares because the issuance violated the articles of 
incorporation) (citations omitted). The Individual Defendants violated AIA Services' articles with no remorse. 
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CropUSA from GemCap Lending I, LLC ("GemCap"). (R. 1656, 1673, 1709-28.) Connie, John 
and Beck signed the purported board resolution authorizing the original guarantee, which was 
subsequently increased to the full $10,000,000 loan (they signed that resolution, too). (R. 3136-38 
(A. 132-34).) The GemCap guarantees also violated, inter alia, AIA Services' amended articles of 
incorporation.6 (R. 89-91 (A. 49-51), 726-28 (same restrictions), 2870.) This point was conceded 
in a pleading before the district court by former counsel when they apparently misrepresented that 
GemCap was not pursuing the guarantees, but admitted: "If the California Court ultimately 
determines that AIA guaranteed the CropUSA loan and the lender pursues the remedies that are 
available to it under the guaranty, then AIA will have incurred a prohibited indebtedness under 
subsection 4.2.9(c) [of the amended articles ofincorporation]." (R. 2361 (referring to R. 726-28).). 
During all of these illegal activities (and others not mentioned herein), the Individual 
Defendants were also refusing to honor Donna's designees to AIA Services board of directors, as 
was her unequivocal right under the articles, and they were ignoring other shareholder's demands 
to inspect records. (R. 689 § 4.2.8 (A. 49), 725 § 4.2.8 (same right), 2351-52, 2835-45, 2870-71.) 
In 2012, the Individual Defendants wanted to extract even more pain from AIA Services' 
innocent minority shareholders by seeking to effectuate an abusive reverse stock split to squeeze 
them out for nothing when they falsely asserted that the minority shareholders had not complied 
with Idaho Code. (R. 863-923.) That lawsuit was dismissed by the Hon. Carl Kerrick (who 
awarded fees to the minority shareholders), and this was another effort (albeit a failed one this 
6 See footnote 5. 
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time) to violate AIA Services' amended articles of incorporation because AIA Services could not 
purchase any common shares because it was in arrears to its obligations to Donna and the Series 
C Preferred Shareholders (the 401(k) Plan). 7 (R. 729 § 4.2.9(t), 733 § 4.3.3, 2835-38, 3052 n.5 
( over $1 million in accrued unpaid dividends as of 2011 ), 1881-1896.) The Individual Defendants 
(except Cashman) never followed through with their representations to this Court (AJA Services 
Corp., 151 Idaho 552)-there was never an effort to make anything right for any minority 
shareholders. (E.g., R. 2867-72.) 
On February 11, 2013, Donna wrote to AIA Services demanding payment in full and 
further provided notice of acceleration, to the extent necessary. (R. 528, 635.) Donna's demand 
was ignored and she has still not received a single payment since May 30, 2008. (R. 528.) All the 
while Donna was complaining, the Individual Defendants were busy writing hundreds of 
thousands, if not millions, of dollars in checks to themselves and entities that the controlled from 
AIA's bank accounts. (R. 3009-40, 2867-72.) 
Later in 2013, the Individual Defendants' "Ponzi" scheme collapsed when GemCap sued 
AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, John and others, asserting fraud, conversion and other 
claims. (R. 1656-1728.) In early 2015, John purportedly executed an illegal Settlement Agreement 
with GemCap resulting in a $12,126,584.61 judgment against AIA Services and AIA Insurance, 
7 As with the Individual Defendants, this Court will recall that the 40l(k) Plan represented on Reed's appeal 
that it was necessary to have the Stock Redemption Agreement declared illegal for those Plain Participants. They have 
done nothing for those Plan participants and simply taken the money. (R. 3052 n.5 (noting that over $1 million in 
accrued dividends were accrued, but unpaid).) 
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and led to their headquarters being transferred and sold. 8 (R. 3585-3612 (A. 104-31), 3642-44.) 
As mentioned in footnote 4 above, this had led to numerous other lawsuits involving GemCap and 
other parties, including the law firm representing CropUSA for the loans, Quarles & Brady. (R. 
3146-67; 2015 WL 4914399 (citing the fraud allegations in Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., et al.) 
In the end, based on the few above examples (there are more), there is no denying that 
Donna's 41,651.25 Series A Preferred Shares could have easily been redeemed over a decade ago 
with just a small portion of the funds unlawfully taken from AIA Services. (E.g., R. 2867-72.) 
Instead, the Individual Defendants increased their majority ownership interest by illegally 
redeeming over $600,000 in lower-priority common shares (and without providing full disclosure 
to the sellers of the shares). (Id.; R. 729 § 4.2.9(f), 733 § 4.3.3, 2225-38, 3052 n.5, 3237-61.) 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On June 2, 2008, Donna filed suit against John for his personal guarantee of sums owed to 
her for the redemption of her shares and for other tort claims ("First Lawsuit"). (R. 136-39.) On 
October 27, 2008, Donna amended her complaint and she also named Connie as a defendant. (R. 
159-166.) On November 6, 2009, Donna filed her Second Amended Complaint. (R. 373-83.) John 
and Connie filed counterclaims requesting John's guarantee be discharged. (R. 172-76, 188-91.) 
8 The Settlement Agreement is illegal for violating the articles of incorporation, restated bylaws and various 
Idaho Code sections on limitations under articles of incorporation. Moreover, it unlawfully assigns legal malpractice 
claims and prevents John, AIA Services or AIA Insurance from filing for bankruptcy protection. (R. 3589-91 (A. 108-
10), 3605-07 (A. 124-26).) St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 43,293 P.3d 
661,667 (2012); In re Cole, 226 B.R. 647, 651-54 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899,904 (2d Cir. 
1966); In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). These issues, however, will be litigated against 
GemCap and others by another shareholder, Dale Miesen, in U.S. District Court ofldaho. (2017 WL 2712998.) 
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On January 15, 2010, the district court deferred rulings on the motions and stayed the case 
pending the issuance of this Court's opinion in Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., et al. (R. 393-400.) 
On May 8, 2013, after this Court issued its opinion in AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, John 
and Connie moved for partial summary judgment arguing Donna's redemption was illegal. (R. 
412-15). Donna submitted opposing affidavits and responded by asserting, inter alia, that AIA 
Services was authorized to use capital surplus to redeem her shares. (R. 503-976.) On July 26, 
2013, the district court found genuine issues of material fact, denied Connie and John's motion, 
and lifted the stay. (R. 1009-14.) 
On May 24, 2013 (after no payments had been made since 2008), Donna filed a second 
lawsuit, which included John and Connie and three newly named defendants: AIA Services, Beck 
and Cashman ("Second Lawsuit").9 (R. 11-25.) Donna asserted claims for breaches of contract, 
breaches of fiduciary duties, aiding and abetting in the breach of fiduciary duties, unjust 
enrichment, declaratory relief/specific performance and alter-ego/piercing the corporate veil. (Id.) 
The district court consolidated the lawsuits. (R. 26-27, 64-73.) On June 17, 2013, AIA Services 
filed its answer and asserted a counterclaim, alleging that Donna had breached the 1996 Series A 
Preferred Shareholder Agreement. (R. 54-63.) On September 23, 2013, John, Connie, Beck and 
Cashman filed their answer. (R. 74-84.) 
9 Unfortunately, filing a motion to amend to add new parties would not have tolled the statute of limitations 
because AIA Services, Beck and Cashman were not defendants. J.C.§ 5-216; J.C.§ 5-238; English v. Taylor, 160 
Idaho 737, 742-745, 378 P.3d 1036, 1041-1044 (2016) (holding that the filing date of a motion to amend does not toll 
the statute of limitations as to newly named defendants). Thus, Donna filed a new lawsuit. 
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On March 17, 2014, AIA Services filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary 
judgment, requesting an award of fees under LC.§ 12-121. 10 (R. 1032-89, 1190-1213.) On April 
25, 2014, Donna moved for partial summary judgment, including, asserting that the January 11, 
1995 Letter Agreement was legal and AIA Services was authorized to use capital surplus at that 
time. (R. 2049-2308.) 
On July 14, 2014, the district court granted both sides' motions in part; ruling that Donna's 
fraud and fiduciary duty claims were barred by the Economic Loss Rule, that she failed to state a 
claim for unjust enrichment, that the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement was illegal, but 
that the Letter Agreements were valid and enforceable contracts, and Donna held the number of 
Series A Preferred Shares indicated in AIA Services' records. 11 (R. 2413-30.) After both sides 
moved for reconsideration, on August 25, 2014, the district court further granted Donna's motion 
in part by holding that her breach of fiduciary duty claims were not barred by the Economic Loss 
Rule. (R. 2601-10.) 
On July 21, 2015, Donna filed her Third Amended Complaint in the First Lawsuit. (R. 
3367-77.) After AIA Services moved for reconsideration once again and on the very eve of trial, 
on June 15, 2015, the district court abruptly changed its mind and summarily reversed its earlier 
decisions, without citing any authority, and ruled that Donna only held 7,110 Series A Shares. (R. 
3346-51.) On August 14, 2015, the John and Connie filed their Answer to the First Lawsuit, and 
10 As this Court is well aware, "I.C. § 12-121 applies to cases as a whole and not to individual motions." 
Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451,457, 95 P.3d 69, 75 (2004). 
11 While Donna's expert found minor discrepancies (R. 2293), Donna is not challenging the district court's 
earlier ruling as to the number of shares in AIA Services' records, so she will use the 41,651.25 Series A Preferred 
Shares ($416,512) indicated in AIA's records as the appropriate number of shares. (R. 2199, 2477 (A. 77).) 
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asserted counterclaims for unjust enrichment and abuse of process. (R. 3378-88.) 
On January 14, 2016, counsel for AIA Services withdrew. (R. 3389-91.) On September 8, 
2016, the district court entered a Rule 54(b) Judgment consistent with its prior rulings. (R. 3438-
41.) On September 22, 2016, Donna timely moved for reconsideration and to amend the Rule 54(b) 
judgment (R. 3442-64), and she submitted additional testimony and evidence (including evidence 
of yet additional malfeasance and shareholder meeting notices and proxies approving the January 
11, 1995 Letter Agreement). (R. 3465-3644.) On October 6, 2016, Donna filed an amended motion 
to reconsider. 12 (R. 3647-75.) On December 28, 2016, the district court again, without providing 
any legal analysis or a reasoned explanation, denied Donna's motions in a two-page ruling. (R. 
3802-3804.) 
On February 8, 2017, Donna timely appealed. (R. 3805-26.) On March 1, 2017, the 
Individual Defendants cross-appealed. (R. 3827-59.) This appeal followed. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred when it failed to conduct a full analysis of the illegality 
doctrine as it pertains to the 1995 Letter Agreements and the 1996 Series A Preferred 
Shareholder Agreement and whether this Court should do so for the first time on appeal. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it ruled that Donna only holds 7,110 Series A 
Preferred Shares because, at most, it should have left her where it found her if it did not 
enforce that Agreement (which is holding 41,651.25 shares). 
3. Whether the Letter Agreements complied with Idaho Code section 30-1-6 (repealed). 
12 The Individual Defendants moved to strike Donna's amended motion and further sought sanctions against 
the undersigned counsel (albeit the sanctions were brought under the inapplicable Rule 12.2(a), which applies to 
successive applications, not motions to reconsider). (R. 3676-86.) After submitting additional briefing on the issues, 
the district court denied that motion and the request for sanctions. (R. 3690-3773.) That motion perfectly illustrates 
just one more example of the untenable positions and intransigence caused by the Individual Defendants' actions. 
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4. Whether the district court erred because the 1995 Letter Agreements and/or the 1996 Series 
A Preferred Shareholder Agreement are enforceable and unchallengeable contracts for a 
number of reasons. 
5. Whether this Court should overrule prior precedent and allow parties to appeal orders 
denying summary judgment. 
6. Whether the district court erred when it denied Donna's motion for partial summary 
judgment on the number of Series A Preferred Shares held by her, AIA Services' default 
on the payment obligations, and the Individual Defendants liability under alter-ego. 
7. Whether the district court erred when it ruled that the Economic Loss Doctrine bars 
Donna's fraud claims and whether this Court should expand and rename that Rule. 
8. Whether the district court erred when it dismissed Donna's claim for unjust enrichment. 
9. Whether the assignment of a new district court judge on remand would bring a fresh 
perspective to these cases. 
10. Whether Donna is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees on appeal or, in the 
alternative, reserve the issue of fees for remand after a prevailing party is named. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Standards of Review Applicable to All lssues. 13 
This appeal arises from the district court's decisions on motions for summary judgment and 
motions for reconsideration. (R. 2413-30, 2601-10, 3346-51, 3802-04.) The following applies: 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the 
same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." When considering whether the evidence shows a genuine issue of material 
fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 
13 Additional applicable standards ofreview also be set forth in the following Sections were applicable. 
15 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,271,281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012) (citations omitted). 
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). On a motion 
for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence or 
authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. However, a motion 
for reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority. When 
deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is 
being reconsidered. 
Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276,281 P.3d at 113 (citations omitted). "This means the Court reviews 
the district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration de novo." Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 
540, 545, 328 P.3d 520, 525 (2014). 
The interpretation of statutes are questions of law over which this Court exercises free 
review.Ada Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351,353,298 
P.3d 245, 247 (2013). "The burden of proving an affirmative defense, however, rests upon the 
party who advances the affirmative defense." U.S. Bank National Assoc. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 
157 Idaho 446, 337 P.3d 605, 610 (2014). 14 
B. The District Court Erred When It Granted AIA Services' Motion for Reconsideration 
Because Donna Still Holds 41,651.25 Shares, the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder 
Agreement Should Be Enforced, the 1995 Letter Agreements Are Legal, Enforceable 
and Unchallengeable. 
1. Additional Applicable Standards of Review. 
'An illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act 
or forbearance which is contract to law or public policy,' and such a contract is 
'illegal and unenforceable.' '[W]hen the consideration for a contract explicitly 
violates a statute, the contract is illegal and unenforceable.' In Trees v. Kersey, we 
explained: 
14 To the extent that additional standards ofreview also apply to the arguments below, they will be discussed 
in each of the applicable arguments below. 
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... Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to 
determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. An 
illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration of any act or 
forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. The general 
rule is that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and unenforceable. 
A contract which is made for the purpose of furthering any matter or 
thing prohibited by statute is void. This rule applies on the ground of 
public policy to every contract which is founded on a transaction 
prohibited by statute. The Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested that 
where a statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that its 
violation is illegal, without regard to the reason of the inhibition or 
to the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting statute. 
AL4 Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 564-65, 261 P.3d at 841-42 (citations omitted). Contract 
interpretation begins with the document's language and is interpreted by the plain, ordinary and 
proper meaning of the contract. Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 259 P.3d 595 
(2011 ). "Interpretation and legal effect of an unambiguous contract are questions oflaw over which 
this Court exercises free review." Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 748, 9 
P.3d 1204, 1214 (2000). "When construing corporate organizational documents [i.e., articles of 
incorporation and bylaws], the general rules of contract interpretation apply." Heritage Lake 
Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. York, 859 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
2. The District Court Erred Because Donna Should Still Hold 41,651.25 Series A 
Preferred Shares Under Any Possible Scenario. 
The parties agreed, and the district court correctly ruled, that the 1996 Series A Preferred 
Shareholder was an illegal and unenforceable contract as to Donna, Reed and AJA Services. 15 (R. 
617-25, 2425 (A. 75), 2428 (A. 78).) The district court also correctly ruled the first two times that 
15 Since the 1995 Letter Agreements and the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreements were entered 
into in 1995 and 1996, respectively (R. 602-04, 608-625), the Idaho Business Corporation Act in existence at that time 
applies to any violations of Idaho Code at those times. See, e.g., I.C. § 30-1-1703(1) (repealed); I.C. § 30-29-1703(1). 
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the Letter Agreements were legal (R. 2425-27 (A. 75-77), 2602-05 (A. 82-85), and when it held 
that Donna held that "the number of unredeemed shares still held by Donna is the amount shown 
by AIA's records on the date of the last payment made to Donna." (R. 2427 (A. 77).) 
However, almost one year later, the district court then abruptly changed its mind and, 
without citing any authority, held that the "only equitable remedy for the situation as presented in 
2015 that this Court can conceive of is that suggested by AIA: Recalculation of the redemptions 
made for Donna's Series A Preferred shares at the only lawful interest rate-that established by 
the Articles oflncorporation ... " (R. 3349 (A. 94).) Then, the district court erroneously went back 
in time to 1995 and retroactively recalculated the payments made and retroactively increased the 
number of shares redeemed with each payment to find "that all but 7,110 Preferred A Shares owned 
by Donna have been redeemed." (R. 3350 (A. 95); Compare R. 2056-2213 (actual redemptions) 
with 1067-1189 (the recalculation, i.e., what did not happen).) After Donna moved to reconsider, 
R. 3647-75, the district court denied her motion, again, without citing any authority or providing 
any authoritative explanation. (R. 3802-04 (A. 1001-03).) Both of those decisions were erroneous. 
Once the district court determined that the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement 
was illegal, then it was required to determine whether that Agreement would be enforced under 
one of the exceptions to the illegality doctrine. See generally AL4 Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 
565-67, 261 P.3d at 842-44. If none of the exceptions applied, then the district court must leave 
Donna and AIA Services where it found them on July 14, 2014, which was Donna holding the 
same 41,651.25 Series A Preferred Shares that she had held since AIA Services stopped paying 
her on May 30, 2008. (R. 528, 13, 633, 817, 2427.) Next, the district court needed to determine 
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whether Donna's contractual rights were governed by any one or more of the 1995 Letter 
Agreements or AIA Services' amended articles of incorporation-or both. (R. 602-04, 608-15, 
649-738.) When the district court entered its orders on reconsideration, the district court side-
stepped this entire analysis and disregarded the facts and authorities ( and, indeed, cited no 
authority) in order to justify the result that it apparently wanted. 16 (R. 3346-51 (A. 91-96), 3802-
04 (A. 101-03).) For the following reasons, those decisions were error and the district court had it 
right the first time. (Id; R. 2425-29 (A. 75-79).) 
a. This Court Should Conclusively Decide the Legality and Enforceability o(the 1995 
Letter Agreements and the Enforceability of the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder 
Agreement. 
As explained above, in both of its reconsideration decisions, the district court failed to 
expressly address whether the 1995 Letter Agreements were legal and enforceable or whether the 
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement was enforceable (it correctly ruled it was illegal) in its 
earlier decisions. The district court did "not find it necessary to rule" on capital surplus. (R. 3349 
n.3 (A. 94 n.3).) Instead, the district court ultimately concluded that the higher interest rate was 
not "lawful" and held that Donna's contractual rights revert back to the articles of incorporation. 
(R. 3349-50 (A. 94-95).) This was error, and this Court should address the legality issue now. 
Once the issue of illegality of a contract is raised, a district court has the obligation to 
address the issue. Syringa Networks, LLCv. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 159 Idaho 813, _, 367 P.3d 
208, 218 (2016) ("We affirm the district court's holding that it had a duty to raise the issue of 
16 "Courts decide cases in one of two ways: (a) they apply the law to the facts and thereby arrive at the result 
or (b) they determine the desired result and then twist the law and/or the facts to justify it." Nield v. Pocatello Health 
Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802,819,332 P.3d 714, 731 (2012) (Eismann, J., dissenting). 
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illegality ... "); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 566-67, 944 P.2d 695, 701-02 (1997) (the 
district court "has a duty to raise the issue of illegality, whether pied or otherwise ... "). 
"The illegality of a contract ... can be raised at any stage in litigation. The Court has the 
duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte." Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6-7, 56 P.3d 765, 
768-69 (2002); accord; Riley I, 157 Idaho at 329,336 P.3d at 261;AL4 Services Corp., 151 Idaho 
at 564, 261 P.3d at 841. 17 
Thus, this Court should address the applicable illegality issues (alleged) discussed below 
and it is further appropriate for this Court to do so for the first time on appeal, if necessary. 
b. The District Court Erred Because Under All Circumstances Donna Should Still Hold 
the Same 41,651.25 Series A Preferred Shares that She Held When AL4 Services 
Stopped Paying Her in 2008 Because the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement 
Is an Illegal Contract. 
The district court correctly ruled that the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement was 
illegal and unenforceable as to Donna, Reed and AIA Services. (R. 617-25 (A. 16-24), 2425, 2428 
(A. 75, 78).) But the district court erred because it disregarded the illegality doctrine and failed to 
determine whether it was leaving the parties where it found them. (Id.; R. 3346-51 (A. 91-96).) In 
fact, it did erroneously not leave the parties where it found them. (R. 3349-50 (A. 94-95).) 
'" If a contract is illegal and void, the court will leave the parties as it finds them and refuse 
to enforce the contract."' AL4 Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 565,261 P.3d at 842 (citation omitted). 
"[A] court of equity will not knowingly aid in the furtherance of an illegal transaction; in harmony 
with this principle, it does not concern itself as to the manner in which the illegality of a matter 
17 Ironically, the district judge here is the same one who ruled sua sponte that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement was illegal. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829. 
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before it is brought to its attention." Id. at 564 (citation omitted). Moreover, when responding to a 
motion for summary judgment, the "nonmoving party cannot rely on speculation." Edwards v. 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 154 Idaho 511,519,300 P.3d 43, 51 (2013). 
Here, the district court appears to have left the parties where it found them as a result of 
the illegal 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement because it discusses the Letter 
Agreements as being the operative agreements on reconsideration (albeit Donna maintains below 
the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement should be enforced). Then, the district court ruled 
that the higher interest rate was not authorized by shareholders and, consequently, the higher 
interest rate in the Letter Agreements was not "lawful" (albeit Donna maintains this was error, too, 
for the reasons discussed below). (R. 3349-50 (A. 94-95), 602 (A. 1).) 
Irrespective of whether the district court was implicitly ruling that the Letter Agreements 
were illegal (another error if it did, as discussed below) or whether it had actually left the parties 
where it found them as a result of the illegal Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, the result 
must be the same (subject to Donna's other challenges below)-that the district court was required 
to leave the parties where it found them, which was with Donna holding the same 41,651.25 Series 
A Preferred Shares that she had held since May 31, 2008 according to AIA Services' records (as 
it had previously correctly ruled). (R. 2427 (A. 77), 2199.) It was error for the district court to 
employ an "equitable remedy" to reduce the number of Donna's Series A Preferred Shares to 
7,110 "[p ]ursuant to the recalculation and reamortization as performed by AIA." (R. 3349-50 (A. 
94-95) (emphasis added).) This is because "no court shall lend its aid to a man who grounds his 
action upon an immoral or illegal act. Therefore, there is no place for equitable considerations, 
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presumptions, or estoppels." Clark v. Utah Const. Co., 51 Idaho 587, 8 P.2d 454, 458 (1932) 
(emphasis added). Instead, at most, Donna must be left where the district court found her, holding 
41,651.25 Series A Preferred Shares, and at the very least her contractual rights for redemption 
would revert back to the amending articles of incorporation. (R. 725-26.) 
Lastly, it should be noted that the "recalculation and reamortization" performed by AIA 
Services was pure speculation on how it may have wished that it had redeemed Donna's shares, 
but that was not how her shares were redeemed since 1995 (as the district court noted). (Compare 
R. 2056-2213 (the actual redemptions) with R. 1067-1189 (the recalculation and reamortization, 
i.e., what did not happen and what AIA Services wished had happened).) "Th[is] speculation 
provides no facts relevant to summary judgment." Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 
774, 780 n.1, 251 P.3d 602,608 n.1 (2011). Accordingly, the district court's erroneous decision 
was also based on the purest of speculation, which is a separate basis for reversal. 
c. The District Court E"ed by Not Enforcing the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder 
Agreement as to Donna and AJA Services Because the Illegal Portions of that 
Agreement Involving Reed Could Have Been Severed, Donna Was Not In Pari Delicto 
and Other Exceptions Also Apply to Her. 
While Donna agrees that the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement is illegal and 
unenforceable as to Donna, Reed and AIA Services, the district court erred by not enforcing that 
Agreement as to Donna and AIA Services, and the provisions regarding Reed should be severed 
(those terms are meaningless anyway). (R. 2425 (A. 75).) Thus, the Agreement should be enforced. 
If an agreement is illegal, a court may sever the illegal portions of an agreement and enforce 
the non-illegal portions. Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 611, 200 P.3d 1153, 1160 (2008). 
A court may also enforce an agreement when one party is more innocent or when the complaining 
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parties are not intended beneficiaries. Id. at 611 (quantum meruit); Minnelusa Co. v. A.G. 
Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321 (Col. 1996) (not intended beneficiary); McShane v. Quillin, 47 
Idaho 542, 277 P. 554, 559 (1929) (in pari delicto exception). A corporation may not disavow its 
obligations. LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120,369 P.2d 45 (1962) (corporation may not 
invalidate an illegal redemption agreement). See AL4 Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 575, 261 P.3d 
at 852 (Jones, J., concurring). ("This does not necessarily mean that any contract made in 
contravention of any corporate governance statute is automatically void and unenforceable. Each 
case should be decided on its own merits."). 
Here, the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement should still be enforced as to 
Donna and AJA Services only. (R. 617-25 (A. 16-24).) Unlike her ex-husband Reed, Donna is in 
an entirely different position, and all of the exceptions to the illegality doctrine overwhelmingly 
weigh in her favor. And, most importantly, Donna needs a contractual remedy and closure. 
First, there is no question that Donna is the least guilty party. She also has no high school 
diploma or college degree. (R. 2350.) Donna was not represented by counsel for entry into the 
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement and she had no knowledge of LC.§ 30-1-6 (A. 151-
52). (R. 623, 2350-51.) Donna is a minority preferred shareholder with "no right ... to receive notice 
of or to vote at any regular or special shareholder meeting of stockholders." (R. 726 § 4.2.8.) In 
other words, Donna could not call a shareholder meeting to authorize capital surplus nor did she 
have any other rights as a common shareholder to vote at such a meeting. (Id.) J.C. § 30-1-6 
(repealed) (A. 151-52). Indeed, the one right she does have-to designate a person to the board-
has been repeatedly denied. (R. 2352.) Donna's Series A Preferred Shares was the key payment 
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for her divorce. (R. 532-600.) 
On the other side of the equation, AIA Services was represented by in house counsel (Dan 
Spickler) and outside counsel for entry into the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, both 
of whom attended the March 7, 1995 shareholder and board meetings. (R. 623, 3476, 3485, 3524, 
3554.) John and Connie were the majority common shareholders of AIA Services and were both 
attorneys (R. 879-80 n.1, 880, 2225-38), and they are "presumed to know the law." Miller v. Smith, 
7 Idaho 204, 61 P. 824, 827 (1900). They could have called a special shareholder meeting and 
obtained a separate shareholder resolution authorizing capital surplus. (R. 2900-05.) John, Beck 
and Cashman were directors of AIA Services in 1996, while John was also President. (R. 974-75.) 
They owed Donna fiduciary duties, and the Individual Defendants and AIA Services are who 
wanted to redeem Reed's shares. (R. 602-25 (A. 1-24), 1813-30, 1843, 3476-3565.) AIA Services, 
through the direction and control of the Individual Defendants, could have and should have paid 
Donna long ago-they are the cause of the present predicament. (E.g., R. 2342-47, 2867-72, 3614-
27 (A. 135-47).) In sum, Donna is not in pari delicto. McShane, 277 P. at 559. 
Second, for the same reasons discussed above, this Court should hold that AIA Services 
and the Individual Defendants may not have the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement or the 
Letter Agreements declared illegal or invalidated. Minnelusa Co., 929 P.2d 1321; La Voy Supply 
Co., 84 Idaho 120,369 P.2d 45; AL4 Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 575,261 P.3d at 852. And, even 
if this Court rejects this argument, then it should create a remedy for her under quantum meruit. 
Farrell, 146 Idaho at 611, 200 P.3d at 1160. 
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As such, Donna requests that this Court sever Reed as a party to the 1996 Series A Preferred 
Shareholder Agreement, sever the recitals from that Agreement, and sever all of the provisions 
except for Sections l(a) and (c), which are merely the same contractual rights that she already had 
under the Letter Agreements. (R. 617-25 (A. 16-24).) 
d. No Further Shareholder Vote Was Necessary for the Interest Rate Increase or 
Shortened Redemption Amortization Period Because the January 11, 1995 Letter 
Agreement Was Authorized by AL4 Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation, 
Which Expressly Authorized the Use of Capital Surplus Pursuant to J.C. § 30-1-6. 
The district court erred when it declined to address the authorization to use capital surplus 
under AIA Services' amended articles of incorporation on reconsideration. (R. 3349 n.3 (A. 94 
n.3).) The district court also failed to address the issue in its other three decisions. (R. 2413-30 (A. 
63-80), 2601-10 (A. 81-90), 3802-04 (A. 101-03).) This was error because AIA Services was 
authorized to use capital surplus under its amended articles of incorporation at the time the January 
11, 1995 Letter Agreement was entered into This is fatal to AIA Services and the Individual 
Defendants' argument and dispositive. Under then-existing Idaho law: 
A corporation shall have the right to purchase .. .its own shares, but purchases ofits 
own shares ... shall be made only to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned 
surplus available therefor, and, if the articles of incorporation so permit or with 
the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, 
to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor. 
I.C. § 30-1-6 (repealed) (emphasis added) (A. 151-52.) 
When Donna and AIA Services entered into the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement (R. 
602-04 (A. 1-3)), AIA Services' amended articles of incorporation expressly authorized the use of 
capital surplus in accordance with I.C. § 30-1-6 (repealed): 
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The corporation shall have the right to purchase its own shares, whether direct 
or indirect, to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available 
therefor and to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus 
available therefor. 18 
(R. 681, Article Twelfth (A. 41) (emphasis added).) The plain language ofl.C. § 30-1-6 states that 
if capital surplus is authorized, then there is no limitation on the redemption price, payments terms, 
interest rate or amortization schedule. I.C. § 30-1-6 (repealed) (A. 151-52.) Since there was capital 
surplus, the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement legally provided that: 
Effective February 1, 1995, regardless of the outcome of the private placement, 19 
the monthly preferred stock redemption payments shall be converted from a fifteen 
year amortization at prime rate less 1-1/2% to a ten-year payout at prime rate plus 
1/4% ... 
(R. 602 (A. 1).) Further, the modification ofDonna's redemption terms was additionally authorized 
under then-applicable 1987 amended articles of incorporation. (R. 660 § 4.12 (A. 36 § 4.12.) 
Thus, AIA Services was lawfully required, without exception, to accrue interest at prime 
plus V4% and to fully redeem Donna's Series A Preferred Shares in ten years--on or before 
December 2, 2003, which is confirmed by AIA Services' payments as reflected in its financial 
statements and year-end accounting work papers. (R. 2056-2213.) Moreover, AIA Services' board 
of directors and common shareholders also authorized the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement and 
the increased interest rate and shorter amortization period. (3476-3565.) Indeed, if AIA Services 
18 Incredibly, AJA Services actually repealed Article Twelfth on April 11, 1995 (three months after it had 
entered into the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement to redeem Donna's shares), when those amended articles were 
superseded and replaced. (R. 685-702 (A. 45-62).) This was fatal to the legality of Reed's redemption. (Id.) AJA 
Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 559-67, 261 P.3d at 836-44. 
19 As this Court is well aware, "AJA Services failed to raise the necessary funds through the private 
placement." AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 557,261 P.3d at 834. However, the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement 
confirms that AJA Services promised to pay Donna in ten years with interest accruing at prime plus 1/4% regardless 
of whether the funds were raised to redeem Reed's shares. (R. 602 (A. 1).) 
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had paid Donna in the shorter (ten-year) amortization period as promised, it would have saved 
over $100,000 in interest expense. (Compare R. 3328-33 with R. 3334-37.) 
Thus, the district court committed reversible error here, too. 
e. AJA Services May NOT Impair Donna's Contractual Rights by Amending Its Articles 
o(Incorporation to Exclude the Capital Surplus Authorization. 
The district court erred by not considering or addressing the argument that the January 11, 
1995 Letter Agreement could not be impaired by AJA Services' amendments to its articles of 
incorporation, which effectively repealed the amended articles authorizing capital surplus. (R. 
2413-30 (A. 63-80), 2601-10 (A. 81-90), 3346-51 (A. 91-96), 3802-04 (A. 101-03).) 
"[A] corporation cannot impair the obligation of its contracts with third persons by the 
simple expedient of amending its articles of incorporation." Disabled American Veterans v. 
Hendrixson, 340 P.2d 416,418 (Utah 1959); accord Fisher v. Intermountain Building & Loan 
Ass'n, 55 Idaho 326, 42 P.2d 50, 54 (1935); Davidson v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 817 
F. Supp. 611,616 (D.C. E.D. Va. 1993). 
Here, since AJA Services had authorization to use capital surplus under LC. § 30-1-6 when 
it entered into the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement with Donna, AJA Services may not impair 
Donna's contractual obligations through its subsequent amendments to its articles ofincorporation. 
(R. 602 (A. 1 ), 681 (A. 41 ), 685-702 (A. 45-62).) This Court should adopt this rule of law because 
it would simply be unfair for a corporation to get out of its obligations by simply amending its 
articles of incorporation to impair its contractual obligations with others. Thus, the district court 
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erred because AIA Services could not improperly amend its articles to impair Donna's rights. 20 
f. Assuming that the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement Is Determined by this 
Court to Also Be Unenforceable at Is Illegal). Then that Illegal 1996 Agreement Does 
Not Impact the Legality ofthe January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement. 
The district court originally correctly held that the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement 
could not be made void through the execution of the illegal 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder 
Agreement. (R. 24-26 (A. 26-27).) Then, the district court erred when it apparently abandoned that 
ruling at the time that granted reconsideration and subsequently denied Donna's reconsideration. 
(R. 3346-51 (A. 91-96), 3802-04 (A. 101-03).) This Court should correct this error, too. 
"[A] contract could not be both void and in full force and effect at one and the same time." 
Hill v. Wilkinson, 60 Idaho 243, 90 P.2d 696, 699 (1939); Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 909, 
204 P.3d 1114 (2009) ("Since an accord and satisfaction is a substituted contract, the essentials of 
a valid contract must be present"); Walter v. Balogh, 619 N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ind. 1993); Morfeld 
v. Andrews, 579 P.2d 426, 429 (Wy. 1978); Shinn v. Edwin Yee, Ltd., 553 P.2d 733, 745 (Hawaii 
1976) (An illegal "amendatory agreement could have no effect and the original contract must 
stand"); Tilman v. Talbert, 93 S.E.2d 101, 103 (N.C. 1956) ("A subsequent illegal agreement by 
the parties cannot affect a previous fair and lawful contract between them in relation to the same 
subject"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 279 cmt. b (1981) ("Thus, if the substituted 
contract is voidable, it discharges the original duty until avoidance, but on avoidance of the 
substituted contract the original duty is again enforceable"). 
20 The April 11, 1995 amended and restated articles of incorporation does not reference the March 8, 1989 
amended articles of incorporation. (R. 686 (A. 46).) Instead, it contains the catch-all language that the amendments 
"supersede the original Articles of Amendment and all previous amendments thereto." (Id.) 
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Here, if this Court does not enforce the illegal 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder 
Agreement as requested above, then this Court should hold that the legal and enforceable January 
11, 1995 Letter Agreement cannot be superseded, substituted, amended or replaced by the illegal 
1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement. (R. 602-04 (A. 1-3), 617-25 (A. 16-24).) Thus, 
Donna's contractual rights would revert back to the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement. 
g. AL4 Services Had Sufficient Earned Surplus to Redeem Donna's Shares When She 
Exercised Her Mandatory Right o(Redemption on December 3, 1993. 
The district court erred when it failed to rule that Donna's redemption complied with LC. 
§ 30-1-6 because AIA Services had $3,948,262 in sufficient earned surplus at the time Donna 
exercised her mandatory redemption rights for her $2,000,000 in Series A Preferred Shares. (R. 
2413-30 (A. 63-80), 2601-10 (A. 81-90), 3346-51 (A. 91-96), 3802-04 (A. 101-03).) 
Here, when Donna exercised her right for the mandatory redemption of her shares on 
December 2, 1993 (R. 525-26), AIA Services had $3,948,262 in earned surplus, 21 which was more 
than sufficient to authorize the redemption of Donna's shares (only $2,000,000 in earned surplus 
was required to redeem Donna's 200,000 Series A Preferred Shares ($10 per share)). (Id.; R. 652-
53 (A. 28-29), 3308.) I.C. § 30-1-6 (repealed) (A. 151-52.) Since there was more than sufficient 
earned surplus when Donna exercised her redemption rights and because AIA Services elected to 
pay over time, the bell cannot be un-rung-Donna's redemption obligations were authorized from 
21 The district court also erroneously ruled that AIA Services "at no time possessing assets in excess of 
liabilities since 1993." (R. 3348 (A. 93).) AIA Services financial statements (which are statutory balance sheet 
financial statements) showed assets exceeding liabilities by over $6,000,000 at year-end 1993. (R. 3308.) Moreover, 
as Richard Riley (AIA Services' former attorney) testified, the fair value of AIA Services was significantly more than 
the amount stated on its balance sheets, which did not place a fair value on assets. (R. 772-73.) 
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that point forward. This conclusion is supported by the plain meaning of LC. § 30-1-6. There is 
nothing ambiguous about that statute. And, once Donna's redemption was legally authorized, she 
could agree to modify those terms with AIA Services. (R. 660 § 4.12 (A. 36 § 4.12).) Further, the 
board of directors and shareholders also separately authorized the modified terms and specifically 
the January 11, 1995 Agreement. (R. 3476-3565.) 
h. AL4 Services' Shareholders and Board o(Directors Authorized the Higher Interest 
Rate and Shorter Amortization Period in the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement. 
The district court erred when it held on reconsideration, and failed to correct in a 
subsequent reconsideration, that "[i]t is now uncontroverted that AIA shareholders never voted to 
pay a higher interest rate than that authorized by the Articles oflncorporation." (R. 3349 (A. 94), 
3802-03 (A. 101-02).) In reality, AIA Services' shareholders approved and acquiesced in the 
higher interest rate, and the directors had the power to authorize the increased rate, which they did. 
First, AIA Services' shareholders expressly authorized the January 11, 1995 Letter 
Agreement at the March 7, 1995 shareholder meeting. (9/22/16 Bond Deel., Ex. 3-6.) Not 
surprisingly, John had his lieutenant JoLee Duclos provide the incorrect testimony and evidence 
that the district court erroneously relied upon (R. 3349 (A. 94) (citing R. 2707-20).) Ms. Duclos, 
like John, has no credibility. It is easy to see why. She only submitted the shareholder meeting 
minutes for obvious reasons. 
She is incorrect. The notice sent to the shareholders expressly provided that shareholder 
approval was requested for "[a]ll other corporate actions necessary to recapitalize and reorganize 
the Company .. .in accordance with the reorganization plan approved by the Board of Directors." 
(R. 3505.) The March 7, 1995 Board Meeting Resolutions expressly addressed and authorized the 
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January 11, 1996 Letter Agreement, and directed AIA Services' officers to negotiate and modify 
the terms for redeeming Donna's shares. (R. 3499.) The elements of the "Reorganization Plan" 
are listed in the index to the Disclosure Statement, and include the "Redemption of Donna's Series 
A Preferred Stock." (R. 3510 (emphasis added).) The acceleration of the redemption of Donna's 
Series A Preferred Shares and the increased interest rate were specifically disclosed and discussed 
in the "Reorganization Plan" portion of the Disclosure Statement. (R. 3416 (emphasis added).) 
.. . any remaining shares will be redeemed over a ten-year period. Begging 
February 1, 1995, monthly redemption payments will be computed on a ten year 
amortization at the prime rate ofthe First Interstate Bank plus~% 
(R. 3416 (emphasis added).) AIA Services' shareholders expressly voted for and approved the 
"Reorganization Plan" (by checking a box indicating "FOR the Reorganization Plan ... "). (R. 
3563.) The proxies sent to the shareholders included the same "[a]ll other corporate actions 
necessary to recapitalize and reorganize the Company .. .in accordance with the reorganization 
plan approved by the Board of Directors." (R. 3562, viii. (emphasis added).) The shareholders 
overwhelmingly approved the Reorganization Plan by a vote of 926,698.07 in favor of the plan 
and 6,688.09 against. (R. 3555, 3557-58.) 
Moreover, even if the shareholders had not approved the higher interest rate, at a minimum, 
the Individual Defendants (and AIA Services) have waived the right to challenge the Letter 
Agreements and any alleged deficiencies in the shareholder notices or votes (including any alleged 
failure to amend the articles) for acquiescing in the transactions for decades. See Rowland v. 
Rowland, 102 Idaho 534, 538-540, 633 P.2d 599, 603-605 (l981);Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Rock 
Creek Mining Co., 449 F.2d 664, 667-68 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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Second, there is no authority that the undersigned could find that requires more than board 
of director approval for the higher interest rate. And the board expressly approved the higher rate. 
Thus, the district court separately erred in this regard. 
"Each corporation shall have the power ... To make contracts and guarantees and incur 
liabilities, borrow money at such rates ofinterest as the corporation may determine, issues its notes, 
bonds, and other obligations ... " I.C. § 30-1-4(h) (repealed) (A. 149-50). "All corporate powers 
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall 
be managed under director of, a board of directors except as may be otherwise provided in this act 
or the articles of incorporation." I.C. § 30-1-35 (repealed) (A. 154-55). See also Sanderson v. 
Salmon River Canal Co., 45 Idaho 244,263 P. 32 (1927) (holding that directors had the power 
and authority to borrow money and execute bonds and mortgages without shareholder approval). 
Here, the district court's decision is not supported by any applicable authority, and the 
above-referenced authorities wholly undermine that decision. (R. 3348-50 (A. 93-95).) Moreover, 
on January 12, 1995 (one day after the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement was signed), AIA 
Services' board of directors authorized and ratified the terms of the January 11, 1995 Letter 
Agreement. (R. 3477, 3480-83.) Specifically, the board resolution states: 
That the letter agreement dated January 11, 1995 between the corporation and the 
holder of the corporation's Stated Value Preferred Stock, and the actions taken by 
the corporation's officers in negotiating and entering into such agreement on behalf 
of the corporation, be and hereby are ratified and confirmed; and that the 
corporation's officers be and hereby are authorized and directed to carry out such 
agreement in accordance with its terms. 
(R. 3480.) This was further authorized by AIA Services' bylaws. (R. 2906 § 4.4, 2912 § 5.2(b), 
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2914 §§ 6.1 and 6.2.) Thus, the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement was duly authorized by AIA 
Services' board of directors and nothing else was required. (R. 602-04 (A. 1-3).) 
Third, the issue is also a red-herring. Had AIA Services actually paid Donna in ten years 
at the higher interest rate as agreed and promised, AIA Services would have actually paid over 
$100,000 less in interest to Donna. (Compare R. 3328-33 with R. 3334-37.) It is difficult to 
imagine how a corporate decision that would have, and should have, resulted in AIA Services 
saving money would require shareholder approval before entering into that modification. (R. 602 
(A. 1).) After all, Donna had the right to consent to modifications of her rights and preferences, 
and she did so through the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement. (R. 602-04 (A. 1-3), 660 § 4.12 
(A. 36 § 4.12.) Thus, the district court erred, once again, for the three reasons stated above. 
L AL4 Services' Amended Articles o(lncorporation Authorized the January 11, 1995 
Letter Agreement. 
The district court erred because AIA Services' amended articles of incorporation, which 
were adopted by the shareholders, expressly authorized Donna to consent to modifications of her 
rights and preferences. (R. 660 § 4.12 (A. 36 § 4.12).) Thus, she had the right, so long as there was 
mutual consent with AIA Services, to increase the interest rate paid to her, which occurred. 
A corporation has the general power to engage in any business activities. I.C. § 30-1-4 
(repealed) (A. 149-50). In addition, a corporation's articles of incorporation must indicate "the 
designation of each class and a statement of the preferences, limitations and relative rights in 
respect of the shares of each class." I.C. § 30-1-54(t) (repealed) (A. 162-63). The articles may also 
include "[a]ny provision, not inconsistent with law, which the incorporators elect to set forth in 
the articles of incorporation for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation ... " I.C. § 
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30-l-54(f) (repealed) (A. 162-63). The mandatory redemption rights contained in articles of 
incorporation are a contract between the shareholder and the corporation. Franklin Life Ins. Co. 
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 415 F. Supp. 602,613 (D.C. Ill. 1978). 
A contract may be modified by mutual consent of the parties. Ore-Ida Potato Prod., Inc. 
v. Larsen, 83 Idaho 290,293,362 P.2d 384,385 (1961). 
Here, the district court erred because AIA Services' amended articles of incorporation 
authorized Donna to agree with AIA Services to modify provisions pertaining to her Series A 
Preferred Shares. (R. 660 § 4.12 (A. 36 § 4.12).) When the shareholders voted and authorized the 
amended articles of incorporation, they unanimously authorized Donna to consent to any 
modifications of the provisions pertaining to the Series A Preferred Shares. (Id.; R. 662.) 
The rights and preferences hereby conferred on the Series A Preferred Stock shall 
not be changed, altered or revoked without the consent of the holders of the majority 
of the Series A Preferred Stock outstanding at the time. 
(R. 660 § 4.12 (A. 36 § 4.12).) Because the shareholders authorized Donna and AIA Services to 
change or alter her preferences under the terms of the amended articles of incorporation, no further 
shareholder consent was required to enter into the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement or the 
subsequent ones. (R. 602-04 (A. 1-3), 608-12 (A. 7-11), 614-15 (A. 13-14), 617-25 (A. 16-24).) 
Indeed, AIA Services would have actually saved over $100,000 by paying Donna over a shorter 
period of time (and at the higher interest rate) had it simply paid her as it was contractually 
obligated to do, instead of using her money for other purposes. (Compare R. 3328-33 with R. 3334-
37; R. 2867-72, 2342-47.) Consequently, the district court's decision was, once again, error. 
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j. The Defendants Cannot Ask this Court to Void the Letter Agreements or to 
Recalculate the Interest and Principal Payments Made to Donna and the Number of 
Her Series A Shares that Were Redeemed with Each Payment. 
The district court erred because, assuming the higher interest rate and shorter amortization 
period were not authorized, the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement would have been, at most, ultra 
vires and not subject to an "equitable remedy." (R. 3802-03 (A. 101-02).) Indeed, like many of 
Donna's other arguments, the district court never even addressed the ultra vires issue. (Id.) 
"Ultra vires" means: "Unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a 
corporate charter or by law." BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY (10th ed.2014). The then-existing Idaho 
Code section on ultra vires acts, I.C. § 30-1-7 (repealed), provides in pertinent part: 
30-1-7 Defense of ultra vires. 
No act of a corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real or personal property 
to or by a corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was 
without capacity or power to do such act or to make or receive such conveyance or 
transfer, but such lack of capacity or power may be asserted: 
I.C. § 30-1-7 (repealed) (A. 152-53). See also Scona, Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 
985 P.2d 1145 (1999) (explaining how a party lacks standing to challenge ultra vires acts unless 
that party falls within the ambit of permissible parties); 7 A FLETCHER Cvc. CORP.§ 3407 (2016) 
("It is the policy of the law to look with disfavor upon the defense of ultra vires ... "); accord 
Rowland, 102 Idaho at 538-540, 633 P.2d at 603-605 (consent through acquiescing in acts). 
There are three limited exceptions that provide an exception to challenge an ultra vires act. 
I.C. § 30-1-7(a)-(c) (repealed) (A. 152-53). However, none of them apply here. Simply put, the 
district court's finding that it "is now uncontroverted that AIA shareholders never voted to pay a 
higher interest rate than that authorized by the Articles of Incorporation" is not supported by any 
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provision in LC.§ 30-1-7. Id. (R. 3349 (A. 94) (emphasis added).) 
First, these consolidated lawsuits are not proceedings by and not an action by the Attorney 
General. (R. 22-25, 54-63, 74-84, 3367-77, 3378-88.) Thus, I.e.§ 30-1-7(c) does not apply. 
Second, these consolidated lawsuits do not involve proceedings by a shareholder against 
AIA Services to enjoin an act or transfer of property. (R. 22-25, 54-63, 74-84, 3367-77, 3378-88.) 
Thus, I.C. § 30-1-7(a) does not apply. 
Third, these consolidated lawsuits are not proceedings by AIA Services or another 
permissible party (i.e., a receiver, trustee, legal representative or derivative action) on behalf of 
AIA Services against incumbent or former officers or directors. (R. 22-25, 54-63, 74-84, 3367-77, 
3378-88.) Thus, I.e.§ 30-1-7(b) does not apply. 
Accordingly, the district court erred by setting aside the Letter Agreements or invalidating 
the higher interest rate that has been paid to Donna since 1995 because AIA Services and the 
Individual Defendants do not fall within the ambit of parties who may challenge those corporate 
actions by AIA Services. 
k. AL4 Services and the Individual Defendants Are Estopped from Challenging the 
Letter Agreements. 
The district court also erred when it failed to rule that AIA Services and the Individual 
Defendants were estopped from challenging the Letter Agreements or the higher interest rate. 
It is well-settled that the doctrine of ultra vires when invoked for or against corporation 
should not be allowed to prevail where it would defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong 
or the other party has received the benefit of the transaction; in such case the party was estopped. 
Meholin v. Carlson, 17 Idaho 742, 107 P. 755 (1910); First Nat'l Bank v. Callahan Mining Co., 
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28 Idaho 627, 155 P. 673 (1916); Hansen v. Woods, 49 Idaho 656,290 P.379 (1930). 
For all of the reasons stated above (including in the Statement of the Facts), AIA Services 
and the Individual Defendants are estopped from challenging the authority or validity of the higher 
interest rate or shorter amortization period agreed to in the Letter Agreements. AIA Services and 
the Individual Defendants obtained the benefit of having all of Reed's shares redeemed ( and, 
indeed, without having to pay for all of them) in order to take the company a different direction 
(and used AIA Services' funds and assets for other purposes instead of paying Donna). (Id.) Under 
these circumstances, AIA Services and the Individual Defendants should be estopped from 
asserting ultra-vires as a defense. 
L AL4 Services Never Pleaded or Asserted a Claim to Obtain the Equitable Relief the 
District Court Granted. 
Finally, the district court also erred because the "equitable remedy" that it erroneously 
granted to AIA Services was never pleaded or requested in AIA Services' answer or through a 
counterclaim. (R. 3349 (A. 94).) 
'"A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary 
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal."' Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 
Idaho 802,807,229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010) (citations omitted). Thus, the district court erred by 





C. To the Extent that this Court Finds the Letter Agreements or Series A Preferred 
Shareholder Agreement to Be Valid and Enforceable as Requested in Section B Above, 
this Court Should Reverse the District Court Denial of Her Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on AIA Services' Default of the Payment Terms, the Number of 
Shares Held and that the Individual Defendants Should Be Liable Under Alter-
Ego/Piercing the Corporate Veil. 
1. Additional Applicable Standard of Review. 
On an appeal from a denial of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same 
summary judgment standard. Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 170, 296 P.3d 
373, 376 (2013). 
2. This Court Should Overrule Prior Precedent and Allow Parties to Appeal Orders 
Denying Motions for Summary Judgment 
In order for this Court to consider Donna's appeal of the denial of her motion for partial 
summary judgment, this Court must first agree with Donna on overruling prior precedent. 
This Court has long-held that "an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not 
subject to review-even after the entry of an appealable final judgment." Dominguez ex rel. Hamp 
v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 944 (2005) (citations omitted). Yet, this 
Court has also allowed parties to appeal orders denying summary judgment. See, e.g., Riley I, 157 
Idaho at 329, 336 P.3d at 262; Morgan v. State, Dept. of Public Works, 124 Idaho 658, 661, 62 
P.2d 1080, 1083-84 (1993). Other jurisdictions allow parties to appeal the denial of summary 
judgment. Cf Muir v. Council 2 Washington State Council of County & City Employees, Local 
1849, 154 Wn.App. 528,529,225 P.3d 1024, 1025 (Wa. Ct. App. 2009); Gackstetter v. Frawley, 
135 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1268, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 333, 341-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
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Indeed, the Legislature expressly gave this Court the power to "reverse, affirm or modify 
any order or judgment appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or order to be 
entered ... " I.C. § 1-205 (emphasis added). 
Thus, this Court should harmonize the apparent inconsistency as to the right to appeal an 
order denying summary judgment by overruling the prior precedent and allowing parties to appeal 
orders denying summary judgment after a final judgment is entered. This is also a logical and 
efficient extension of appeals. However, this Court should limit review of decisions denying 
summary judgment so long as summary judgment was not denied based on disputed facts after a 
trial on the merits as to those factual issues. E.g., Herring v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 81 
Wn.App. 1, 14, 914 P.2d 67 (Wa. Ct. App. 1996). This limitation should not apply to issues of 
law. E.g., Washburn v. City of Federal Way, 178 Wn.2d 732,310 P.3d 1275 (Wa. 2016).This will 
also promote efficiency by resolving certain issues on appeal without requiring a new trial. 
3. This Court Should Reverse the Denial of Donna's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the Default of the Agreements and the Number of Series A Preferred 
Shares that She Holds. 
The district court erred by not granting partial summary judgment regarding AIA Services' 
default of the Letter Agreements, Amended Articles of Incorporation or the Series A Preferred 
Shareholder Agreement. (R. 2427-28 (A. 77-78), 2607-08 (A. 87-88).) In addition, for the same 
reasons discussed above, this Court should, at a minimum, vacate the district court's orders 
declaring that Donna only holds 7,110 Series A Preferred Shares, which would result in the district 
court's original order being correct-that Donna holds the number of shares indicated in AJA 
Services' actual records-or 41,651.25 Series A Preferred Shares. 
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'"The burden of proving the existence of a contract and fact of its breach is upon the 
plaintiff, and one those facts are established, the defendant has the burden of pleading and proving 
affirmative defenses, which legally excuse performance."' Tapadeera, LLC v. Knowlton, 153 
Idaho 182, 186, 280 P.3d 685, 689 (2012) ( citation omitted). 
Here, there is no dispute that Donna's redemption commenced on December 2, 1993. (R. 
525-26, 2056-2213, 3320.) There is no dispute that AIA Services has not made a single payment 
to Donna since May 30, 2008. (R. 633, 635, 2352.) In other words, Donna has not been paid a cent 
in over nine years. (Id.) There is no dispute that, under any possible theory under any of the 
following Agreements or Amended Articles of Incorporation, AIA Services is in default. 
If this Court rules that Donna's Letter Agreements (including the January 11, 1995 Letter 
Agreement) or the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement are valid and enforceable, then there 
is no dispute that all of the elements necessary to prove AIA Services is in breach are present. (R. 
R. 602-04 (A. 1-3), 614-15 (A. 13-14), 617-25 (A. 16-24).) These contract provisions required the 
full redemption no later than ten years of December 2, 1995. (Id.) This did not happen. Thus, AIA 
Services is in default under these scenarios. 
Likewise, if this Court rules that Donna's contractual rights to enforce payment of her 
41,651.25 Series A Preferred Shares revert back to the applicable amended articles of 
incorporation, then all of the elements required to prove breach are present. (R. 722 §§ 4.2.5, 4.2.6.) 
These contract provisions requires AIA Services to fully redeem Donna's shares within fifteen 
years of December 2, 1993. (Id.) This did not happen. Thus, AIA Services is in default under this 
scenario. 
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Finally, there is no dispute that the number of Series A Preferred Shares is 41,651.25, worth 
$416,512 according to AIA Services records the day after the last payment was made to Donna on 
May 30, 2008. (R. 2199.) This is the amount the district court originally ruled that Donna held. (R. 
2427 (A. 77).) But even if this Court is inclined to use the number calculated by Donna's expert, 
41,509.69, R. 2293, it is essentially so close that the amounts are irrelevant to her. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's denial of Donna's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and order the district court to enter judgment in her favor against AIA 
Services in the amount of$416,512 or the less amount of $416,097. (R. 2199, 2293.) There is 
simply no reason to have a trial on these issues. 
4. The District Court Erred by Not Granting Partial Summary Judgment that the 
Individual Defendants Are Liable Because They Are the Alter-Egos of AJA Services. 
The district court erred and abused its discretion by not applying the alter-ego or piercing 
the corporate veil to correct the fraud and avoid the injustice inflicted upon Donna. (R. 2608 (A. 
88).) If there was ever a case for this Court to apply alter-ego and/or piercing the corporate veil, 
this is the case. It is difficult to imagine that this Court has seen such wide-spread and long-term 
corporate malfeasance. There can be no better case showing injustice. This Court can correct the 
wrongs inflicted on Donna now by ordering the district court to enter judgment against the 
Individual Defendants under the alter-ego and/or piercing the corporate veil theories. 
A court may22 disregard the corporate entity if two requirements are met. First, 
there must be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and individual no longer exist. Second, there must be a showing 
22 "'A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it ( 1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts 
within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise 
of reason.'" Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 271,281 P.3d at 108 (citations omitted) 
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that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation, an inequitable result will 
follow or that it would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 23 
Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 940, 950 P.2d 1275, 1279 (1997). 1 FLETCHER Cvc. 
CORP.§ 41.85 (2016) ("Piercing the corporate veil and the alter ego doctrine are applicable to 
causes of action in tort, in contract, or both"); 1 FLETCHER Cvc. CORP.§ 41.10 (2016) ("Under 
the alter ego doctrine, when a corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another 
corporation or person, the corporate form may be disregarded"). The decision to apply alter-ego 
or piercing the corporate veil was a decision the district court was required to make. Wandering 
Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 591-92, 329 P.3d 368, 373-74 (2014). 
Here, there is no reason for this Court to require Donna to continue spending money with 
expert witnesses and on attorneys' fees. There is no dispute that the Individual Defendants have 
used their unity of interest and ownership to loot AIA Services for the benefit of them and entities 
that they partially own. (E.g., R. 958-76, 1656-1728, 2342-47, 2867-72, 2925-38.) 
This Court can end these cases now. In order to do so, this Court need only look at the 
unrebutted expert testimony submitted by Donna, including, specifically as to the issues of alter-
ego and piercing the corporate veil. (R. 2342-47, 2867-72.) Next, this Court need only look to the 
over $12,000,000 judgment that John, Connie and Beck caused AIA Services to be inflicted with 
when they unlawfully guaranteed a loan for CropUSA, in violation of AIA Services amended 
articles of incorporation, and led the transfer of AIA's headquarters. (Id.; R. 726-29, 2867-82, 
23 I.C. § 30-1-622 cmt. (repealed) ("Shareholders may also possibly become liable for corporate obligations 
by their voluntary actions or by other conduct under the old common Jaw doctrine of 'piercing the corporate veil"'). 
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3136-38,24 3585-3612, 3635 n.3 and 3637 n.12.25) In fact, even the former attorneys for AIA 
Services and the Individual Defendants concede that much: 
If the California Court ultimately determines that AIA guaranteed the CropUSA 
loan and the lender pursues the remedies that are available to it under the guaranty, 
then AIA will have incurred a prohibited indebtedness under subsection 4.2.9(c) 
[of the amended articles of incorporation]. 
(R. 2361 (referring to R. 726-28).) While another AIA Services shareholder is challenging the 
GemCap loans and Settlement Agreement (which the undersigned believe are illegal or ultra vires), 
the present status of the affairs at AIA Services is that AIA Services has an over $12,000,000 
judgment against it. (R. 3141-42.) 
However, if the Gem Cap debacle is not enough to convince this Court, then this Court need 
only look to the over $1,800,000 that AIA Services, through the Individual Defendants, unlawfully 
lent to PERC, a non-credit worthy entity partially owned by John and Connie. (R. 726-29, 3089-
3133, 3567, 3614-26 (A. 135-47).) Those loans also violated AIA Services' amended articles of 
incorporation, which barred loans or guarantees for any entity other than a wholly owned 
subsidiary. (R. 2867-82.) Indeed, it is only fair that if the Individual Defendants have disregarded 
AIA Services' corporate structure and limitations, then it is appropriate and warranted for them to 
pay. This would also benefit the other minority shareholders, too. 
24 Although not contained in the record on appeal, John, Connie and Beck also signed another board 
resolution purportedly increasing the guarantee to an unlimited amount. This fact, however, is irrelevant to this appeal 
since Donna need only prove less than $1,000,000 in tort damages and illegal conduct to recover the sums owed on 
her Series A Preferred Shares, plus all accrued interest and attorneys' fees. 
25 This disclosure was first made to AIA's shareholders after certain of them had already caught wind of the 
illegal guarantees and settlement agreement and made derivative demands to take action. Those demands, like all of 
the others, were ignored. (E.g., 2017 WL 1458191.) Those transactions were concealed from the shareholders. 
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The bottom line is that the Individual Defendants have exerted their control over AIA 
Services in such a manner that the unity of interest and ownership is such that the separate 
personalities of AIA Services and the Individual Defendants no longer exist. It would be wholly 
unjust to leave Donna holding the bag for their extensive malfeasance. This Court should reverse 
the district court and order that judgments be entered against the Individual Defendants pursuant 
to the alter-ego and/or piercing the corporate veil. Then, the Individual Defendants can fight it out 
amongst themselves regarding contribution or indemnification. I.C. § 6-803. 
D. The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Donna's Fraud Claims Based on the 
Economic Loss Rule, this Court Should Re-Visit and Expand the Economic Loss Rule, 
and the District Court Erred When It Dismissed Donna's Unjust Enrichment Claim. 
1. Additional Applicable Standards of Review. 
When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6), [the Court] appl[ies] the same standard of review [the Court] appl[ies] to 
a motion for summary judgment. After viewing all facts and inferences from the 
record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for 
relief has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, 
but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,832,243 P.3d 642,648 (2010). 
Under notice pleading, 'a party is no longer slavishly bound to stating particular 
theories in its pleadings.' A complaint must merely state claims upon which relief 
may be granted, and pleadings should be liberally construed in the interest of 
securing 'a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case.' The technical rules 
of pleading have long been abandoned in Idaho, and the 'general policy behind the 
current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant with his or her day in 
court.' ... 'The key issue in determining the validity of a complaint is whether the 
adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against it.' 
Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 807, 229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010) (citations omitted). 
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2. The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Donna's Fraud Claims Based on the 
"Economic Loss Rule" and this Court Should Expand and Rename that Rule. 
a. The District Court Erred Because the "Economic Loss Rule" Only Applies to 
Negligence Claims Under Idaho Law and, Even if the Rule Applied to Donna's 
Intentional Tort Claims, this Court Should Create a New Special Exception. 
The district court erred when Donna's fraud claims were barred by the "Economic Loss 
Rule" because that Rule applies to negligence claims under Idaho law, and this Court should create 
a new special relationship or exception under that Rule. (R. 2418-21 (A. 68-71), 2606 (A. 86).) 
Under Idaho law, "[t]he economic loss rule applies to negligence cases in general." 
Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999) (emphasis added); accord 
Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling and Pump Co. Inc., 153 Idaho 735, 742-43, 291 P.3d 418 
(2011) (negligence claims barred by the Economic Loss Rule); Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, 
Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 790, 215 P.3d 505, 510 (2009) (same); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 
126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995) (same); Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 
Idaho 37, 41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) (same); Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., Inc., 99 
Idaho 462, 467-71, 583 P.2d 997, 1002-06 (1978) (same). 
There are two exceptions to the general rule which prevents a party from recovering 
purely economic loss in a tort claim; those two exceptions are, (1) where a special 
relationship exists between the parties, or (2) where unique circumstances require 
a reallocation of the risk. A special relationship exists "where the relationship 
between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty." The 
special relationship exception to the economic loss rule is an extremely narrow 
exception which applies in only limited circumstances. This Court has found a 
special relationship to exist in only two situations, ( 1) "where a professional or 
quasi-professional performs personal services [;]" and (2) "where an entity holds 
itself out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and by 
so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its performance of that function." 
Aardema, 147 Idaho at 792,215 P.3d at 512. 
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Although that it appears that this Court has never addressed the "special relationship" 
exception or the unique circumstance exception in the context of the fiduciary duties owed by 
directors or controlling shareholders of a corporation, this Court has recognized that "The 'special 
relationship' exception generally pertains to claims for personal services provided by 
professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers, and insurance agents." Nelson 
v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (Ct. App. 2004). This Court, however, 
"has never applied" the "unique circumstances exception to the economic loss rule." Blahd v. 
Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 302, 108 P.3d 996, 1002 (2005). 
This Court should reverse the district court's decision for the following reasons. 
First, Donna's torts are intentional ones, including fraud. (3367-77, 11-25.) Thus, under 
the authorities cited above, intentional tort claims are not barred by the Economic Loss Rule 
because they are not negligence actions. It appears that this Court has never squarely addressed 
this issue. The district court erred by barring Donna's fraud claims under the Economic Loss Rule. 
Second, this Court should carve out a new special relationship or a unique circumstances 
exception for directors, officers and shareholders who owe fiduciary duties. The Individual 
Defendants owed fiduciary duties at various times based on being directors, officers and/or 
controlling shareholders of AJA Services (or in the case of John, all three). (R. 958-76, 1813-30, 
1843, 2240-43, 2342-47, 2867-72, 2925-38, 2941-45.) 
"In Idaho, a director has a fiduciary responsibility to both the corporation and to 
shareholders." Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, 506, 492 P.2d 43, 45 (1972); 
Mccann v. Mccann, 152 Idaho 809, 814-15, 275 P.3d 824, 829-31 (2011); Steelman v. Mallory, 
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110 Idaho 510, 513, 716 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1986). Likewise, corporate officers owe duties to 
shareholders. E.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424, 427, 64 P.3d 953, 956 (2003). 
"Where majority or controlling shareholders in a close corporation breach their heightened 
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by utilizing their majority control of the corporation to 
their own advantage ... such breach .. .is actionable." McCann, 152 Idaho at 815 n.5; 19 AM. JuR. 
2D CORPORATIONS§ 1956(2016) ( discussing "the fiduciary obligation of dominant or controlling 
stockholders or directors"); l2B FLETCHER Cvc. CORP. § 5810 (2016) ("When majority 
shareholders exercise their right to control the corporation, they occupy fiduciary relationship 
toward minority shareholders ... Their transactions ... must not amount to a wanton destruction of 
the rights of the minority"); l2B FLETCHER Cvc. CORP.§ 5811 (2016) ("majority shareholders 
can violate their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by causing selective corporate 
purchase of its shares"). 
Accordingly, this Court should create a new special relationship exception or carve out a 
unique circumstances exception based on the fiduciary duties owed by officers, directors and 
controlling shareholders of a corporation. On this basis, this Court should also reverse. 
Third, the district court separately erred when, on reconsideration, it found "the fraud 
claims in the instant matter duplicative of Donna's breach of fiduciary duties claims." (R. 2606 
(A. 86).) The district court correctly reconsidered, and held that Donna's breach of fiduciary duties 
and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims are not barred by the Economic Loss Rule. 
(R. 2606-07 (A. 86-87).) The district court questioned Donna's fraud and constru~tive fraud claims 
on the basis that they "are merely a regurgitation of her claims for breach of fiduciary duties." (R. 
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2606 (A. 86). The district court's decision ignores the fact that constructive fraud arises from a 
fiduciary or special relationship. 
In its generic sense constructive fraud comprises all acts, om1ss1ons and 
concealments involving a breach oflegal or equitable duty, trust or confidence and 
resulting in damage to another. Constructive fraud usually arises from a breach 
of duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists; such relationship may be 
said to exist whenever trust or confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity 
and fidelity of another. 
McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 353 P.2d 760 (1960) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
In sum, there was no legal basis for the district court to bar Donna's fraud or constructive 
fraud claims, and those claims should not have been barred for the same reasons the district court 
changed its mind on the fiduciary duty claims. (R. 2606-07 (A. 86-87).) 
b. This Court Should Clarifv and Expand the "Economic Loss Rule" and Rename It the 
"Independent Duty Doctrine". 
Moreover, this Court should expand and clarify that Rule to specifically exclude torts that 
arise independently from any contractual obligations and instances when parties make 
misrepresentations to other party to induce them to enter into a contract. 
[T]he economic loss rule does not bar recovery in tort when the defendant's alleged 
misconduct implicates a tort duty that arises independently of the terms of the 
contract ... The test is not simply whether an injury is an economic loss arising from 
a breach of contract, but rather whether the injury is traceable also to a breach of a 
tort law duty of care arising independently of the contract. 
Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wn.2d 380, 241 P.3d 1256 (Wa. 2010). See also 
Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 991, 102 P.3d 268, 274 (Cal. 2004) 
(holding that the economic loss rule did not bar a plaintiffs fraud and misrepresentation claim 
"because they were independent of [the defendant's] breach of contract."). The Washington 
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Supreme Court further "concluded that the term 'economic loss rule' was a misnomer and renamed 
the rule the 'independent duty doctrine' to more accurately describe how this court determines 
whether one contracting party can seek tort remedies against another party to the contract." 
Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers, Inc., 179 Wn.2d 84,312 P.3d 620 (2013); accord 
Jackowski v. Borchelt, Wn.2d 720,730,278 P.3d 1100, 1105 (Wa. 2010). 
Here, this Court should abandon the Economic Loss Rule consistent with the authorities 
cited above, rename it the Independent Duty Doctrine and expand that Doctrine to include 
misrepresentations made to induce a party to enter into a contract. 
c. Because Donna Is the Sole Series A Preferred Shareholder, She ls Not Required to 
Bring a Derivative Action to Assert Fraud Claims or Other Tort Claims. 
The district court also erroneously held that "Donna also appears to argue that the 
Individual Defendants fraudulently diverted AIA assets to themselves or to entities from which 
only they benefited. This theory requires Donna to bring a derivative action, not a personal action." 
(R. 2606 n.5.) This ruling was error because Donna is the sole Series A Preferred Shareholder and 
she is entitled to bring a direct, rather than derivative, action asserting fraud and other torts. 
It is well-settled in Idaho and other states that a shareholder may pursue a direct action for 
his or her sole benefit, rather than a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation.26 McCann 
v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809, 275 P.3d 824 (2011) ("[I]n a closely held corporation a minority 
shareholder may bring a direct action, rather than a derivative action, if the shareholder alleges 
harm to himself distinct from that suffered by other shareholders of the corporation or breach of a 
26 It does not appear that this Court has ever addressed a preferred shareholder's right to bring a direct, rather 
than derivative action. This Court can clarify this point of law, too. 
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special duty owed by the defendant to the shareholder."); Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 
513, 716 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1986) ("[W]e cannot agree with appellants' contention that this case 
should have been dismissed because it is a 'direct action' rather than a shareholder's derivative 
suit."); Wolfe v. American Savings and Loan Assoc. of Florida, 539 So.2d 606 (Fl. 1989) 
(preferred shareholder may assert direct claims); Security National Bank v. Peters, Writer and 
Christensen, Inc., 569 P.2d 875 (Col. 1977) (preferred shareholder may maintain a direct action). 
Here, Donna is the sole Series A Preferred Shareholder, and she also has special rights and 
privileges under AIA Services' amended articles ofincorporation that apply to her alone. (R. 724-
32, 2144-2213.) She is asserting direct fraud and other tort claims (including breach of fiduciary 
duties) against the Individual Defendants. (R. 11-25, 3367-77.) And, unless Donna is permitted to 
amend to include a prayer for punitive damages, she will be limited to recovering the $416,512.00 
in principal owed on her Series A Preferred Shares, plus all accrued interest (and attorneys' fees 
and costs), since it appears that AIA Services has no way of paying those sums. Indeed, this would 
also benefit the other minority shareholders because the Individual Defendants should have to pay, 
which would ultimately leave more assets and funds to distribute to them once other lawsuits have 
concluded. (E.g., R. 2342-47, 2867-72.) 
3. The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Donna's Unjust Enrichment Claim for 
Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted When Even the 
Individual Defendants Concede that She Adequately Pleaded the Claim. 
The district court erred when it ruled that Donna failed to state a claim for unjust 
enrichment in her Second Lawsuit. (R. 2421-23 (A. 71-73), .) Donna's allegations exceeded the 
minimal pleading requirements under Idaho law. 
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A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was a 
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the 
defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances 
that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to 
the plaintiff for the value thereof. 
Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 739, 184 P.3d 860, 864 
(2008). 
Both quantum meruit (implied-in-fact contracts) and unjust enrichment (implied-
in-law contracts) are 'measures of equitable recovery.' 'The application of 
equitable remedies is a question of fact because it requires a balancing of the parties' 
equities.' 
Clayson v. Zehe, 153 Idaho 228,232,280 P.3d 731, 735 (2012) (citations omitted). 
Here, Donna sufficiently stated a claim for unjust enrichment in her Second Lawsuit: 
52. Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation 
contained in other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of 
action. 
53. Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor have been 
conferred the benefit by Donna Taylor of obtaining operational and financial 
control over AIA Services. Through that conferred benefit, Beck, Cashman, John 
Taylor and Connie Taylor have looted AIA Services to their benefit and to the 
detriment of Donna Taylor. It would be unjust to allow Beck, Cashman, John 
Taylor and Connie Taylor to retain the benefits without justly compensating Donna 
Taylor. As a result, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor liable to Donna 
Taylor under the theory of unjust enrichment. 
54. As a direct and/or proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of 
Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor, they have been unjustly enriched 
and Donna Taylor has been damaged, and, is therefore entitled to judgment and/or 
relief on this claim in an amount to be proven at or before trial. 
(R. 22-23.) As noted above, Donna also incorporated all other allegations in the complaint to 
support her unjust enrichment claim. (R. 11-22.) Applying notice pleading standards, accepting 
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the allegations in the complaint as being true, and construing those allegations in Donna's favor 
as required, she more than adequately states a claim for unjust enrichment. The district court erred 
in concluding otherwise. (R. 2421-23 (A. 71-73), 2607 (A. 87), 3802-04 (A. 101-03).) Brown, 148 
Idaho at 807, 229 P.3d at 1169. In fact, in the district court's first order, it erroneously focused 
solely on the allegations in Donna's complaint in the First Lawsuit.27 (R. 2421-23 (A. 71-73).) 
To the extent that this Court will consider matters outside of the record, Donna presented 
more than sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her unjust enrichment claim. 
There is simply no dispute that Donna conferred a benefit upon the Individual Defendants 
when she consented, at their request, to allow Reed's shares to be redeemed-that spelled the 
begging of the long road to the end for AJA Services to the detriment of Donna. 
John's Executive Officer's Agreement, alone, provides more than sufficient evidence to 
establish this point as it confirms in the recitals that Reed's shares were being redeemed so that 
they could obtain operational and financial control over AJA Services. (R. 1843.) Indeed, the 
entire reorganization plan was contingent upon Donna's consent (one she wishes that she would 
have never given). (R. 602-25 (A. 1-24), 3476-3565.) Her consent led to Beck, Cashman and John 
entering into an Investment Agreement and Voting Agreement to ensure that they maintained 
control over AIA Services. (R. 1813-30, 2240-43.) 
In each of the circumstances below, a portion of the funds or assets could have been used 
to pay Donna in full and those transactions would never have occurred had she not consented to 
27 Donna is not appealing the dismissal of her unjust enrichment claim asserted in her First Lawsuit as limited 
solely to John's guarantee. 
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Reed's redemption and Reed not sold. Once the Individual Defendants obtained control, they 
determined where all of the money went and used the funds for their own unlawful purposes. 
First, the Individual Defendants used AIA Services' funds, assets and creditworthiness to 
fund other businesses and pay themselves millions of dollars. (R. 2342-47, 2867-72, 3009-40.) 
Second, the Individual Defendants had AIA Services lend over $2,000,000 to PERC, when 
it was unable to pay its bills and had tax liens asserted against it. (R. 3089-3133, 3614-3626 (A. 
135-47).) 
Third, the Individual Defendants used their control to guarantee loans for CropUSA with 
GemCap, enter into one-sided Settlement Agreements obligating AIA to pay over $12,000,000, 
and to transfer AIA's prized asset-its headquarters in Lewiston Idah~to GemCap as partial 
payment. (R. 1656-1728, 3136-38 (A. 132-34). 3585-3612 (A. 104-31), 3642-44.) 
Fourth, the Individual Defendants unlawfully redeemed over $600,000 of lower-priority 
common shares, which increased their ownership interest and control over AIA Services, while at 
the same time deprived Donna of being paid. (R. 3237-61.) 
Fifth, John Taylor (and Connie Taylor Henderson through her marriage to him) obtained 
over $2,729,000 in direct known compensation (Donna will never know where all of the money 
went) from AIA Services after obtaining operational and financial control over AIA Services (as 
confirmed in John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement, which was executed after the 
redemption of Reed's shares). (R. 1843-51, 3009-40, 3569-70.) 
The above are just a sampling of the malfeasance and illegal conduct that has occurred at 
the hands of the Individual Defendants after Donna conferred the benefit upon them to take 
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operational control over AIA Services. They obtained an appreciation of those benefits by and 
through director or indirectly obtaining millions of dollars, and it would be unjust to leave Donna 
without a remedy under these circumstances. Thus, the district court erroneously dismissed 
Donna's unjust enrichment claim. This Court should reverse the district court's dismissal of 
Donna's unjust enrichment claim. That claim is one for the jury. 
E. The Rule 54{b) Judgment Should Be Vacated. 
If this Court reverses, this Court should similarly order that the Rule 54(b) Judgment be 
vacated consistent with this Court's opinion. (R. 3438-40.) Lepper v. Eastern Idaho Health 
Services, Inc., 160 Idaho 104, 116,369 P.3d 882, 894 (2016). 
F. This Court Should Order a District Court Judge Be Assigned on Remand. 
While Donna appreciates the long and complex history of these cases (almost ten years, R 
1-3863), any confusion which may have impacted the district court's decisions, and with all due 
respect to Judge Brudie, Donna most respectfully believes this Court's assignment of a new judge 
would bring a fresh perspective to these cases and eliminate any possible concern of potential bias. 
Nevertheless, because this case has such a long and complex history, with close to 
ten years of litigation, this Court believes that a new judge would provide a much 
needed fresh perspective and would eliminate any concern of bias. Therefore, this 
Court Orders that the case on remand be assigned to a new district judge. 
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,283 P.3d 728 (2012). 
G. Donna Should Be Awarded Costs and Fees on Appeal or, Alternatively, the Award of 
Fees Should Be Reserved for When a Prevailing Party Is Named on Remand. 
1. This Court Should Award Costs to Donna on Appeal. 
This Court should award Donna costs. I.A.R. 40(a); Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 110 
Idaho 971,975, 719 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1986) (substantially prevailing party entitled to costs). 
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2. This Court Should Award Fees to Donna on Appeal Pursuant to J.C.§ 12-121 Based 
on Their Anticipated Frivolous Defense. 
If Donna prevails on this appeal, this Court should award attorneys' fees to her on appeal. 
I.A.R. 41(a). Based on the conduct of the Individual Defendants and their anticipated frivolous, 
unreasonable and lack of foundation defense of this appeal (including the lack of applicable 
authority), this Court should order the Individual Defendants to pay Donna's attorneys' fees. 
"In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." I.C. § 12-121. "An award of attorney fees under that statute 
will be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal only when this Court is left with the abiding 
belief that the entire appeal was ... defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." 
American Semiconductor.,lnc. v. Sage Silicon Solutions, LLC, 162 Idaho 119, _, 395 P.3d 338, 
346 (2017). The failure to cite applicable authority constitutes sufficient grounds to award fees. 
McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425,432,283 P.3d 742, 749 (2012). 
Here, for the reasons articulated in the Statement of the Facts (and the evidence cited 
therein) and based on the wide-spread corporate malfeasance that has resulted in the intentional 
refusal to pay Donna when there is no excuse to have not paid her over a decade ago, this Court 
should order the Individual Defendants to pay Donna's attorneys' fees on appeal for their illegal 
and frivolous conduct. (E.g., R. 2342-47, 2867-72.) 
3. Alternatively, this Court Should Reserve an Award of Fees for Remand. 
Since the redemption of Donna's shares is a commercial transaction between she and AIA 
Services, this Court should reserve an award of fees incurred by her on appeal to be determined by 
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the district court after a prevailing party is named on remand. (R. 602-04, 608-12, 649-738.) I.C. 
§ 12-120(3); Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,247 P.3d 620 (2010). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse and remand consistent with the arguments asserted above, and 
award Donna costs and attorneys' fees, or reserve the award of fees for remand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of August, 2017. 
By: ------4-.....-
Roderick 
Attorney for Appellant Donna J. Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 8th day of August, 2017, I caused to be served 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing to the following parties: 
Steve Wieland 
Mooney Wieland Smith & Rose PLLC 
405 S. 8th Street, Suite 295 
Boise, ID 83702 
56 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile - (208) 401-9218 
Email (pdf attachment) 
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS 
January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement ..................................................................... 1-3 
March 22, 1995 Letter Agreement ............................................................................. 5 
July 18, 1995 Letter Agreement ............................................................................ 7-11 
August 10, 1995 Letter Agreement .................................................................... 13-14 
July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement. .......................................... 16-24 
1987 AIA Services' Amended Articles oflncorporation .......................................... .25-38 
1989 AIA Services' Amended Articles oflncorporation (capital surplus authorized) ......... 39-44 
1995 AIA Services' Amended Articles oflncorporation (capital surplus withdrawn) ........ .45-62 
July 14, 2014 District Court Opinion and Order ..................................................... 63-80 
August 25, 2014 District Court Opinion and Order. ................................................ 81-90 
June 15, 2015 District Court Opinion and Order ..................................................... 91-96 
September 18, 2016 District Court Rule 54(b) Judgment.. ....................................... 97-100 
December 28, 2016 District Court Ruling ......................................................... 101-103 
2015 Illegal Settlement Agreement with GemCap re: $12,126,584.61 judgments .......... .104-131 
2011 Illegal Board Resolution for the Guarantee for the GemCap Loan ...................... 132-134 
2010 AIA Services loan to PERC for $680,365.85 .............................................. .135-137 
2011 AIA Services loan to PERC for $787,599.07 ............................................... 138-140 
2012 AIA Services loan to PERC for $457,650 ................................................... 141-143 
2013 AIA Services loan to PERC for $310,245 ................................................... 144-146 
2016 IRS Tax Lien filed against PERC for $540,434.21 ............................................. 14 7 
1995 Then Existing Pertinent Idaho Code Sections ............................................. .148-157 
Idaho Code section 30-1-4 (1995) (repealed) ..................................................... .149-150 
Idaho Code section 30-1-6 (1995) (repealed) ..................................................... .151-152 
Idaho Code section 30-1-7 (1995) (repealed) ..................................................... .152-153 
Idaho Code section 30-1-35 (1995) (repealed) .................................................... 154-155 
1995 Pocket Supplement for Then Existing Pertinent Idaho Code Sections .................. 158-164 
Idaho Code section 30-1-2 (1995) (repealed) ...................................................... 159-161 
Idaho Code section 30-1-54 (1995) (repealed)................................................. 162-163 
CWner L. Green, Esq. 
Green Law Offices 
P.O. Box 2597 
Boise, :tD 83701 
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Re: AIA Services Corporation/Donna Taylor 
Dear Cumer: 
;, 
1'bis letter -me:mori-al.izes our agreement oonoern!ng Donna J-. 
'raylor•s interest in All s~rvices corporation as the hol.der 0£ its 
Stated Value Preferred Stock and in the pending reorganiz~tion of 
thte company, incl.uding the contribution. of additional capit~l 
through a private placement to be conducted by J.G. Kinnard and 
Company, :tnoorporated. 1. 
1. Effective February 1, ·1995, regardless of the outcome of 
the pri-v-ate placement, the monthly preferred. stock redemption 
payments sha.11 be c::onver1:.Qd from a fifteen year amortization at -
prime :rate less. 1-1/2% to a ten-year payout at prime rate plus 
l/4%r to confoniwith the terms of the. anticipated nc;,ta paym.entto 
Reed· J. Taylor for re.dempt,ion -c,f his common stock. In addition, 
your client will be en1;itled to accelerate the redemption 
obligation upon 1apse of fiftectn days after defaul.t in payment of 
the 'prinoipa.l or ii:erest. _, 
. Further, Al'.A Services~ Corporation I s note or MtY note payable 
to Reed J. 'l'aylor t~r the ,6, 000-, ooo purehase price :tor his..· common 
shares will ba subordinated ·to the r$demption ·rights qf yc;,ur· client 
so t,hat ·a$&<1 J. ~e.ylo.r wlll rec,ai.v.e no principal p~ymentJ on slli~ 
nQtG until Donna. ~ayl.or 1 $ sto·ck has been complai:ely r1:1deemet;l. ~ead 
J. ~ay1cr wll1 receive ·no interet=t paYll',ents on the.note payable .to 
him if payrilents to Donna Taylor are in d&fault~ Shou.lcl Reed J. 
'l'ayl.or transfer hi;a :r;emaining 1131 494 shares of~ serv:tces c~c:,n 
stock to the ·Co:J:POration, directly or indirectly or af~ecuata a 
rec!uction or el~ination of his note in &Ollle other fashion, Donna 
Taylor·• e re4emption obligation shall become due and :f\Uly payable. 
. ., 
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2. In the interim prior to closing of the private placement, all 
of your client's existing claims are preserved and discovery may 
continue. An Se:z:vic:es ag~e~s to cooperate with you in setting a 
hearing, if the offering i~ tinsuceessful, within .sixty days after 
termination of tha o~fering. 
3. If the private pla.cem~t is successful, AJ:1. Stirvices will pay 
to Donna Taylor a lwnp sqm redemption payment of $700,000 plus 
$100,000 for professional tees inou.rred by your client in pursuing 
her cl.aims to date. In fa.ddition, to the extent the o~~ering 
proceeds exceed the minimum offering level o:t $5,350,000, AIA 
Services will pay your client each dollar of net offering proceeds 
in exce~s of the minimum up to the full amount of the · unpaid 
principal balance of the red.elUption price. !.f tha offering 
pz-oceeds exceed the minimum but do not reach thQ maximum, any 
unpaid principal balance of the redemption price will be paid in 
monthly install.lllents based 1,1pon the ten-year amortization at prime 
plus 1/4%. 
;, 
4. Conditioned upon the ;'successful completion of the private 
pI-a:c·ement and you:r- client ;:s racaipt of the foregoing paymentl!, 
Donna Taylor re1eas~s AIA services corporation and it subsidiaries, 
their respect! va ofticers; directors, sh~reholders, employees, 
affiliates and. other agents:.. in their official c_apacitiesj':§'sffromtal:l" 
Donna Tayler arising from .-said ctivorce action. Further, Donna 
Taylor's rights and proteo#.ions as a preferred shareholder which 
are set forth in the Amenq~d Articles of Incorporation shall be 
p:r:eservec,.. In addition, J;tUbject to the same cona.itionst Donna 
Tayl9r consents to, and agra.es that she will not assert dissenter's 
rigti.ts in connection with ~ii corporate transactions neceesary to 
effectuate tne l)rivate placement, including (without lil\\ii;:ation) 
uendment . ot the corporation's Articles of Incorporation to 
authorize ~e: creation o.f the neceassary preferred stock and 
wa::rr~nts.; the issua,nce of such securities to the private .plac•ent 
investo2:s., the Agency Agreement with J. G-. ~nnar4 an4 Comp~y, 
Incotpora.ted and the conduct of the privat:e placement in accordance 
therewith_, the uee of the proposed C~nfid~tial :Private Placement 
Memorandum representing i:J'iat .your client has consented to .all such 
trans.actions, i:he merger of Rich Campanaro •·s Delaware. corporation 
intc All. services corporat~o~ and all ·other ~ctions. necessary to 
achieve the. capital s~cture .(as of the .closing of the pri<Vate 
. placement) refl.ected jn ~~ Private Plac••nt Heaorandum. suoh 
corporate transactions will not be allowed to l)ecome eftec:ti ve 
unless th~ offering is successful; and therefore, your client shall . . 
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0660~9 P.04 
r.¢-1: '\fr1ive Cl.nf right• Qt bt prcij.l,l~ioed by h-or r;ionvent to 1 ~nd watve:r 
of di~senta~'• ~1ghtG in OQnnQcticn with thoae t~anaaat.iort~. 
lt tho ecrpo~ati¢n c¢mpl~t•lY redeem• yQU~ Qlient'• P~•t•rrsd 
~ook, oenn~ ~~?~or compl•tvly ~•laaAea J.:tA servieos ~rporatio~ 
es.nd $.t:.a cub•id.i~=-ie~, th.au- rup~ctiv• effiQers, dir&otora, 
dMr'i'h~l~e.rs, ~l.oyaea, ~tfiliates Zlfid ctlu1~ &g~ttta, ~d lteed ~, 
'.r .. y1or a.a an !nd.ividlU.l, tram &ll c:la.a,, • 
I! th!~ 1~ttur acau.~~t.ly 1tat~1 ~ur ~greGm~~t, pi~su 8ign 
and obtain jJ'Q\1? cli~nt1~ 5iqntture balO'ol; and fa~ e copy ct this 
:fU.l.J.~ axadtit•d l.atto~· to us a.ti •oon .aa riOllaibla. :tb•2tl.& Darlin and 
yoo, will mutU.&lly p'ftpa.re e. draft 'ct a dot,mit1v• csett.l.eint.nt 
aqtaam«nt i.nbOt'por«tihg ths to~egoi~g tarma ~nd ether dooumant• 
neo•••&x"Y t¢ e!iactU&t, the teP11Q ct t;.hia Agr•~aont,· 
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.. vi• tElacopy 
Ricba,:~ A. Ril~y, E•i• 
EBERLE, nrm!.:tN, KAOXNG, 'J!trlUIBOW 
· & McI<LVERN 
300 N. 6th street 
Bai•e, ID B3701 
Ra! 'l'aylol:' v. iitayl cir 
.GLO.- Fi.l.a,.No .. -.t. . AIUS- 0.0. o..o.1.. 
Oea.r Dic::kt 
Ju&"t a note to me~orialize o~r und~rstandin~ that the 
al'AortJ.z~tioo coneempl.ated Uhde.r tha l•tt'ilJ:' o:t January 11, 499-S (the 
Donna Taylo.r agreement) was tha~ reoa.lculated. payments would bEJgin 
i:n S'Qch an alCIOUht:. (as. of F~br11aq 1, 199S) i:hat tba al!loun~ d,.ue t.o 
Donna 'l'aylo:r: wo1.tld .be amortizs4 over ~ pe1::f.od cf tune wh:tcll w<n4ld 
be ten·. yea:rs :e;r~ni i::ha date the radelllptio.n ~gal'l (10'7 pa~en.1:11 
CODr:111~o.in9 en !'e~ruuy 1, 19'5) • · · . , 
· Would you kindly confin by way of a. Jligned fax copf of this 
· letter and advis.e AIA servia.as ··to..make the approp.t:-.iato ;idj\Ultll\Gnts 
to thoae ~~yments which alreaay h~ve ~ee~ made an~ wniob ~i11 be 
made under-the Donn~ ~aylor ag~aemant. 
'l'hank you tor your c;ourtesy and copa:r.stion in tho.as ~ega~d.s. 
OC! Ma. .Susa?l" ·i!astlak4, (!. P.A. 
~a. Ponna Taylo~ 
c:i:;. ~n /\mJ 
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i' 
L09 900 ·Y 
_ . .,_:~_k .. _' . ... ·.J _,'·=, ........ , .. "'"·:·· .• s:,·. ;, ' ',',. 
;----··,· 
.< •• , "K•"•. ~-~-- ·~-- ··•.: ··-··-----·'---·---~-·--: ···~·-··-··.&·---<'-'": ... _'.·, .... ,.-.[ k. a.::·.~·. . ··---··· ... ·. 
S'fNT BY: 
/. 
l :------ -------· ··-- ··-·--1 
8-11-35 1 :.SBPM 
-· 
• AIA Universe 
July 18, 1995 
Curner L. Green. Esq .. 
Green Law Offices 
P.O. Box: 2897 
Boise, ID 8370! 
Re: />J.A Services Corporation/Donna Tay!o, 
DearCumer. 
EBERLE.BERLIN-- 20B 738 s112::1s12s 
A IA Un/vrrse ln~11ra"ce Group 
Onci Lawis c::arx Plaza 
P.O. &Ix 538 
l.9"4ston, l~/',o 8l.SOT--O:l38 
(208} 799-9000 ,:t,X (208) 746.a1,9 
"This letter superscdt!s our January [ I, l 995, letter except for those provision already accomplished 
and/or modified by your letter of March 22, 1995. This fetter memorializes ol.!r further agreement 
concerning Donna I. Tc'.ylor'? interest in AfA Services Corporation as the holder of its Stated Value 
?referred Seo ck' and in the pending reorganizadoR of that tompany, including the contribution of 
additional capita[ through a privare placement or a.tithorized borrowing. 
L Your client will be entitled to accelerate the total redemption obligation with respect 
to her preferr~d stock tipon lapse of fifteen days after default in payment of the principal or interest. 
2. Further, AfA Services Corporation·s note or any note payable to Reed J. Taylor for 
approximately $6,000,000 of the purchase price for his common shares will be subordinaced co che 
rederirption rights of your client so chat Reed J. Taylor wiH receive no principal payments on said 
note until Donna Taylor's stock _has been completely redeemed. Ret!d J. Taylor will receive no 
interest payments on the note p<Lyable ro him if payrhenrs to Donna Taylor ti.re in default. Shoutd 
A . 007 AIA0002~ 
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Reed J. Taylor direci:Jy or indirectly effectuate a reducrio n or elimination of his note in some fashion 
for consideration received from the Corporation, Donna Taylor's redemption obljgation shall 
become due and fully payable. 
3. In rheinterim prior to Donna Taylor being paid the sum of$800,000 (other than from 
normal amortization), all of your client's existing claims are preserved. and discovery may concinue. 
AlA Services agrees co cooperate with you 1n setting a hearing, if such payment is not received 
within ninety (90) days after the Reorganization. 
4. This a&rreement contemplates that the Corporation will close the sale of 150,000 
shares of Series C Preferred Stock for S \.5 million, the contribution of $1.5 mil!lon to the Universe 
Life Insurance Company (''UL!C") and UL[C's distribution of the sroc:k of its subsidiary, AlA 
Insurance, Inc., to the C~rporation ("Reorganization''). 
Funds received by the corporation frorn add}rional sales· of Series C Preferred $cock or n7w 
authorized bocrowing (or any combination thereof) in excess of such $l.5 million proceeds ofrne 
' 
Reorganization sha[l be allocated as follows: 
(i) The first $ t00,000 shall be paid to Donna Taylor for reimbursement of 
professional fees incurred. 
(ii) The ne:i;c $1.4 miliion will be paid in equal amounts, as received, to Donna 
Taylor and Reed Taylor until Donna Taylor has be,m paid $700,000 for redemption of her 
Preferred Stoclc (in a.ddirion to chc regular amortization payment). 
(iii) Thereafter1 the next $800,000 shall be paid to Reed Taylor until Reed Taylor 
' . 
has been paid th'e full $ [.;S millio.n downpayment for r·edc:mption of his Common Scock. 
If Donna Taylor has not been paid the! ft.di $700,000 within ninety (90) da.ys following thi:t 
Reorganization, che Corporation's rnonthf.y payment o[intcrest on the Corporation's approximate.$& 
A e°>fflibit • D - Page· 2 
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EBERLE. BERLIN.., 
-
Gurner L. Green 
July !8, 1995 
Page:l 
million riote payable to Reed shall be reduced co the amount of monthly payment to Donna. Tayior 
for r:demption ofherPreferred Stock; and the excess amount of such interest payments due to Reed 
Taylor shall be act.'7Ued and payable to Reed Taylor only if and after Donna Taylor has received the 
full S?00.000 redemption payment. 
Corporation agrees that it will not grant any stock options, warrants or other interest in 
Corporation's stock to Richard W. Campanaro _unless and until Donna Taylor has received the full 
$700,000 redemption payment and the Corporation has obtained S3.5 million in proceeds from rhe 
sale of Series C Preferred Stock or additional authorized borrowing or any combination ,hereof. 
5. Condition~ upon ttie p~ymenc of such .$800,000 to Donna Taylor, Donna Taylor 
releases ALA Services Corporation and ics subsidiaries, their respective officers, direccors, 
shareholders, emp!oye~s. affiiiates and other agents in their official capacities, from all claims 
arising prior to closing of the Reorganization including, without limttation, her assenion of 
purported ~issenter's righc.s in connection with the ~encennial rransaction and all claims against the 
Corpomion which are the subject of the various. pleadings you have filed on behalf of your client 
in the divorce action (C3se No. 51087) in Nez Perce County. Howc~er, such release does not 
release Reed Taylor individua[ly from his o&ligation ro Donna Taylor arising from said divorce 
action. Further, Donna Taylor's rights and protections as a preferred shareholder which are set forth 
in the Amended Articles of!ncorpomion shall be preserved. 
In addition, subject to the same condirions. ·Donna Taylor consents to. and agrees that she 
will not assert dissem:er's righrs in connection with, all corporate transactions nec;ssary ro effectuate 
the Reorg~i.z:aiton, _including (witho1;1t limitation) amendment of the corporations's- Articles of 
!ncorporation to authorize the creation of che necessary preferred stock and warrants, the issuance 
of such securities to 1he pdvate placement invesrors .. the use of the proposed Confidential Private 
A • 009 AIA000272q:; IO 




Cumer L. Green 
July 18. 1995 
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. Placement Memorandum dared June· 1, 1995, representing rha.t your client has. consented to all suc:h 
transactions. and aU other actio~ necessary to achieve the capital strucrure (as of the closing of the 
Reorganization) reflected in that Private Placement Memorandum. 
6. If the corporation completely redeems your client's preferred stock, Donna. Taylor 
completely releases AJA Services Corporation and its subsidiaries, their respectiv~ officers, 
directors. shareholders, employees, affiliates and other agents, a.nd Reed J. Taylor as an individual, 
from an claims. 
If this letter acc:untely states our agreement, please sign and obtain your client's signature 
below'. _and fax a copy of_this_,fully·executed lecrer :°- us as soon ~spo;sible. Eberle ~er~i_n a~~ xou 
IMll mutually ptepare: a draft· of a de6nltive setcl-emenc agreement· inco,·porarion the foregoing terms 
and other documents necessaiy to effectuate the terms of chis Agreement. 
A· 010 
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.-- · Cum er L. Green 
July 18, 199S 
Pages 
Very tm!yyours, 






~=> _ . r-een 
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Cumer L. Green. Esq. 
Green law Offices 
P.O. Box 2597 
Boise ID 83701-2597 
,.,.,.0111,..,,.,:5. ~o cour,,iac1.0As aT t_..w 
Cap1'l'01. PARK Pu.u 
:ioo NOA'tH 51,n-i. St•c~ 
Po!.T 0r'1CE IJOX /:3SI! 
Bor:,c;, lo,o.""O =3701 
August IO, 1995 
Re: AJA Services Corporation/Donna Taylor 
Dear Cumer: 
TG.El'HCIHC 
(20SI :s .... ,a~s 




This letter confirms my understanding-.of o_!it cottVet~tfons subsequent to tl:!e e.xeq1::1p.on 
and delivery of the Ju1y f8, 19·9,5· letter agreement among- AfA Services Corpotation., Reed 
Taylor, Donna Taylor and Rich Ca,m_pa.nat0; t\at letter provides that the corporation "will not 
gtant ·any stock options. warrants. or other interest. in cxxpc,ratio.n 's stock to Richard W. 
Can:tpanaro ~ and untilDonna Taylor has received the full $700,000 redemption payment 
and the ~n has obf.ained·$3.5 millioa in proceeds from the sale of Series C Preferred 
·Sl'l::lclt or~~ authorized borrowing or any <ptrtbfnalion· thetcof.." Iti~ my ~3 
that you have ~-. and hereby req11est that yon ~ b-y sipjng be.tqw and returning dii$. 
letter. that this piovisionis not.intended to aff~ _and wil1 not .. affcct ffieanpo,rilion.,s obligation 
to issue to Mr. Campanaro 50,000 shares of Serles C Preferred Stock and attendant Series C 
Wamnts· for $5.00,000 c:a.sll in accordance with.,the t.erms, of tho Investment Agreement dated 
June 30, 1995 among the Company and Mess.rs. Campanaro·, Cash.man and Beck. 
rn addition·, Section 9.e. Qi.the June 30, t995 In:vestm.ent Agreement, as approved by the 
Board at the July 18, 1'995 meeting-, -cont.ains the-.following condition pre-Gedent to dosing of the 
sale of $1.5 million of Seri.es C Preferred Stock and Warrants; 
c. Donna Taylor Waiver and Buyout. The Company 
and Reed Taylor shall obtain .a. waiver in form and substance 
satisi-actory to dlt ~~ (i) =wafy.iilg · ;qi_y and all defau!tst 
b~ches artd/or rights to acc_efcra.tion ~ the payments that Donna 
'taylor may have been due to her under any of her a:,greementS 
·with the Company; and (ri) stating that she has reviewed the Reed 
Taylor ·Buyout Agreement and that H i$ ~cceptabte in its present 
form and · she will · not make any claim for acceleration for her 
· payments based on any term contained in the Reed Taylor Buyout 
Agreement or from the consummation of any of the transactions 
contemplated therein . 
A • 013 AIA00027a;1I4 
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c~d w,1~ir~ ~~-,,-~~ 
~·d lt:4.t.O.L 
Cumcr L. Grmft, Ssq, 
Auaust 20, 199~ 
Pq~2 
Meaui, Cuhman and ~ have -run:o r~Ubat-ed Donna '?'iiyfor', 1&~atlot1 Uni,, QOMl!t~tu 
with the July lSt 19~5 r ...st~r A1rutt1ent !he wttlVe1 any objection to the lt'"'!!f'tll0Hnni1 rcqulrcd 
to a.eeamplllh th~ twrgarilutlcin of m~ di:unp!tny Whloh wero _ approved by the Bc:a.rd of 
-'DlrtCtors &t i~ ~tlfli JU!y 18, t995 Ill wolf u the Company's exchtnga or $,Ol Spoolal 
Option& fer B_erie1 C Wamnia. 
Wo would 1ppr('date your confirmfl\i. by aignlng betow ind returning this tettc:rf the 
wadvera :equlrtd by the tnv51tot1 as da,i:rl'bed above. I11 thb regard and In rooo1nlt1an of the 
flnancl11 etl'eot1 or ins roorganl.urlon, you ittdlea~ed a wHHnsne11 e.o .renea0Ui11 thet .tlnanclal 
covehtnt1 contal.rtM! ln Ar&lt Fourth ot Utt Company', Artic!u of Tnootpatatlan rilatlng to th.e 
.S-ei'iet A ~l'.'tt.ti Sta_ek (!t' « trtOUtatiU.rtt on •ttfcm:emant ot _ the QUfi'elit OOVl!tllnt& lo: l. 
01111 ll, !Alul 'l'•Jll'lr 
I>1nll,l t.. 9plokl&I' 
J h~. kit)' 
ll)' m)' 11.in&ture bslow, I conflrm your undimUtnding or cur dlaou11lon• and agrt&m~ntr 
H contaJ.nad in elte 1uly 18. 1995 Letbir A!Jreeimettt and as dvac,rl!d.d ibovt, 
A-014 
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SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT 
THIS SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is 
made and entered into this 1st day of July 1996, by and among AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, 
an Idaho corporation ("Company"), REED J. TAYLOR ("Creditor) and DONNA J. TAYLOR 
("Series A Preferred Shareholder"). 
RECITALS: 
A. Series A Preferred Shareholder is the owner of all of Company's issued and 
outstanding· Series A Preferred Stock. Company is redeeming that stock pursuant to (i) Company's 
articles of incorporation ~nd (ii)that certain letter agreement among the parties hereto and Cumer 
L. Green ("Green") dated January 11, 1995, as amended by (a) that certain ietter from Green to 
Richard A Riley ("Riley") dated March 22, 1995, (b) that certain letter agreement among the parties, 
Green and Richard W. Campanaro dated July 18, 1995, and (c) that certain letter from Green to Riley 
dated August 10, 1995 (collectively, the "Series A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements"). 
Pursuant to the Letter Agreements, Company has reamortized its redemption obligation to Series A 
Preferred Shareholder over a shorter period and has increased the rate of interest paid to Series A 
Preferred Shareholder in exchange of waiver by Series A Preferred Shareholder of alleged defaults 
by Company and other consideration. 
B. Pursuant to that certain Stock_ Redemption Agreement between Company and 
Creditor dated July 22, 1995, as amended by that certain Addendum to Stock Redemption Agreement 
also dated. July 22, 1995 (together, the "Stock Redempti.on Agreement") and related agreements 
including (without limitation) a Stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge Agreement") and a 
Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement"), each dated July 22, 1995, granting a security interest 
A· 016 






































in certain collateral to secure payment of the $6M Note, all of Creditor's shares of conunon stock of 
Company were redeemed. 
C. k;, part consideration of the redemption of Creditor's common stock, Company: (i) 
executed a promissory note dated July 22, 1995 payable to Creditor in the principal amount of 
$1,500,000 (the "Down Payment Note") and (ii) executed a promissory note dated August 1, 1995 
payable to Creditor in the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"). 
D. Simultaneously with the redemption of Creditor's common stock, the Company 
reorganized by selling 150,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock for $1.5 million, contributing that 
$1.5 million to the Company's wholly-owned insurance subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance 
Company ("ULIC"), and distributing ULIC's stock of its s~bsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc. to the 
Company ("Reorganization"). 
E. In connection with the redemption of Creditor's common stock and Company's 
reorganization, the parties entered into the Letter Agreement dated July 18, 1995 which, among other 
things, imposed certain restrictions on Company's payment of interest and principal to Creditor. 
F. Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Company and Creditor have entered 
into that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement") pursuant 
to which Company's obligations to Creditor under the Stock Redemption Agreement and related 
agreements have been restructured (the "Res!TI1cture"). 
G. As a part of the Restructure, Company and Creditor have agreed to amend and restate . 
. the Down Payment Note (as amended pursuant to the Restructure, the "Amended Down Payment 
Note"), the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement. 
H. In consideration of Company's. willingness to accelerate principal payments to Series 
A Preferred Shareholder on its redemption of the Series A Preferred Stock, the Series A Preferred 
Shareholder is willing to release Company and Creditor from certain of those interest and principal 
. A-017 618 
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payment restrictions contained in the Letter Agreements and to release Company from any and all 
defaults under Company's Articles of Incorporation or the Letter Agreements, and to consent to the 
restructure of Company's obligations to pay principal and interesn6 Creditor pursuant to the terms 
of the Amended Down Payment Note as provided therein and in the Restructure Agreement. 
AGREEMENTS 
1. Series A Preferred Stock Redemption. 
(a) Company will continue monthly payments to Series A Preferred Shareholder 
in accordance with a ten year amortization (from the date redemption commenced) at prime rate plus 
1/.s% pursuant to paragraph 1 of the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement. 
(b) In addition to (and without affecting the amount of) the regular amortized 
payment, Company wiii accelerate payment of principal by paying Series A Preferred Shareholder 
$100,000 at the end of each six-month period beginning at the end of the six-month period 
commencing upon full payment to Creditor of the Amended Down Payment Note. 
(c) Series A Preferred Shareholder will be entitled to accelerate the total 
redemption obligation with respect to the Series A Preferred Stock upon lapse of thirty (30) days 
after default by Company in payment when due of principal or interest on such obligation, unless 
Company_shall have cured such default within such 30-day period. 
2. Consent to Amended Down Payment Note, $6M Note and Security Therefor. Series 
A Preferred Shareholder hereby consents to (i) Company's payment of its obligations to Creditor in 
accordance with the temis of the Amended Down Payment Note and the Restructure Agreement; (ii) 
Company's payment to Creditor of its obligations to Creditor in accordance with the terms of the 
$6M Note, subject however to the subordination provisions of Section 3 hereof; (iii) the grant of 
security interests in the Commission Collateral and Pledged Shares to secure payment of the two 
notes; and (iv) the possible future pledge of bonds pursuant to Section 10 of the Amended Stock 
A-018 619 
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Pledge Agreement and the release of security interest in part or all of the Pledged Shares and the 
Commission Collateral. 
3. Subordination of Certain Principal Payments to Creditor. Payment of principal to 
Creditor on-the $6M Note (whether at maturity or at any earlier time in accordance with any right 
of prepayment) shall be subordinated to payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem the Series 
A Preferred Stock. Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the Series A 
Preferred Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shall not preclude 
Company from exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset against the principal of the $6M 
Note). 
4. Unconditional Release. Series A Preferred Shareholder releases Company and its 
subsidiaries, their respective directors, officers, shareholders, employees, affiliates and other agents 
in their offir,ial capacities, from all claims arising prior to the date hereof including, without limitation: 
the assertion of purported dissenter's rights in connection with certain 
transactions between ULIC and The Centennial Life Insurance Company; 
(ii) all claims against Company which are the subject of the various pleadings filed 
on behalf of Series A Preferred Shareholder in her divorce action against Creditor in Case No. 5108 7 
filed in Nez Perce County, Idaho; 
(iii) any breach of Company's articles of incorporation or the terms or conditions 
of any of the Letter Agreements; 
(iv) any and all claims arising in connection with the Restructure, including 
(without limitation) any dissenter1s rights in connection therewith; and 
(v) any acts or omissions by Company, its subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, 
directors, officers, employees or other agents. 
A.:. 01 Q • 620 
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5. Agreement to Forbear. Notwithstanding the foregoing release, Series A Preferred 
Shareholder's rights and protection under Company's articles of incorporation shall be preserved; 
provided, however, that so long as Company has not failed to pay principal or interest for redemption 
of the Series A Preferred Stock hereunder when due or within the thirty-day cure period provided 
by Section 1 ( c) hereof, Series A Preferred Shareholder agrees to forbear from alleging any default 
under Company's articles of incorporation and further agrees to forbear from exercising or attempting 
to exercise any remedy for such default, whether arising from the terms of the articles of 
incorporation or under legal or equitable principles. 
6. Estoppel Certificate. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that, to date, 
Company has (i) paid $384,010 of principal of its obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred ·Stock 
and (ii) has redeemed 38,401 shares of the 200,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock originally 
issued to Series A Preferred Shareholder; and Series A Preferred Shareholder further acknowledges-
that (iii) the unpaid principal balance of Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock 
is $1,615,990 and (iv) 161,599 shares of Series A Preferred Stock remain outstanding. 
7. Representations and Warranties. Series A Preferred_ Shareholder represents and 
warrants to Company and to Creditor as follows: 
(a) Series A Preferred Shareholder owns beneficially and of record all of the 
outstanding Series A Preferred Stock, free and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security 
interests, equities, claims, options or other limitations on Series A Preferred Shareholder's ability to 
transfer such shares to Company upon payment of the redemption price. Series A Preferred 
Shareholder has full right, title and interest in and to the Series A ·Preferred Stock, and the legal 
capacity and authority to execute, deliver and perform this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement 
and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby and thereby. 
A. 020 621 
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(b) Company and Creditor have advised Series A Preferred Shareholder to consult 
legal and other professional counsel in connection with this Agreement and the Restructure 
Agreement and has had the opportunity to do so. Series A Preferred Shareholder has consulted such 
attorneys, accountants, family members and other advisors as she has deemed necessary or desirable 
to assist her in reviewing this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement and in determining whether 
it is in her best interests to execute and deliver them. Series A Preferred Shareholder has read and 
understands the terms and conditions of this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement, as well as 
the Letter Agreements which · are being superseded and replaced by this Agreement and the 
Restructure Agreement. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that she has had no contact 
with Company or any of its directors, officers, legal counsel or other agents concerning this 
Agreement or the Restructure Agreement; that this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement have 
been drafted by counsel for Company and reviewed by counsel for Creditor; and that neither 
Company, Creditor nor their respective counsel have represented Series A Preferred Shareholder in 
connection herewith or therewith. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that her execution 
and delivery of this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement have not been obtained by fraud, 
duress, undue influence, coercion, breach of fiduciary relationship or breach of relationship of 
confidence and trust; and Series A Preferred Shareholder hereby indemnifies Company against any 
and all claims that her execution and delivery of this Agreement or the Restructure Agreement·was 
obtained by any such means. 
A· 021 622 
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8. General Terms. 
(a) All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings 
assigned in the Restructure Agreement. 
(b) This Agreement supersedes any replaces the Letter Agreements in their . 
entirety. The Letter Agreements shall hereafter have no further force or effect. 
(c) All notices, requests, demands and other communications which are required 
to be or may be given under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly 
given when delivered in person or transmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or telegram, or by certified 
or registered first class mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to the respective parties as 
follows: 
Ifto Company, to: 
With a copy to: 
lfto Creditor to: 
With a copy to: 
If to Series A Preferred 
Shareholder, to: 
AIA Services Corporation 
P.O. Box 538 
One Lewis Clark Plaza 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Attention: John Taylor 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKlveen, Chartered 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise ID 83701-1368 
Attention: Richard A. Riley 
Reed J. Taylor 
P.O. Box 1165 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Caimcross & Hempelmann 
70th Floor, Columbia Center 
701 Fifth Avenue 
Seattle WA 98104-7016 
Attention: W. Frank Taylor 
Donna J. Taylor 
c/o ---------
· A- 022 623 
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or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in accordance 
herewith, except that notices of change of address shall be effective only upon receipt. Company's 
payments of its redemption obligation to Series A Preferred Shareholder shall be delivered to Series 
A Preferred Shareholder at her notice address as provided above. 
( d) This Agreement and the other Restructure Agreement contain the complete 
and final expression of the entire agreement of the parties concerning Company's redemption of the 
Series A Preferred Stock. No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or 
supplemented, except by a writing signed by all parties to this Agreement. 
( e) This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the 
laws of the State ofldaho, without giving effect to any provisions or principles regarding conflict of 
laws. 
(f) Headings used herein are for convenience only and shall not in any way affect 
the construction of, or be taken into consideration in interpreting, this Agreement. 
(g) Each provision of this Agreement is interdependent with and inseparable from 
every other provision hereof; and each covenant herein is given in consideration of every other 
covenant herein. If any provision ofthis Agreement is invalid, illegal, unenforceable or inapplicable 
to any person or circumstance to which it is intended to be applicable, in whole or in part, this entire 
Agreement shall be void. 
A-023 ~4 





EFFECTIVE as of the date first set forth above. 
COMPANY: 
CREDITOR: 
SERIES A PREFERRED 
SHAREHOLDER: 
APPROVED: 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION 
~; Ml:; 7f 
REED J. TAYLOR 
/'./ ~,, ~-ed',,',;,/~-




for Series A ---
Preferred Shareholder 
A· 024 
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CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT 
OF 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION 
= I PETET. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho hereby. certify that ~ 
~ = 
~ duplicate originals of Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of ~ 
; AIA SERVICES CORPORATIQ:1 i 
i duly signed and verified pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation Act. have ~ 
= been received in this office and are found to conform to law. ~ 
~ ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority Vefited in me by law. I issue this Certificate llf ~ 
= = 
~ Amendment to the Articles of lncorponition and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Articles i 
= = = of Amendment. ;;; 
'.'.: Dated · December 29 . 19 .iL_. ~ 
= = 
: = C3-r-~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
,.• -I &' ,,:··· 

















~ICLES OF AMENDMENT 
UEC 23 ~RTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
SEC'RE'l ti.R't OF ~fsER VICESCORPORA TION 
' . ---- ------. , ____ ' ---------~--
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 30-1-59 and 30-1-61 of the Idaho 
Business Corporation Act, the undersigned· corporation adopts the following 
Articles of Amendment to its Articles of Incorporation, as heretofore amended. 
FIRST: The name of the corporation is AIA SERVICES CORPORATION. 
SECOND: Effective on December ~:?», 1987, the shareholders of the 
corporation adopted and approved the following Amended and Restated Articles 
of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation, pursuant to which Article Fourth 
was amended by replacing it in its entirety and new Articles Tenth and Eleventh 
were added to the original Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation 
as filed on December 20, 1983 and previously amended on October 14, 1986: 
'''AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
AIA SERVICESCORPORA TION 
Except for the amendment of Article Fourth by replacing it in its entirety 
and the addition of new Article Tenth and new Article Eleventh as contained 
herein, these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services 
Corporation correctly set forth without change the corresponding provisions of 
the original Articles of Incorporation as heretofore filed on December 20, 1983 
and amended on October 14, 1986; and these Amended and Restated Articles of 
Incorporation of AJA Services Corporation, including the amendment of Article 
Fourth and the addition of new Articles Tenth and Eleventh, supersede the 
original Articles of Amendment and all previous amendments thereto. 
FIRST 
The name of the corporation is AIA SERVICES CORPORATION. 
SECOND 
The period of its duration is perpetual. 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - 1 
Exhibit - 1 - Page • 10 
A - 026 650 
I j·' 
~ .. .; 
., 
I.·, 
I i I:~ 
' ' ! l 
i j 









' ' ' ' ··,1 
I 
.. ·--. ---------· - --_ ---~-J - - ----- ------- ... -. 
THIRD 
The purpose for which the corporation is organized is for the transaction 
of any or all lawful business for which the corporation may be incorporated 
under the Idaho Business Corporation Act. 
FOURTH 
4.1 Authorized Capital. This corporation is authorized to issue two classes 
of stock to be designated, respectively, "Stated Value Preferred Stock" and 
''Common Stock". The total number of shares which this corporation is 
authorized to issue is 5,200,000 shares, of which 200,000 shares shall be Stated 
Value Preferred Stock, without par value, and 5,000,000 shares shall be common 
stock, $1.00 par value. The Stated Value Preferred Stock shall be issued in a 
single series; and each share of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have the 
rights and preferences conferred in this Article Fourth. Holders of Stated Value 
Preferred Stock shall have no rights to share in any distribution of the profits 
or assets of the corporation, whether in the form of cash or stock or dividends 
or otherwise, except to the extent specifically provided herein. 
4.2 No Dividends. The Stated Value Preferred Stock shall not pay or 
accrue any dividends. 
4.3 Demand for Redemption. (a) The holder of Stated Value Preferred 
Stock shall have the right to require the corporation to redeem such stock from 
any legally available funds upon breach of any covenant of the corporation set 
forth in this Article Fourth, but only to the extent such redemption shall not 
violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions · on the corl?oration's 
redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised by giving the 
corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifying the default and a 
redemption date not less than ninety (90) days from the date such notice 
delivered to the corporation; provided however that, if the corporation cures 
such specified default within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice by 
corporation, the right to redeem Stated Value Preferred Stock on account of 
such specified default shall be extinguished. 
(b) The holder of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have the right 
to require the corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds 
at any time after September 14, 1993, but only to the extent such redemption 
shall not violate the ldaho ·Business Corporation Act restrictions on the 
corporation's redemption of iLc; own shares. This right may be exercised by 
giving the corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifying a 
redemption date after September 14, 1993 and not less than ninety (90) days or 
more than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date such notice is delivered 
to the corporation. 
4.4 Call for Redemption. The Stated Value Preferred Stock may be called 
for redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of the 
redemption price from legally available funds at any tlme prior to demand for 
redemption by the holder of Stated Value Preferred Stock. Notice of such call· 
for redemption, specifying the redemption date not less than thlrty (30) days 
from the date such notice is mailed, shall be malled to each record holder of 
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Stated Value Preferred Stock. If fewer than all shares of Stated Value Preferred 
Stock are to be redeemed, the shares shall be redeemed prorata from the holders 
thereof. 
4.5 . Redemption Price;. If Stated Value Preferred Stock is redeemed on or 
before September l4, 1990, the redemption price is $8.00 per share .if paid in a 
Jump sum. If Stated Value Preferred Stock is redeemed any time during the 
three-year period beginning September 15, 1990 and ending on September 14, 
1993, the redemption price is $8.50 per share if paid in a lump sum. If not paid 
in a lump sum on or before September 14, 1993, the redemption price for Stated 
Value Preferred Stock is $ I 0.00 per share, provided that the redemption price 
may be paid, at the corporation's sole option, in monthly installments on a 
fifteen (15) year amortieation schedule beginning on the day after the redemption 
date and accruing interest at a rate one-and one-half (l-1/2) points under The 
First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., prime lending rate, adjusted quarterly. 
4.6 Redemption Procedure and Effect. 
(a) Lump Sum Payment. If the redemption price is to be paid in a 
lump sum, the corporation shall deposit, or shall cause its nominee to deposit, on 
or before the redemption date specified in the notice of redemption, the 
aggregate redemption price of the shares or Stated Value Preferred Stock to be 
redeemed with a bank or trust company specified. in the notice, payable on the 
redemption date in the amounts and to the respective orders of the holders of 
the shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock to be redeemed, on endorsement to 
the corporation or itc; nominee as may be required and upon surrender of the 
certificates for such shares. Unless the · corporation or its nominee fails to pay 
the lump sum redemption price on or before the redemption date, the shares of 
Stated Value Preferred Stock subject to such redemption shall be deemed to have 
been redeemed, and shall be deemed no longer to be outstanding, from and after 
the redemption date set forth in the notice of redemption. On or after the 
redemption date, subject only to payment of the redemption price, Stated Value 
Preferred Stock so called for redemption shall cease to be entitled to any 
interest or right in the corporation; and holders of such Stated Value Preferred 
Stock shall thereafter cease to be shareholders and shall be entitled only to 
payment of the amount of the redemption price, without interest, upon surrender 
of the certificates evidencing such stock. If the lump sum redemption price 
shall be paid by a nominee of the corporation, such nominee shall upon such 
payment become the owner of the shares with respect to which such parment 
was made; anc\ certificates of stock may be issued to such nominee in evidence 
of such ownership. 
(b) Installment Payment. If the corporation elects· to pay the 
redemption price in installments, the number of shares of Stated Value Preferred 
Stock equal to. the principal portion of each installment divided by Sl0.00 per 
sh.are shall be deemed to have been redeemed and to be no longer outstanding 
from and after the date of payment of such installment. On and after such 
payment date, such number of shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall cease 
to be entitled to any interest or right in the corporation; and holders of such 
shares shall thereafter cease to be shareholders of the corporation with respect 
to such shares, whether or not the certificates evidencing such shares have '6een 
surrendered. Upon request of the corporation from time to. time, certificates 
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evidencing shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock including redeemed shares 
shall be surrendered to and reissued by the corporation in reduced amount to 
reflect any and all installment redemptions of shares prior to such request. 
4.7 Liquidation Preference. In case of the voluntary liquidation or 
dissolution of the corporation, the hokier of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall 
have the right to be paid in full, before any amount shall be paid to the owners 
of the common stock, as follows: 
$8.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid on or before 
September 14, 1990. 
$8.50 per share if the liquidation price is paid after 
September 14, 1990 and on or before September 14, 1993. 
$10.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid after 
September 14, 1993. 
In case of the involuntary liquidation or dissolution of the corporation, the 
holder of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid $ I 0.00 
per share, in full, before any amount shall be paid to the owners of the common 
stock. After payment to the holders of the Stated Value Preferred Stock of the 
full preferential amounts hereinabove provided, the holders of the Stated Value 
Preferred Stock as such shall have no right or claim to any of the remaining 
assets of the corporation either upon any distribution of such assets or upon 
dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining assets to be distributed, 
if any, upon a distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or 
winding up, may be distributed among the holders of the common stock. 
4.8 Limited Voting Rights. The Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have no 
right (except as required by law or as provided by Section 4.11 of this Article 
Fourth) to receive notice of or to vote at any regular or special meeting of 
stockholders, except that the holders of a majority of the shares of Stated Value 
Preferred Stock shall have the right, voting separately as a class, to elect one 
director to the board of directors of the corporation. 
4.9 Covenants. So long as any shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock are 
outstanding, and except with the consent of the holders of a majority of the 
outstanding shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock: · 
(a) Common Stock. The corporation shall not is.c;ue any common 
stock for less than book value (determined as of the end of the immediately 
preceding fiscal year), except for common stock issued to pay a dividend payable 
solely in shares of common stock or issued to employees or agents pursuant to 
incentive stock option or bonus plan. 
(b) · Preferred Stock. The corporation shall issue no preferred stock 
other than the Stated Value Preferred Stock, nor any securities convertible into 
such stock. 
(c) Indebtedness. The corporation will not, and will not permit any 
of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, create, incur, assume, guaranty or 
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otherwise become or remain directly or indirectly liable with respect to, any 
Indebtedness, except: 
(l) The corporation may remain liable in respect of Indebtedness 
outstanding on the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the 
corporation's shareholders. 
. (2) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain 
liable with respect to Indebtedness that is not secured by a Lien on any of 
the assets of the corporation or its Subsidiaries, provided that the 
aggregate principal amount of such unsecured Indebtedness shall not exceed 
Consolidated Net Worth less goodwill of the corporation at any time; and 
(3) The corporation and ilc; Subsidiaries may become and remain 
liable in respect of Indebtedness secured by any of the following Liens: 
(i) Liens for taxes, assessments or governmental charges or 
claims the payment of which is not yet delinquent or is being 
contested in good faith, if such reserve or other provision, if any, as 
shall be required by generally accepted accounting principles, 
consistently applied, shall have been made therefor; 
(ii) Statutory Liens of landlords .and Liens of carriers, 
warehousemen, mechanics, materialmen and other liens imposed by law 
incurred in the ordinary course of business for sums not yet 
delinquent or being contested in good faith, if such reserve or other 
appropriate provision, if any, as shall be required by generally 
accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, shall have been 
made therefor; 
(iii) Liens incurred or deposits made in the ordinary course 
of business in connection with workers' compensation, unemployment 
insurance and other types of social security, or to secure the 
performance of tenders, statutory obligations, surety and appeal bonds, 
bids, leases, government contracts, performance and return-of-money 
bonds and other similar obligations (exclusive of obligations for the 
payment of borrowed money); 
(iv) Any attachment or judgment Lien; provided that if the 
judgment it secures exceeds $250,000 (alone or when aggregated with 
all other judgmentc; secured by Liens permitted by this clause (iv)), 
such judgment shall, within 45 days after the entry thereof, have been 
discharged or execution thereof stayed pending appeal, or shall have 
been discharged within 45 days after the expiration of any such stay; 
(v) Easements, rights-of-way, restrictions and other similar 
charges or encumbrances not interfering with. the ordinary conduct of 
the business of the corporation or any of its Subsidiaries; 
(vi) Any interest or title of a lessor under any lease; 
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. (vii) Any Lien existing on any asset of any corporation at 
the time such corporation becomes a Subsidiary if such Lien was not 
created in contemplation of such event; 
(viii) Any Lien on any asset securing Indebtedness incurred 
or assumed for the purpose of financing not more than eighty-five 
percent (85%) of the cost of acquiring such asset; provided that such 
Lien attaches to such asset concurrently with or within 90 days after 
the acquisition thereof; 
(ill) Any Lien on any asset of any corporation existing at 
the time such corporation is merged into or consolidated with the 
corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in 
contemplation of such event; 
(x) Any Lien existing on any asset prior to the acquisition 
thereof by the corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not 
created in contemplation of such acquisition; 
(,ci) Any Lien arising out of the refinancing, extension, 
renewal or refunding of any Indebtedness secured by any Lien 
permitted by any of the foregoing clauses of this Section 4.9(c); 
provided that the amount of such Indebtedness is not increased and 
that such Indebtedness is not secured by any additional assets; and 
(xii) Liens not otherwise permitted by the foregoing 
clauses of this Section 4.9(c) (including, without limitation, Liens on 
stock of Subsidiaries, whether consolidated or unconsolidated) securing 
Indebtedness in an aggregate principal amount at any time outstanding 
not to exceed 10% of the difference between Consolidated Net Worth 
and the amount of the goodwill of the corporation. 
(d) Corporate Existence. The corporation will maintain its corporate 
existence and will not liquidate, wind. up or dissolve itself (or suffer any 
liquidation or dissolution), or enter into any transaction of merger or 
consolidation with any Person (including any Subsidiary) unless {i) this 
corporation is the surviying corporation following any such merger or 
consolidation. and (ii) the Consolidated Net Worth of the surviving corporation 
immediately following such merger or consolidation equals or exceeds the 
Consolidated Net Worth of this corporation immediately prior to such merger or 
consolidation. · 
(e) Sale of Assets. The corporation will not, and will not permit any 
of its Subsidiaries to, convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or 
any material part of its business, property or assets, whether now owned or 
hereafter acquired, except: 
(l) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may convey, sell, lease, 
transfer or otherwise dispose of investment assets in the ordinary course of 
business; 
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(2) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise 
dispose of Capital Assets or real property if the asset so disposed of is 
concurrently replaced by a substantially equivalent asset having a value 
equal to or greater than the asset disposed of; 
(3) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise 
dispose of obsolete or worn out property in the ordinary course of 
business; 
(4) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell and lease back 
any newly acquired asset for the purpose of financing the acquisition of 
such asset and securing the repayment of Indebtedness, provided that such 
Indebtedness shall not exceed eighty-five percent (85%) of the cost of such 
asset and is otherwise permitted by the covenants contained in this Article 
Fourth; and 
(5) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise 
dispose of any of their other assets; provided that any such sale or other 
disposition is made for the fair market value of such assets. 
(I) Acquisitions. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of 
its Subsidiaries to, acquire by purchase or otherwise all or substantially all the 
business, property or fixed assets, or the stock or other evidence of beneficial 
ownership, of any Person unless, immediately prior to and after giving effect to 
such transaction, no violation of any of the covenants or other provisions 
contained in this Article Fourth shall have occurred and be continuing or would 
be caused by such acquisition. 
(g) Transactions with Shareholders and Affiliates. The corporation 
will not, and will not permit any of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, 
enter into or permit to e,rist any transaction (including, without limitation, the 
purchase, sale, lease, loan or exchange or any property or the rendering of any 
service) with any director or officer or any holder of equity securities of the 
corporation, or with any Affiliate of the corporation or of such director, officer 
or holder, on terms that are less favorable to the corporation or that 
Subsidiary, as the case may be, than those which might be obtained at the time 
from Persons who are not such a director, officer, holder or Affiliate; provided 
that the forgoing restriction shall not apply to · (l) any transaction in effect at 
the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's shareholders; (2) 
any transaction between the corporation and any of its wholly-owned Subsidiaries 
or between any of its wholly-owned Subsidiaries; (3) compensation (net of 
amounts contributed or repaid to the corporation or any Subsidiary or to 
Lewiston Land Company an<l contributed or repaid to the corporation or any 
Subsidiary), by way of salary or bonus, paid to directors or officers of the 
corporation in an amount, as to any one individual, not greater than the greater 
of $400,000 or the total compensation paid in calendar year 1986; (4) 
compensation paid to any director or officer of the corporation in amounts equal 
to income tax liability of such director or officer attributable to transactions 
\nvo\ving the corporation, A.LA., Inc., AIA Travel Services, Inc., AIA Travel, 
Inc., Lewiston Land Company, AIA Bancard Services Corporation or Taylor 
Brothers Aircraft on or before January I, 1988 or to other personal income tax 
liability of such director or officer for tax years ended before January I, 1988; 
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Consolidated Net Worth. The corporation will not permit 
Net Worth any date to be less than the number of shares of 
Preferred Stock outstanding at such date multiplied by $10.00 per 
(i) Dividend Restriction. The corporation will not, directly or 
indirectly, declare, order, make or set apart any sum for payment of any 
dividend in respect of its common stock (other than a dividend payable solely in 
shares of common stock), except that the corporation may declare and pay 
common stock dividends in an aggregate amount not exceeding the Dividend 
Availability Amount. 
(j) Debt/Equity Ratio. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary 
will incur any new Indebtedness (other than lndebtedness permitted by Section 
4.9(c)(xi) of this Article Fourth) if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness, 
the ratio of Consolidated Long Term Debt to Consolidated Net Worth exceeds, or 
such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to exceed, 3.6 to 1.0. · 
(k) Debt Service Coverage. Neither the corporation nor any 
Subsidiary will incur any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by 
Section 4.9(c)(xi) of this Article Fourth) if, at the time of incurring such 
Indebtedness, the ralio of (i) Consolidated Net Income plus depreciation and 
amortization expenses plus compensation contributed or repaid to the corporation, 
any Subsidiary, Lewiston Land Company or AJA Travel Services, Inc. during the 
immediately preceding fiscal year of the corporation, divided by (ii) current 
maturities of Long Term Debt is, or such additional Indebtedness would cause 
such ratio to be, less than .8 to 1.0. 
. 4.10 · Definitions. For the purpose of Section 4.9 of this Article Fourth, 
the following t~rms shall have the following meanings: 
"Affiliate .. , as applied to any Person, shall mean any other Person directly 
or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, tbat 
Person. For the purposes of this definition, "control• (including, with correlative 
meanings, the terms "controlling", "controlled by" and "under common control 
with"), as applied to any Person, means the possession, directly or indirectly, of 
the power to direct or cause lhe direction of the management and policies of 
that Person, whether through the ownership of voting securities or by contract 
or otherwise. 
'''Capital A..sct· shall mean, as at any date of determination, those assets of 
a Person that would, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, 
consistently applied, be classified as plant, property or equipment on the balance 
sheet of tbat Person. 
•eonsolidated Long Term Debt· shall mean, as at any date of determination, 
the total of all Long Term Debt of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a 
consolidated basis determined in accordance with generally accepted (or, in the 
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case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial statements are not 
prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied. 
·consolidated Net Worth' shall mean, as at any date of determination, the 
sum of (a) the capital stock and additional paid-in capital, (b) plus retained 
earnings (or minus accumulated deficit) of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on 
a consolidated basis, determined in conformity with generally accepted (or, in the 
case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial statements are not 
prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied. 
"Consolidated Net Income' for any period, shall mean the net income (or 
loss) of the corporation and iLc; Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis determined 
in conformity with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company 
for which GAAP financial statemenlc; are not prepared, statutory) accounting 
principles consistently applied. 
'Dividend Availability Amount" shall mean, as at any date of determination, 
an amount equal to 50% of Consolidated Net Income for the period (taken as 
single accounting period) commencing January 31, 1987 and ending on the last 
day of the fiscal quarter immediately preceding such date of determination. 
'"Indebtedness" as applied to any person, means (a) all indebtedness for 
borrowed money, (b) that portion of obligations with respect to finance \eases 
which is capitalized on a balance sheet in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles, consistently applied, (c) notes · payable and drafts accepted 
representing extensions of credit whether or not representing obligations for 
borrowed money, (d) any obligation owed for all or any part of the deferred 
purchase price of property or services which purchase price is (i) due more than 
six month from the date of incurrence of the obligation in respect thereof, or 
(ii) evidenced by a note or similar written instrument, and (e) all indebtedness 
secured by any Lien or vendor's interest under any conditional sale or other title 
retention agreement existing on any property or asset owned or held by that 
Person regardless of whether the indebtedness secured thereby shalJ have been 
assumed by that Person or is non-recourse to the credit of that Person; 
provided, however, that "Indebtedness" shall not include policy claims, policy 
reserves or mandatory securities valuation reserves of a regulated insurance 
company; and further provided that .. Indebtedness" shall not include indebtedness 
of the corporation to any Subsidiary. _ 
'"Lien'" shall mean any lien, mortgage, pledge, security interest, charge or 
encumbrance of any kind (including any conditional sale or other title retention 
agreement, any lease in the nature thereof, and any agreement to give a security 
interest). 
'Long Term Debt", as applied to any Person, shall mean all Indebtedness of 
that Person which by its terms or by the terms of any instrument or agreement 
relating thereto matures more than one year, or is directly renewable or 
extendable at the option of the debtor to a date more than one year (including 
an option of the debtor under a revolving credit or similar agreement obligating 
the lenders to extend credit over a period of one year or more}, from the date 
of creation thereof, but excluding any payments due under the terms the_reof 
within 12 months of any date of determination. 
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·Person• shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, 
trust, unincorporated organization or any other jurisdictional entity, or a foreign 
state or any agency or political subdivision thereof. 
- ~ubsidiary• shall mean any corporation of which at least a majority of the 
outstanding stock having by the terms thereof ordinary voting power to elect a 
majority of the board of directors of such corporation (irrespective of whether 
or not at the time stock of any other class or classes of such corporation shall 
have or might have voting power by reason of the happening of any 
contingency) is at the time directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the 
corporation or one or more of its Subsidiaries or by the corporation and one or 
more of its Subsidiaries. 
4.11 Conversion Right The holders of the Stated Value Preferred Stock 
shall have the following conversion right ("Conversion Right"): 
· (a) Right to Convert. Each share of Stated Value Preferred Stock 
shall be convertible, at the option of. the holder thereof, at any· time prior to 
---· -- the· date on which notice of redemption is given under Section 4.3 or Section 
4.4, at the office of the corporation or any transfer agent for the Stated Value 
Preferred Stock or Common Stock, into one fully paid and nonassessable share 
of Common Stock. 
(b) Mechanics of Conversion. Before any holder of Stated Value 
Preferred Stock shall be entitled to convert such stock into shares of Common 
Stock, he shall surrender the certificate or certificates for such Preferred Stock, 
duly endorsed, at the office of the corporation or of any transfer agent for the 
Common Stock, and shall give written notice to the corporation at such office 
that he elects to convert such Preferred Stock and shall state therein the 
number of shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock being converted. Thereupon 
the corporation shall promptly issue and deliver at such office to such holder of 
Stated Value Preferred Stock a certificate or certificates for the number of 
shares of Common Stock to which he shall be entitled. 
Such conversion shall be deemed to have been made immediately prior 
to the close of business on the date of such surrender of the shares of Stated 
Value Preferred Stock to be converted (the "Conversion Date"); and the person 
or persons entitled to receive the shares of Common Stock issuable upon such 
conversion shall be treated for all purposes as the record holder or holders of 
such shares of Common Stock on such date. 
(c) Fractional Shares. No fractional share of Common Stock shall be 
issued upon conversion or Stated Value Preferred Stock. In lieu of any 
fractional shares to which the holder would otherwise be entitled, the 
corporation shall pay cash equal to the product of such fraction multiplied by 
the fair market value of one share of the corporation's Common Stock on the 
Conversion Date, such value to be determined in good faith by the Board of 
Directors. 
(d) Reservation of Stock Issuable Upon Conversion. The corporation 
shall at all times reserve and k.cep available out of its authorized but unissued 
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shares of Common Stock, solely for the purpose of effecting the conversion of 
the shares of the Stated Value Preferred Stock, such number of its shares of 
Common- Stock as shall from time to time be sufficient to effect the conversion 
of all outstanding shares of the Stated Value Preferred Stock; and if at any time 
the number of authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock shall not be 
sufficient to effect the conversion of all then outstanding shares of the Stated 
Value Preferred Stock, the corporation will take such corporate action as may, in 
the opinion of its counsel, be necessary to increase its authorized but unissued 
shares of Common Stock to such number of shares as shall be sufficient for such 
purpose. 
(e) Termination of Redemption Right. Upon exercise of the 
Conversion Right under this Section 4.11, all rights of a holder of Stated Value 
Preferred Stock to require redemption of such stock under Section 4.3 shall 
automatically terminated; and no holder of Common Stock acquired upon 
conversion of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have any right of redemption. 
4.12 Modification of Rights and Preferences. The rights and preferences 
hereby conferred on the Stated Value Preferred Stock shall not be changed, 
altered or revoked without the consent of the holders of the majority of the 
Stated Value Preferred Stock outstanding at the time. 
FIFTH 
Shareholders shall not have a preemptive right to acquire unissued or 
treasury shares or securities convertible into such shares or carrying a right to 
subscribe to or acquire shares, except as provided in the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act. 
SIXTH 
The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is One Lewis 
Clark Plaza, Lewiston, Idaho 83501; and the name of its initial registered agent 
at such address is R. John Taylor. 
SEVENTH 
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors is four, 
and the names and addresses of the persons who arc to serve until the first 
annual meeting of the shareholders and until their successors are elected and 
qualified are: 
NAME 
Reed J. Taylor 
R. John Taylor 
Raymond R. Heilman 
ADDRESS 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Mary K. Frost 
EIGHTH 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
The name and address of the incorporator is as follows: 
Reed J. Taylor 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 8350 l 
NINTH 
The Board of Directors is expressly authorized to alter, amend or repeal the 
Bylaws or the corporation and to adopt new Bylaws, subject to repeal or change 
by a majority vote of the shareholders. . 
TENTH 
At each meeting of shareholders, every shareholder of record of the 
corporation shall be entitled to one vote for each share of common stock 
registered in his name on the books of the corporation. Shareholders shall not 
be entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors of the 
corporation. 
ELEVENTH 
A director of this corporation shall not be personally liable to this 
corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty as a director, except for liability (a) for any breach of the director's duty 
of loyalty to this corporation or its shareholders, (b) for acts or omissions not 
in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of 
law, (c) under Section 30-1-48, Idaho Code, or (d) for any transaction from 
which the director derived an improper personal benefit. If the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act is amended to authorize corporate action further eliminating or 
limiting the personal liability of directors, then the liability of a director of this 
corporation shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest extent permitted by the 
Idaho Business Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or modification of 
this Article Eleventh by the shareholders of the corporation shall not adversely 
affect any right· or protection of a director of the corporation existing at the 
time of such repeal or modilication." 
THIRD: The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the time 
of such adoption was 801,000; and the number of shares entitled to vote thereon 
was 801,000. 
FOURTH: The designation and number of outstanding shares of each class 
entitled to vote thereon as a class were a follows: 
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Number of Shares: 
80l,OOO 
·--i - ----------.- · ------ .--1 ------------··-
FIFTH: The number of shares voted for such amendment was 80l,OOO; and 
the number of shares voted against such amendment was 0. 
DATED this J~day of December, 1987. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION 
R. o n Tay or, Secre 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF tJttzl8NA ) 
:ss. 
County of ,Jc"e- ~.ac. ) 
I ~t ~ fell a Notary Public, do hereby certify that on the 
d!> ctayc, ecen{ er: 1987, personally appeared before me REED J. TAYLOR, 
who, being by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the President of AIA 
SERVICES CORPORATION, that signed th oregoing document as President 
of the coporation, and that the state ts contain therein are true. 
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~ duly signed and verified pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation Act, have i 
~ been received in this office and are found to conform to law. i 
= ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law. I issue this Ccrtilicate tif § 
= = 
; Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Article~ I 
SECRF.TARY OF STATE 
......... 
C'oq'~bration Clerk 
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A'RTICLES OP AHKNlllKHT · . ,·: ... 
TO THE 
ARTICLES 01' IRCOKFORATION 
or 
All SERVICES CORPORATION 
CJ 
AIA Services Corporation ("Corporation") hereby adopts the following 
Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation under the provisions 
of the Idaho Business Corporation Act: 
(a) The name of the corporation is AIA SERVICES CORPORATION. 
(b) The amendments adopted by the shareholders of the Corporation are 
as follows: 
(i) The current Article ELEVENTH has been deleted in its 
entirety and is replaced by the following new Article ELEVENTH: 
No director or officer of the Corporation shall be personally 
liable to the Corporation or any of its stockholders for damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer, except that this 
provision will not eliminate or limit the liability of a director or 
officer for any act or omission which involves intentional misconduct, 
fraud or knowing violation of law, or for any act or omission 
specified in the Idaho Business Corporation Act as an act or omission 
for which a director or officer shall have liability to the 
Corporation or its shareholders. Arly repeal or modification of this 
Article ELEVENTH by the shareholders of the Corporation shall not 
adversely affect any right or protection of a director or officer of 
the· Corporation existing at the time of such repeal or modification 
with respect to an act or omission which occurred prior to such repeal 
or modification. 
- 1 -
Exhibit • 1 • Page • 40 
A. 040 680 
______ _; - _;_ __ .... ,~·----~- -~·-..:. ___________ _ ,- --,:-. ·-""~ ••• ---- I -.. . .. : ........... ,_ '.· .... :· ----i 
The following new Article TWELFTH, THIRTEENTH, AND FOURTEENTH are 
being added to the Articles of Incorporation: 
The Corporation shall have the right to purchase its own shares, 
whether direct or indirect, to the extent of unreserved and 
W1restricted earned surplus available therefor and to the extent of 
unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor, 
the extent that earned surplus or capital surplus is used as the 
measure of the Corporation's right to purchase its own shares, such 
surplus s~ll be restricted so long as such shares are held as 
treasury shares, and upon the disposition or cancellation of ·any of 
such shares, the restriction shall be removed pro tanto, The 
foregoing limitations shall not apply to purchases or other 
acquisitions by the Corporation of its own shares for the purpose of 
( i) eliminating fractional shares. (ii) collecting or compromising 
indebtedness to the Corporation, (iii) paying dissenting shareholders 
entitled to payment for their shares under the provisions of the Idaho 
Business Corporation Act, or (iv)· effecting, subject to other 
provisions of such Act, the retirement of the Corporation's redeemable 
shares by redemption or by purchase at not to exceed the redemption 
price. The Corporation may not purchase or pay for its own shares at 
a time when the Corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or 
payment would make it solvent. 
The Board of Directors of the Corporation may, from time to time, 
distribute to the Corporation's shareholders out of capital surplus of 
the Corporation a portion of the Corporation's assets, in cash or 
property• if such distribution is not made at a time when the 
Corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would render the 
Corporation insolvent, if such distribution is made at a time when the 
Corporation has paid in full all cumulative dividends accrued on all 
classes of shares entitled to preferential dividends·, if such 
- 2 -
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distribution would not reduce the remaining net assets of the 
Corporation below the aggregate preferential amount payable in the 
event of involuntary liquidation of the .Corporation to the holders of 
shares having preferential rights to the assets of the Corporation in 
the event of liquidation, and if such distribution, when made, is 
identified as a distribution from capital surplus and the amount 
thereof per share is disclosed to the shareholders receiving such 
distribution concurrently with the distribution thereof, 
The officers and directors of this Corporation shall be subject 
to the doctrine or corporate opportunities only insofar as it applies 
to business opportunities in which this Corporation has expressed an 
interest as determined from time to time by the Corporation's Board of 
Directors as eviden_ced by resolutions appearing in the Corporation I s 
Minutes. When such areas of interest are delineated, all such 
business opportunities within such areas of interest which come to the 
attention of the officers and directors of this Corporation shall be 
disclosed promptly to this Corporation and ma.de available to it. The 
Board of Directors may reject any business opportunity presented to it 
· for any valid business reason and thereafter any officer or director 
may avail himself (herself) of such opportunity. This provision shall 
not be construed to release any employee of the Corporation from any 
duties which he (she) may have to the Corporation. 
(c) These Articles of Amendment were adopted by the shareholders of 
the Corporation on February 1S, 1989. 
(d) The number of shares ·of the Corporation outstanding entitled to 
vote on this Amendment of the Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation 
was 973,749 shares of $1.00 par value collllllon stock. 
(e) This Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation was approved by a 
vote of shareholders of the Corporation holding 930,900 1/6 shares of $1.00 
- 3 -
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par value cODDDOn stock. Holders of zero shares of common stock of the 
Corporation voted against this Amendment. 
(f) The Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation does not provide 
for an exchange, reclassification or cancellation of issued shares, 
(g) The Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation does not effect a 
change in the amount of stated capital of the Corporation. 
Dated: February 17, 1989 
All SERVICES CORPORATION 
A~: 
- 4 -
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VERIFICATIOif 
SllTE DY DWIO ) 
_,, ) ss. 
rotMY DY ,~~ ~~·:) 
I, T b: ~ /{ cv[-4 { / , a Notary Public, do hereby certify 
that on February 17, 1989, personally appeared before me Reed J. Taylor, 
who, being by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the President of AIA 
Services Corporation, that he signed the foregoing document as President of 
such Corporation, and that the statements contained herein are true. 
Witness my hand and official seal. 
My Commission expires: 
S E A L 
- s -
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State of Idaho 
I I 
CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT 
OF 
AIA SERVlCES CORPORATION 
File Number C 74568 
I, PETET. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, 
hereby certify U,at duplicate originals of Arlides of Ainendment to the 
Articles of Incorporation of AJA SERVICES CORPORATION duly signed 
and verified pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation 
Act, have been received in this office and are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by 
law, I issue this Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation 
and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Articles of Amendment. 
Dated: April 11, 1995 
Gkr10~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
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ORIGll~AL 
~ ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT 
ki,, II f!] ... r,, ,lo THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
·~c:,•:c:.:.?·· ,:· 1111 :J~ AIA SERVICF.SO~RPORATION 
" 
1
"' ST~ r: 
Pursuant to the provisions of §30-1-58, §30-1-59 and §30-1-61 of the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following Articles of Amendment to 
its Articles oflncorporation, as filed on December 20, 1983 and previously amended on October 
14, 1986 and December 29, 1987. 
FIRST: The name of the corporation is AIA SERVICES CORPORATION. 
SECOND: On March 7, 1995, the shareholders of the corporation adopted and approved 
the following Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation, 
pursuant to which Article Fourth, Article Fifth and Article Tenth were amended by replacing 
them in their entirety. 
"AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION 
Except for the amendment of Articles Fourth, Fifth and Tenth by replacing them in their 
entirety, these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Al.A Services Corporation 
correctly set forth without change the corresponding provisions of the original Articles of 
Incorporation as hereinbefore filed on December 20, 1983 and amended on October 14, 1986 
and December 29, 1987; and these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, including 
the amended Articles Fourth, Fifth and Tenth, supersede the original Articles of Amendment and 
all previous am_endments thereto. 
The name of the corporation is AIA SERVICES CORPORATION. 
SECOND 
IDIHJ SECIIETM'I rF ST~TE 
The period of its duration is perpetual. 1995(),\11 0900 ~ 2 
CK 11 58727 CUSTI 20168 
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The purpose for which the corporation is organized is for the _transaction of any or all 
lawful business for which the corporation may be incorporated under the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act. 
FOURTH 
4.1 Authorized Capital. The aggregate number of shares which this corporation shall 
have authority to issue is 6,085,000 shares, of which 1,085,000 shares shall be Preferred Stock 
and 5,000,000 shares shall be Common Stock ($1 par value). The corporation is authorized to 
issue the Preferred Stock in thr~ series designated as "Series A", consisting of 200,000 shares 
of Stated Value Preferred Stock (without par value); "Series B", consisting of 735,000 shares 
of 10% Preferre.d Stock ($1 par value); and "Series C", consisting of 150,000 shares of 10% 
Preferred Stock ($1 par value). The respective preferences, limitations and relative rights of 
each of the three series of Preferred Stock and the Common Stock of the corporation are set 
forth in the following provisions of Article Fourth: · 
4.2 Series A Preferred Stock. 
4.2.1 General. F.acb share of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the rights and 
preferences conferred in this Section 4.2 of Article Fourth. Holders of Series A Preferred Stock 
shall have no rights to share in any distribution of the profits or assets of the corporation, 
whether in the form of cash or stock or dividends or otherwise, except to the extent specifically 
provided herein. 
4.2.2 No Dividends, The Series A Preferred Stock shall not pay or accrue any 
dividends. 
4.2.3 Demand for Redemptiop. (a) The holder of Series A Preferred Stock 
shall have the right to require the corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available 
funds upon breach of any covenant of the corporation set forth in this Article Fourth, but only 
to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions 
on the corporation's redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised by giving the 
corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifying the default and a redemption 
date not less than ninety (90) days from the date such notice delivered to the corporation; 
provided however that, if the corporation cures such specified default within_ sixty (60) days· after 
receipt of such notice by corporation, the right to redeem Series A Preferred Stock on account 
of such specified default shall be extinguished. 
(b) The holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to require the 
corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds at any time after September 
14, 1993, but only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation 
Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised 
by giving the corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifying a redemption date 
after September 14, 1993 and not less than ninety (90) days or more than one hundred eighty 
(180) days from the date such notice is delivered to the corporation. 
ARTICLES OP AMENDMENT - Page 2 
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4.2.4 Call for Redemption. The Series A Preferred Stock may be called for 
redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of the redemption price from 
legally available funds at any time prior ta the demand for redemption by the holder of Series 
A Preferred Stock. Notice of such call for redemption, specifying the redemption date not less 
than thirty (30) days from the date such notice is mailed, shall be mailed to each record holder 
of Series A Preferred Stock. If fewer than all shares of Series A Preferred Stock are to be 
redeemed, the shares shall be redeemed prorata from the holders thereof. 
4.2.S Redemption Price If Series A Preferred Stock is redeemed on or before 
September 14, 1990, the redemption price is $8.00 per share if paid in a lump sum. If Series 
A Preferred Stock is redeemed any time during the three-year period beginning September 15, 
1990 and ending on September 14, 1993, the redemption price is $8.50 per share if paid in a 
lump sum. If not paid in a lump sum on or before September 14, 1993, the redemption price 
for Series A Preferred Stock is $10.00 per share, provided that the redemption price may be 
paid, at the corporation's sole option, in monthly installments on a fifteen (15) year amortization 
schedule beginning on the day after the redemption date and .accruing interest at a rate of one-
and one-half (1 1h) points under the First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., prime lending rate, 
adjusted quarterly. 
4.2.6 Redemption Procedure and Effect. 
(a) Lum·p · Sum Payment. If the redemption price is to be paid in a lump sum, the 
corporation shall deposit, or shall cause its nominee to deposit, on or before the redemption date 
specified in the notice of redemption, the aggregate redemption price of the shares of Series A 
Preferred Stock to be redeemed with a bank or trust company specified in the notice; payable 
on the redemption date in the amounts and .to the respective orders of the holders of the shares 
of Series A Preferred Stock to be redeemed, on endorsement to the corporation or its nominee 
as may be required and upon surrender of the certificates for such shares. Unless the 
corporation or its nominee fails to pay the lump sum redemption price on or before the 
redemption date, the shares of Series A Preferred Stock subject to such redemption shall be 
deemed to have been redeemed, and shall be deemed no longer to be outstanding, from and after 
the redemption date set forth in the notice of redemption. On or after the redemption date, 
subject only to payment of the redemption price, Series A Preferred Stock so called for 
redemption shall cease to be entitled to any interest or right in the corporation; and holders of 
such Series A Preferred Stock shall thereafter cease to be shareholders and shall be entitled only 
to payment of the amount of the redemption price, without interest, upon surrender of the 
certificates evidencing such stock. If the lump sum redemption price shall be paid by a nominee 
of the corporation, such nominee shall upon such payment become the owner of the shares with 
respect to which such payment was made; and certificates of stock may be issued to such 
nominee in evidence of such ownership. 
. . (b) Installment Pa,yment. If the corporation elects to pay the redemption price in 
installments, the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock equal to the principal portion of 
each installment divided by $10.00 per share shall be deemed to have been redeemed and to be 
no longer outstanding from and after the date of such installment. On and after such payment 
cl.ate, such number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock shall cease to be entitled to any interest 
or right in the corporation; and holders of such shares shall thereafter cease to be shareholders 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT • Page 3 
03/13/95 10:46om/, 






of the corporation with respect to such shares, whether or not the certificates evidencing sucb 
shares have been surrendered. Upon request of the corporation from time to time, certificates 
evidencing shares of Series A Preferred Stock including redeemed shares shall be surrendered 
to and reissued by the coiporation in reduced amount to reflect any and all installment 
redemptions of shares prior to such request. 
4.2. 7 Uquidatiop Pre{erena:. In case of the voluntary liquidation or dissolution 
of the corporation, the holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid in full, 
before any amount shall be paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the 
Series B or Series C Preferred Stock, as follows: 
$8.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid on or before 
September 14, 1990. 
$8.50 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 14, 
1990 and on or before September 14, 1993. 
$10.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 
14, 1993. 
In case of the involuntary liquidation or dissolution of the corporation, the holder of Series A 
Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid $10.00 per share, in full, before any amount shall 
be paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the Series B or. Series C 
Preferred Stock. After payment to the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock of the full 
· preferential amounts hereinabove provided, the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock as such 
shall have no right or claim to any of the remaining assets of the corporation either upon any 
distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining 
assets to be distributed, if any, upon a distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation 
or winding up, may be distributed among the holders of the Series B Preferred Stock, the Series 
C Preferred Stock and the Common Stock in accordance with the provisions of this Article 
Fourth. 
4.2.8 Limited Yotin,: Rights. The Series A Preferred Stock shall have no right 
(except as required by law or as provided by Section 4.2.12 of this Article Fourth) to receive 
notice of or to vote at any regular or special meeting of stockholders, except that the holders of 
a majority of the shares of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right, voting separately as 
a class, to elect one director to the board of directors of the corporation. 
4.2.9 Coveuauts, So long as any shares of Series A Preferred Stock are 
outstanding, and except with the consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares 
of Series A Preferred Stock. 
(a) Common Stock. The corporation shall not issue any Common Stock for 
less than book value (determined as of the end of the immediately preceding fiscal year), except 
for Common Stock issued to pay a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock or issued 
to employees or agents pursuant to incentive stock option or bonus plan. · 
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(b) Prefeu:r,d Stock. The corporation shall issue no Preferred Stock or 
securities convertible into such stock, other than the Series A, Series B and Series C Preferred 
Stock. 
(c) Indebtedness. The corporation will not, and will not pennit any of its 
Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, create, incur, assume, guaranty or otherwise become or 
remain directly or indirectly liable with respect to, any Indebtedness, except: 
(I) The corporation may remain liable in respect of Indebtedness 
outstanding on the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation· s 
shareholders. 
(2) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable 
with respect to Indebtedness Ulat is not secured by a Lien on any of the assets of the 
corporation or its Subsidiaries, provided that the aggregate principal amount of such 
unsecured Indebtedness shall not exceed Consolidated Net Worth less goodwill of the 
corporation at any time; and 
(3) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable 
in respect of Indebtedness secured by any of the following Liens: 
(i) Liens for tax.es, assessments or governmental charges or 
claims the payment of which is not yet delinquent or is being contested in good 
faith, if such reserve or other provision, if any, as shall be re.quired by generally 
accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, shall have been made 
therefor; 
(ii) Statutory Liens of landlords and lines of carriers, 
warehousemen, mechanics, materialmen and other liens imposed by law incurred 
in the ordinary courses of business for sums not yet delinquent or being contested 
in good faith, if such reserve or other appropriate provision, if any, as shall be 
required by generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied shall 
have been made therefor; 
(iii) Liens incurred or deposits made in the ordinary course of 
business in connection with worker's compensation, unemployment insurance and 
other types of social security, or to secure the performance of tenders, statutory 
obligations, surety and appeal bonds, bids, leases, governmental contracts, 
performance and return-of-money bonds and other similar obligations (exclusive 
of obligations for the payment of borrowed money); · 
(iv) Any attachment or judgment Lien; provided that if the 
judgment it secures exceeds $250,000 (alone or when aggregated with all other 
judgments secured by Liens permitted by this clause (vi)), such judgment sball, 
within forty-five (45) days after the entty thereof, have been discharged or 
execution thereof stayed pending appeal, or shall have been discharged within 
forty-five '(4S) days after the expiration of any such stay; 
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(v) F.asements, rights-of-way, restrictions and other similar 
charges or encumbrances not interfering with the ordinary conduct of the business 
of the corporation or any of its Subsidiaries; 
(vi) Any interest or title of a lessor under any lease; 
(vii) Any Lien existing on any asset of any corporation at the 
time such corporation becomes a subsidiary if such Lien was not created in 
contemplation of such event; 
(viii) Any Lien on any asset securing Indebtedness incurred or 
assume for the purpose of financing not more than Eighty-five percent (85 %) of 
the cost of acquiring such assets; provided that such line attaches to such asset 
concurrently with or within ninety (90) days after the acquisition thereof; 
(ix) Any Lien on any asset of any corporation existing at the 
time such corporation is merged into or consolidated with the corporation or a 
subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in contemplation of such event; 
(x) Any Lien existing on any asset prior to the acquisition 
thereof by the corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in 
contemplation of such acquisition; 
(xi) Any Lien arising out of the refinancing, extension, renewal 
· or refunding of any Indebtedness secured by any Lien permitted by any of the 
foregoing clauses of this Section 4.2.9(c); provided that the amount of such 
Indebtedness is not increased and that such Indebtedness is not secured by any 
additional assets; and 
(xii) Liens not otherwise permitted by the foregoing clauses of 
this Section 4.2. 9{c) (including, without limitation, Liens on stock of Subsidiaries, 
whether consolidated or unconsolidated) securing Indebtedness in an aggregate 
principal amount of any time outstanding not to exc.eed ten percent (10 %) of the 
difference between Consolidated Net Worth and the amount of the goodwill of the 
corporation. 
(d) Corporate Existence. The corporation will maintain its corporate existence 
and wiJl not liquidate, wind up or dissolve itself {or suffer any liquidation or dissolution), or 
enter into any transaction of merger or consolidation with any Person (including any Subsidiary) 
unless (i) this corporation is the swviving corporation following any such merger or 
consolidationt .and (ii) the Consolidated Net Worth of the surviving corporation immediately 
following such merger or consolidation equals or exceeds the Consolidated Net Worth of this 
corporation immediately prior to such merger or consolidation. 
(e) Sale of Assets. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its 
Subsidiaries to, convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or any material part of 
its business, property or assets, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, except: 
ARTICLES OP AMENDMENT - Page 6 
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(1) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may convey, sell, lease, 
transfer or otherwise dispose of investment assets in the ordinary course of business; 
(2) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose 
of Capital Assets or real property if the asset so disposed of is concurrently replaced by 
a substantially equivalent asset having a value equal to or greater than the assets disposed 
of: 
(3) The corporation and is Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose 
of obsolete or worn out property in the ordinary course of business; 
( 4) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell and lease back any 
newly acquired asset for the purpose of financing the acquisition of such asset and 
securing the repayment of Indebtedness, provided that such Indebtedness shall not exceed 
eighty-five percent (85 % ) of the cost of such asset and is otherwise permitted by the 
covenants contained in this Article Fourth; and 
(5) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose 
of any of their other assets; provided that any such sale or other disposition is made for 
the fair market value of such assets. 
(f) Acquisitions. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its 
Subsidiaries to, acquire by purchase or otherwise all or substantially all the business, -property 
or fixed assets, or the stock or other evidence of beneficial ownership, of any Person unless, 
immediately prior to and after giving effect to such transaction, no violation of any of the 
covenants or other provisions contained in this Article Fourth shall have occurred and be 
continuing or would be caused by such acquisition. 
(g) Transactions with Shareholders and Affiliates. The corporation will not, 
and will not permit any of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, enter into or permit to exist 
any transaction (including, without limitation, the purchase, sale, lease, loan or exchange of any 
property or the rendering of any service) with any director or officer or any holder of equity 
securities of the corporation, or with any Affiliate of the corporation or of such director, officer 
or bolder, on terms that are less favorable to the corporation or that Subsidiary, as the case may 
be, than those which might be obtained at the time from Persons who are not such a director, 
officer, bolder or· Affiliate; provided that the foregoing restriction shall not apply to (i) any 
transaction in effect at the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's 
shareholders; (ii) any transaction between the corporation and any of its wholly-owned 
Subsidiaries or between any of its wholly-owned Subsidiaries; (iii) compensation (net of amounts 
contributed or repaid to the corporation or any Subsidiary or to Lewiston Land Company and 
contributed or repaid. to the corporation or any Subsidiary), by way of salary or bonus, paid to 
director or officers of the corporation in an amount, as to any one individual, not greater than 
the greater of $400,000 or the total compensation paid in calendar year 1986; (iv) compensation 
paid to any director or officer of the corporation in amounts equal to income tax liability of such 
director or officer attributable to transactions involving the corporation, A.I.A., Inc., AIA 
Travel Services, Inc. 1 AlA Travel, Inc., Lewiston I.and Company, AIA Bancard Services 
Corporation or Taylor Brothers Aircraft on or before January l , J 988 or to other personal 
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income tax liability of such director or officer for tax years ended before January 1, 1988; or 
(v) any loan to or account receivable from an officer, director or stockholder which is repaid 
in full at least annually on or before the last day of the fiscal year. 
(h} Consolidated Net Worth. The corporation will not permit Consolidated 
Net Worth at any date to be less than the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock 
outstanding at such date multiplied by $10.00 per share. 
(i) Dividend Restriction. The corporation will not, directly or indirectly, 
declare, order, make or set apart any sum for payment of any dividend in respect of its Common 
Stock (other than a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock), except that the 
corporation may declare and pay Common Stock dividends in an aggregate amount not exceeding 
the Dividend Availability Amount. 
(j) Debt!Eqyjty Ratio. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will incur 
any new Indebtedness {other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9{c)(xi) of this Article 
Fourth) if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of Consolidated Long Term Debt 
to Consolidated Net Worth exceeds, or such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to 
exceed, 3.6 to 1.0. 
(k) Debt Seryjce Covera&e, Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will 
incur any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness perrrJtted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) of this 
Article Fourth) if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of (i) Consolidated Net 
Income plus depreciation and amortization expenses plus compensation contributed or repaid to 
the corporation, any Subsidiary, Lewiston Land Company or AIA Travel Services, Inc. during . 
the immediately preceding fiscal year of the corporation, divided by (ii) current maturities of 
Long Term Debt is, or such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to be, less than . 8 
to 1.0. 
4.2.10 Definitions. For the purpose of Section 4.2.9 of this Article Fourth, the 
following terms shall have the following meanings: 
"Amliate", as applied to any Person, shall mean any other Person directly or 
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, that Person. For the 
purposes of this definition, •control" (including, with correlative meanings, the terms 
"controlling", "controlled by" and "under common control with"), as applied to any Person, 
means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the 
management and policies of that Person, whether through the ownership of voting securities or 
by contract or otherwise. 
"Capital Asset" shall mean, as at any date of determination, those assets of a 
Person that would, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently 
applied, be classified as plant, property or equipment on the balance sheet of that Person. 
"Consolidated Long Term Debt" shall mean, as at any date of determination, 
the total of all Long Term Debt of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis 
determined in accordance with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for 
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which GAAP financial statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently 
applied. 
"Consolidated Net Worth" shall mean, as at any date of determination, the sum 
of (a) the capital stock and additional. paid.,in capital, (b) plus retained earnings (or minus _ 
accumulated -deficit) of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, determined 
in conformity with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP 
financial statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied. 
"Consolidated Net Income" for any period, shall mean the net income (or loss) 
of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis determined in conformity with 
generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP fin~cial 
statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied. 
"Dividend Availability Amount" shall mean, as at any date of determination, an 
amount equal to fifty percent (50 % ) of Consolidated Net Income for the period (taken as single 
accounting period) commencing January 31, 1987 and ending on the last day of the fiscal quarter 
immediately preceding such date of determination. 
"Indebtedness" as applied to any person, means (a) all indebtedness for borrowed 
money, (b) that portion of obligations with respect to finance leases which is capitalized on a 
balance sheet in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, 
(c) notes payable and drafts accepted representing extensions of credit whether or -not 
representing obligations for borrowed money, (d) any obligation owed for all or any part of the 
deferred purchase price of property or services which purchase price is (i) due more than six (6) 
months from the date of incurrence of the obligation in respect thereof, or (ii) evidenced by a 
note or similar written instrument, and (e) all indebtedness secured by any Lien or vendor's 
interest under any conditional sale or other title retention agreement existing on any property or 
asset owned or held by that Person regardless of whether the indebtedness secured thereby shall 
have been assumed by that Person or is non-recourse to the credit of that Person; provided, 
however, that "Indebtedness" shall not include policy claims, policy reserves or mandatory 
securities valuation reserves of a regulated insurance company; and further provided that 
"Indebtedness~ shall not include indebtedness of the corporation to any Subsidiary. 
"Llen" shall mean any lien, mortgage, pledge, security interest, charge or 
encumbrance of any kind (including any conditional sale or other title retention agreement, any 
lease in the nature thereof, and any agreement to give a security interest). 
"Long Tenn Debt", as applied to any Person, shall mean all Indebtedness of that 
Person which by its terms or by the terms of any instrument or agreement relating thereto 
matures more than one year, or is directly renewable or extendable at the option of the debtor 
to a date more than one year (including an option of the debtor under a revolving credit or 
similar agreement obligating the lenders to extend credit over a period of one year or more), 
from the date of creation thereof, but excluding any payments due under the terms thereof within 
twelve (12) months of any date of determination. 
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"Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, 
unincorporated organization or any other jurisdictional entity, or a foreign state or any agency 
or political subdivision thereof. 
~--·· ... "Subsidiary" shaU mean aey corporation of which at least a majority pf tb~. 
outstanding stock having by the terms thereof ordinary voting power to elect a majority of the 
board of directors of such corporation (irrespective of whether or not at the time stock of any 
other class or classes of such corporation shall have or might have voting power by reason of 
the happening of any contingency) is at the time directly or indirectly owned or controlled by 
the corporation or one or more of its Subsidiaries or by the corporation and one or more of its 
Subsidiaries. 
4.2.11 Conversiop Ript. The holders of the Series A Preferred Stock shall 
have the following conversion right c·conversion Right•): 
(a) Ri&bt to Convert. Each share of Series A Preferred Stock shall be 
convertible, at the option of the holder thereof, at any time prior to the date on which notice of 
redemption is given under Section 4.2.3 or Section 4.2.4, at the office of the corporation or any 
transfer agent for the Series A Preferred Stock or Common Stock, into one fully paid and 
nonassessable share of Common Stock. 
(b) Mechanics of Conversion. Before any holder of Series A Preferred Stock 
shall be entitled to convert such stock into shares of Common Stock, he shall surrender the 
certificate or certificates for such Preferred Stock, duly endorsed, at the office of the corporation 
or ai1y·ttansfer agent for the Common Stock, and shall give written notice. to the <;orporation at 
such office that he elects to convert such Preferred Stock and shall state therein the number of 
shares of Series A Preferred Stock being converted. Thereupon the corporation shall promptly 
issue and deliver at such office to such holder of a certificate or certificates for the number.of 
shares of Common Stock to which he shall be entitled. 
Such conversion shall be deemed to have been made immediately prior to the 
close of business on the date of such surrender of the shares of Series A Stock to be converted 
(the ·conversion Date•); and the person or persons entitled to receive the shares of Common 
Stock issuable upon such conversion shall be treated for all purposes as the record holder or 
· holders of such shares of Common Stock on such date. 
(c) Fractional Shares. No fractional share of Cominon Stock shall be issued 
upon conversion of Series A Stock. In lieu of any fractional shares to which the holder would 
otherwise be entitled, the corporation shall pay cash equal to the product of such fraction 
multiplied by the fair market value of one share of the corporation's Common Stock on the 
Conversion Date, such value to be determined in good faith by the Board of Directors. 
(d) Bcservation of Stoc;k Issuable Upon Convecsioo. The corporation shall at 
all times reserve and keep available out of its authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock. 
solely for the purpose of effecting the conversion of the shares of the Series A Stock, such 
number of its shares of Common Stock as shall from time to time be sufficient to effect the 
conversion of all outstanding shares of the Series A Preferred Stock; and if at any time the 
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number of authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock shall not be sufficient to effect the 
conversion of all then outstanding shares of the Series A Preferred Stock, the corporation will 
take such corporate action as may, in the opinion of its counsel, be necessary to increase its 
authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock to such number of shares as shall be sufficient 
.:.fer-such purpose,. -·-·-"""' -- ... :./-_ . .:c 
(e) Tennination of Redemption Ri&hL Upon exercise of the Conversion Right 
under this Section 4.2. 11, all rights of a holder of Series A Stock to require redemption of such 
stock under Section 4.2.3 shall automatically be terminated; and no holder of Common Stock 
acquired upon conversion of Series A Preferred Stock shall have any right of redemption. 
4.2.12 Modification of Bid,ts and Preferences. The rights and preferences 
hereby conferred on the Series A Preferred Stock shall not be changed, altered or revoked 
without the consent of the holders of the majority of the Series A Preferred Stock outstanding 
___ -- . . .-al-the-time. 
4.3 Series B and Series c Preferred Stock. 
4.3.1 General. Each share of Series B Preferred Stock and each share of Series 
C Preferred Stock shall have the relative rights, preferences and limitations set forth in this 
Section 4.3 of Article Fourth. The rights, preferences and limitations of the Series B Preferred 
Stock shall be identical to the rights, preferences and limitations of the Series C Preferred Stock, 
except that the holders of Series C Preferred Stock shall have certain voting and conversion 
rights not shared by the holders of Series B Preferred Stock; and the Series B Preferre.d Stock 
shall participate pro rata with the Series C Preferred Stock in any·and all dividends declared and 
paid on the Preferred Stock, in distributions upon liquidation, dissolution or winding up of 
corporation's affairs, and in redemption. 
4.3.2 Restricted Yotlni: Rii:hts. The holders of the Series B and the Series C 
Preferred Stock shall have no right (except as required by law) to receive notice of or to vote 
on any matter (including, without limitation, the election of directors of the corporation) at any 
regular or special meeting of stockholders of the corporation, except that the holders of a 
majority of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock shall have the right, voting separately as a 
class, to elect one director to the Board of Directors of the corporation. 
4.3.3 Cumulative Dividend Preference 
The Series B Preferred Stock and the Series C Preferred Stock shall be entitled 
to receive, when and as declared by the corporation's Board of Directors, cash dividends at the 
per annum rate of 10% of the Liquidation Rate (as defined in Section 4.3.4), cumulative, 
payable annually at December 31 of each calendar year out of any funds legally available for 
the payment of dividends, and in preference to any dividends upon the Common Stock. The 
dividends on the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock shall be cumulative, whether or not 
declared, so that, if for any period such dividend shall not be paid, the right to such dividend 
shall -accumulate as against the Common Stock; and all arrears so accumulated shall be paid 
before any dividends shall be declared or paid upon the Common Stock. No dividends shall be 
declared or paid on the Series B or Series C Preferred Stock if the redemption payments due to 
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the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock under Section 4.2. of this Article Fourth are in 
arrears. No dividend shall be declared or paid upon the Common Stock nor shall any Common 
Stock be purchased or otherwise acquired by the corporation for value (other than payment of 
amounts due to Reed J. Taylor for redemption of his Common Stock), unless all dividends on 
-the Series B and .Series C Preferred Stock for all .past period shall have been paid or shall have 
been declared and a sum sufficient for the payment thereof set apart for payment. 
4.3.4 Liquidation Preference. 
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding-up of the corporation, 
whether voluntary or involuntary, before any other distribution or payment is made to the 
holders of Common Stock or any other series of Preferred Stock (except the corporation's Series 
A Preferred Stock), the holders of Series B Preferred Stock and the holders of the Series C 
Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive, out of the assets of the corporation legally available 
therefor, a liquidation payment in the amount of $10.00 cash per share of Series B or Series C 
Preferred Stock ("Liquidation Rate"), plus a further amount equal to the dividends accumulated 
and unpaid thereon to the date of such liquidation payment. If, upon any liquidation, dissolution 
or winding up of the corporation, the assets available for distribution are insufficient to pay to 
the holders of all outstanding Series B and Series C Preferred Stock the full amount of the 
Liquidation Rate and all accumulated but unpaid dividends, the holders of the Series B and 
Series C Preferred Stock shall share pro rata in any such distribution of assets. Such rights of 
the holders of the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock shall be subordinate only to the right 
of the holder of the Series A Preferred Stock to be paid the redemption price of such stock in 
full, together with accrued interest, in accordance with Section 4.2 of this Article Fourth. After 
payment to the holders of the· Series B and Series C Preferred Stock of the full preferential 
amounts hereinabove provided, the holders of the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock as such 
shall have no right or claim to any of the remaining assets of the corporation either upon any 
distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining 
assets to be distributed, if any, upon a distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation 
or winding up, may be distributed among the holders of the Common Stock. 
4.3.S Redemption, 
(a) Mandatory Redemption by COJl)OI'ition. The Series B Preferred Stock and, 
subject to the conversion rights provided in Section 4.3.6 of Article Fourth, the Series C 
Preferred Stock shall be called for redemption by the corporation upon payment of the aggregate 
Redemption Rate from legally available funds upon the closing of the earliest of the following 
events c·E.quity Offering"): 
(i) an offering of the corporation's securities conducted pursuant to the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (" 1933 Act") in which gross 
proceeds of at least $5,000,000 are raised; 
(ii) an offering of the corporation's securities pursuant to exemptions from 
registration_under-the 1933 Act in which gross proceeds of at least $5,000,000 are raised; 
or 
ARTlCL'ES OF AMENDMENT • Page 12 
mm/ll, LD:46oln/• 
Exhibit - 1 - Page - 57 
- --- ··-..:....-·-
A - 057 697 
r--" ----- .. - -- .. ---- .- . - ----- --~-----· 
(iii) · an offering of any securities convertible into corporation's Common Stock 
that are sold in an offering that conforms to the parameters of subparagraph (i) or (ii) 
above. 
---- -.The redemption price for each share _of Seti~ B and S_~ries C _Preferred Stock shall be t11e._ 
"Redemption Rate• equal to 100 % of the Liquidation Rate if such redemption occurs within two 
(2) years from the issuance of the first shares of Series B or Series C Preferred Stock. After 
such two year period, an amount equal to 5 % of the Liquidation Rate will be added to the 
Redemption Rate immediately and each 180 days thereafter until all outstanding shares of the 
Series B and Series C Preferred Stock are fully redeemed, :m;: 
Time from Original Issuance Percentage of Liquidation Rate 
Within two years 100% 
After two years 
but 105% 
before two years plus 181 days 
After two years plus 180 days but 
before two years plus 361 days 110% 
After two years plus 360 days 
but 115% 
before two years plus 541 days 
. . . ... 
Notice of such call for redemption, specifying the anticipated date of closing of the Equity 
Offering, shall be mailed to each record holder of Series B or Series C Preferred Stock as soon 
as practicable before such closing date. The redemption date for mandatory redemption of the 
Series Band Series C Preferred Stock shall be the actual closing date of the Equity Offering. 
Mandatory redemption of the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock under this Section 4.3.5 of 
Article Fourth shall automatically be cancelled upon determination by corporation's board of 
directors that the Equity Offering will not be consummated for any reason. 
(b) Voluntary Redemption by Cotporation, Toe Series B and Series c Preferred 
Stock may be called for redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of 
the Redemption Price from legally available funds at any time prior to the closing of an :Equity 
Offering. Notice of such call for redemption, specifying the redemption date not less than thirty 
days from the date such notice is mailed and the number or percentage of outst.a.ndi ng shares of 
Serles Band Serles C Preferred Stock to be redeemed, shall be mailed to each record holder of 
Series· B · and Serles C Preferred Stock. If fewer than all shares of Series B and Series C 
Preferred Stock are to be redeemed, the shares shall be redeemed prorata from the holders 
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thereof; and, upon request of the corporation, certificates evidencing shares of Series B and 
Series C Preferred Stock including redeemed shares shall be surrendered to and reissued by the 
corporation in reduced amount to reflect any and all partial redemptions of such shares prior to 
such request. 
(c) Redemption Proced,ure and Effect. The corporation shall deposit, on or 
before the redemption date specified in the notice of redemption, the aggregate redemption price 
of the shares of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock to be redeemed with a bank or trust 
company specified in the notice, payable on the redemption date in the amounts and to the 
respective orders of the holders of the shares of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock to be 
redeemed, on endorsement to the corporation as may be required and upon surrender of the 
certificates for such shares. Unless the corporation fails to pay the Redemption Price on or 
before the redemption date, the shares of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock subject to such 
redemption shall be deemed to have been redeemed, and shall be deemed no longer to be 
outstanding, from and after the redemption date set forth in the notice of redemption. On or 
after the redemption date, subject only to payment of the redemption price, Series B and Series 
C Preferred Stock so called for redemption shall cease to be entitled to any interest or right in 
the corporation; and holders of such Series B or Series C Preferred Stock shall thereafter cease 
to be shareholders and shall be entitled only to payment of the amount of the redemption price, 
without interest, upon surrender of the certificates evidencing such stock. 
4.3.6 Conversion or Series C Preferred Stock. Each holder of Series c 
Preferred Stock shall have the right, exercisable beginning at the earlier of the date of receipt 
of notice of mandatory redemption of the Series C Preferred Stock pursuant to Section 4.3.5(a) 
or two years after the first issuance of Series B or Series C Preferred Stock and ending <m the 
closing date of an Equity Offering, to convert Series C Preferred Stock into Common Stock at 
the Conversion Rate determined as follows: Each share of Series C Preferred Stock shall be 
convertible into that number of shares of Common Stock which e.quals 10.4% of the Common 
Stock on a fully diluted basis divided by 150,000. 
This conversion right shall be exercisable by any holder of Series C Preferred 
Stock as to all or any number of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock owned of record by such 
holder and shall be exercised by giving the corporation written notice of the exercise of such 
right, specifying the number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock to be converted and the 
effective date of such conversion, provided that the effective date of the conversion shall not be 
later than the closing date of an Equity Offering. 
4.4 Cominon Stock. Holders of the Common Stock are entitled to one vote per share 
on all matters to be voted on by stockholders, including the election of directors. Common 
Stockholders are not entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors. · 
Holders of Common Stock of the corporation shall be entitled to elect all of the directors of the 
corporation other than the director appointed by the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock and 
the director elected by the holders of Series C Preferred Stock. The holders of any series of 
Preferred Stock of the corporation have a preference over the holders of Common Stock of the 
corporation on the assets of the corporation legally available for distribution to stockholders. in 
the event of any liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the affairs of the corporation. In the 
event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the affairs of the corporation, holders of 
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the Common Stock will share ratably in any assets of the corporation legally available for 
distribution to holders of Common Stock after satisfying the liquidation preferences of the Series 
A, Serles B and Series C Preferred Stock. Holders of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock 
have a preference over the holders of Common Stock u to the payment of dividends. Holders 
of C'..omnion Stock have rights, share for share, to receive dividends if and when declared- by 1he 
Board of Directors out of funds legally available therefor, after paying preferred dividends to 
the holders of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock. · 
FIFTH 
Holders of any class or series of corporation's stock shall not have a preemptive right 
to acquire unissued or treasury shares of any class or series or securities conver_tible into such 
shares or carrying a right to subscribe to or acquire such shares, except as provided in the Idaho. 
Business Corporation Act. 
SIXTH 
The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is One Lewis Clark Plaza, 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501; and the name of its initial registered agent at such address is R. John 
T~ylor. 
SEVENTH 
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors is four, and the names 
-and addresses of the persons who arc to serve until the first-annual meeting of the shareholders ---
and until their successors are ele.cted and qualified are: 
Reed J. Taylor 
R. John Taylor 
Raymond R. Heilman 
Mary K. Frost 
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The name and address of the incorporator is as follows: 
Reed J. TayloJ' 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston ID 83501 
NINTH 
The Board of Directors i~ expressly authorize.d to alter, amend or repeal the Bylaws of 
the corporation and to adopt new Bylaws, subject to repeal or change by a majority vote of the 
shareholders. 
TENTH 
Shareholders entitled under Article Fourth to vote in the election of directors of the 
corporation shall not be entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors of 
the corporation. 
ELEVENTH 
A director of this corporatio~ shall not be personally liable to this corporation or its 
shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability 
(a) forany breach of the director's-duty of loyalty to this corporation or its shareholders, (b) for . 
acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing 
violation of law, (c) under Idaho Code f30-1-48, or (d) for any transaction from which the 
director derived an improper personal benefit. If the Idaho Business Corporation Act is amended 
to authorize corporate action further eliminating or limiting the personal liability of directors, 
then the liability of a director of this corporation shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest 
extent permitted by the Idaho Business Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or 
modification of this Article Eleventh by the shareholders of the corporation shall not adversely 
affect any right or protection of a director of the corporation existing at the time of such repeal 
or modification. • 
mIRD: The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the time of such 
adoption was 973,333.5 shares of Common Stock and 188,065 shares of Stated Value Preferred 
Stock; and the nu.mber of shares entitled to vote thereon was 973,333.5 shares of Common 
Stock. 
FOURTH: The designation and number of outstanding shares of each class entitled to 
vote thereon as a class were as follows: 
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Number of Shares 
Common 973,333.5 
F'IF"l'H: The number of shares of Common Stock voted for such amendment was 
926,698; and the number of shares of Common Stock voted against such amendment was 6,688. 
DATED this '7~ day of March 1995. 
~~--Daniel L. Spiclder,-Secretary 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ·) 
:ss .. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
I, Sog r ~ ?obeyh,a Notary Public, do hereby certify that on the ~ day of 
March 1995, -per y appeared before me R. JOHN TAYLOR, who, being by me first duly 
sworn, declared that he is the President of AI.A SERVICES CORPORATION, that he signed the 
foregoing document as President of the corporation, and that the statements contained therein 
are true. 
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Notarybfic for Idaho 
Residing at: L Oil, i5wn 
My Commission Expires:.lf2i.~o/q7 
Exhibit • 1 • Page • 62 
A· 062 102 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SE OND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR HE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
DONNA J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
and 
DONNA 1. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR; CONNIE 
TAYLOR HENDERSON; JAMES BECK; 
and MICHAEL CAS1™AN, SR., 
Defendants. 
) 
) CASE NO. CVOS-01150 and 
) CVI3-01075 (Consolidated cases) 
) 
) OPINION AND ORDER ON 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE, 
) MOTION TO DISMISS, AND MOTION 
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11ris matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary -
Judgment, Motion to Strike Portions of Peterson Declaration, and on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions on May 23, 2014. 
I>laintiff Donna Taylor was repre~ented by attomey Roderick C. Bond. Defendant AJA Services __ -
Corporation was represented by attorney Douglas J. Siddoway. Defendants John Taylor, Connie 
Taylor Henderson, James Beck, and Michael Cashman were represented by attorney David R. 
Risley. The Court, having read the Motions, affidavits, and briefs filed by the parties, having 
reviewed the record, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the 
matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
This Court articulated the material facts in this matter in its Opinion and Order on 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered in July 26, 2013. For efficiency, the 
Comi will only repeat in part the facts as stated in that Order. 
In 1995, a stock redemption agreement was entered into between AIA Services 
Corporation ("AIA"), shareholder Reed Taylor ("Reed"), who owned common shares, and 
shareholder Donna Taylor ("Donna"), the sole owner of all outstanding Preferred A Shares 
issued by the corporation1• The corporation quickly found it was in default, however, and the 
parties opted to enter into a new restructured agreement in 1996.2 Under the 1996 Series A 
Preferred Shareholder Agreement, AIA was to redeem Donna's shares over a ten year 
amortization payment schedule. 3 The 1996 restructured agreement provided for Reed Taylor to 
1 Donna Taylor became the owner of the Preferred A shares as part of a property settlement when, prior to 1995, 
Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor divorced. 
2 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009. 
3 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009. 
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receive certain payments over the same ten-year period with payment of a $6 million promissory 
note at the end of the ten years. The restructured agreement further provided that the 
corporation's debt to Donna was s"11ior to its debt to Reed.4 In exchange for AIA 's agreement to 
accelerate.payment of the principal du,e.on the~demption of the S~ies A Pre_feIT~d S~ar;s,_. _ .... 
Donna agreed to release AIA from any claims of breach or default relative to the 1995 Series A 
Prefened stock redemption agreement. 5 
AIA Services was incorporated in the mid 1980's and, since that time, John Taylor 
("John") has held the position of president of the corporation.6 Reed Taylor ("Reed") was the 
founder and majority shareholder of AJA until 1995, when AIA agreed to redeem Reed's 
common stocks. Upon the redemption of Reed's shares, John Taylor became the majority 
shareholder. John Taylor continues to be the majority shareholder of AIA and continues to hold 
the position of president of the corporation. 
In a letter dated February 2001, Jolm Taylor informed Donna that AIA was developing an 
insurance program through a new company named CropUSA and requested AJA be allowed to 
defer five months of stock redemption payments, with the understanding the amounts would be 
paid at the end of contract. 7 Donna agreed to defer the payments based on the personal guarantee 
of payment by John Taylor and Reed Taylor. 8 
By 2006, AIA was in default of its 1996 stock redemption agreements with both Donna 
Taylor and Reed Taylor.9 In December 2006, Donna Taylor agreed to subordinate the amounts 
4 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009. 
5 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009 at 1 H. 
6 Deposition of John Taylor, attached to the Affidavit of Michael S. Bissell filed October 1, 2009. . 
7 Exhibit C to Donna Taylor's Motion for Partial Swnm.ary Judgment and Memorandum in Support filed October 1, 
2009. 
8 Exhibit 2 to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor filed October 15, 2009. 
9 AJA entered into an agreement in 1996 to redeem Donna Taylor's Preferred A shares and with Reed Taylor to 
redeem his common shares. 
3 
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· · ·-·and obligations owecrto heFby AIAto those amounts and obligations owed t0 Reed Taylor by 
AJA. Donna and Reed reduced their agreement to writing in a subordination agreement dated 
December 1, 2006. 10 In January 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AlA and others, including 
John Taylor and Connie Taylor, asse1ting numerous causes of action including br_ea<;!'t of ... ,. 
contract. 11 That action was stayed pending appeal on the issue of whether the 1995 stock 
redemption agreement between AIA and Reed Taylor and the 1996 restructured stock 
redemption agreement were illegal contracts under the applicable statutory stock redemption 
statute as it existed in 199 5 and 1996. 
On June 2, 2008, Plaintiff Donna Taylor filed the above-entitled action against Defendant 
John Taylor. John Taylor timely filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. On 
October 27, 2008, by stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding as a 
defendant Connie Taylor ("Connie"). 12 John Taylor timely filed an Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Counterclaim, as did Connie Taylor. 
In October 2009, Plaintiff Donna Taylor filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Defendant John Taylor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Connie Taylor 
filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions in November 2009. 
The Court subsequently entered a stay in Donna Taylor's action after finding Donna's matters 
shared common questions oflaw with Reed Taylor's action against the same Defendants and, 
because the issues of law were on appeal, Donna's matter should be stayed pending a ruling on 
the legal issues. In May 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services 
10 Exhibit 5 to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor filed October IS, 2009. 
11Reed Taylor v. AJA Services, AIA Insurance, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman, JoLee.Dudos, Crop 
USA Insurance, James Beck and Corrine Beck, Nez Perce County Case No. CV07-00208. 
12 Connie Taylor was added as a defendant when it was determined John Taylor and Connie Taylor continue to own 
assets as community property. The maniage of John Taylor and Connie Taylor was terminated by an Interlocutory 
Decree of Divorce in December 2005. However, the parties have not sought, nor has the court entered, a property 
settlement dividing the community property that comprised the marital estate. 
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· Corpol'ation, ·-151 ·.Idaho 353,-261 P .1d 829 (20 H )-affirmed this Court's finding that the Stock, .. _ ""· ... ~· ... 
Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable, having violated the earned and capital 
surplus limitations in LC. § 30-1-6 as the statute existed in 1995 and 1996 . 
.. . following entry of the Idaho Supreroe.Court's.ruling in Reed Taylor's case, Defend.~.nts. 
Taylor filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to have the Court find as a matter 
oflaw that the value of Donna Taylor's unredeemed stocks is $82,000.00, a value that was 
disputed by Donna. The Court denied Defendant Taylors' Motion, lifted the stay, and informed 
the parties that, should they desire, they could re-notice their 2009 motions and file additional 
briefing. 
In 2013, Donna Taylor filed a Complaint against AIA Services Corporation, R. John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor Henderson, James W. Beck, and Michael W. Cashman, Sr. asserting 
claims against AIA for breach of contract, against R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor Henderson, 
James Beck. and :Michael W. Cashman, Sr. claims for breach of fiduciary duties, aiding and 
abetting fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment, and as against all parties a cause of action 
seeking declaratory relief/specific performance. The 2013 lawsuit (Nez Perce County Case No. 
CV13-1075) and the 2008 lawsuit (Nez Perce County Case No. CV08-1150) were consolidated 
by Order of the Court on August 7, 2013. Currently before the Court are motions re-filed by the 
parties in the 2009 matter and the 2013 matter. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence reveals no 
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disputed issues-Gf material fact.. In making this determination;-all disputed facts are liberally=....-.. 
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue 
of material fact. De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 2014 WL 1266104 (2014). Inferences 
that can reasonably be.made from the ~cord _<U'.e made.in favor of the non-movjng paftr,. Jd ... 
However, the non-moving party may not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence. If the record raises 
neither a question of witness credibility nor requires weighing the evidence, then summary 
judgment shouid be granted. Id. Toe moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving 
party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case. ParkWest Homes, LLCv. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,682,302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
A. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRJKE PORTIONS OF PEDERSON DECLARATION 
Defendants seek to have the Court strike portions of the declaration filed by Plaintiff's 
expert, Paul Pederson. In particular, Defendants seek to strike Pederson's adoption and 
incorporation of his affidavit filed in Reed Taylor's case, arguing it is not pa1t of this record. 
Defendants further assert portions of statements are conclusory, opinions oflaw, or based on 
facts for which Pederson has no direct knowledge. The Court, without striking the declaration, 
will determine what is relevant and proper and will consider only those statements that are 
admissible expert statements. 
B. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintifrs claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants contend the tort 
claims are barred by the economic loss rule. The Court agrees. 
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~ -Idaho'sAppellate..Courtshaveconsistentlyheld.that, unless an exceptionaapplie.s,.-the :·.-: 
economic loss rule precludes recovery of pureiy economic losses in negligence actions, stating 
there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another. Stapleton v. Cushman Drilling and Pump 
Co., 15.3ldaho 735~ 142,291 P.3d 418 0014). '1A]s _a gener~ rule, a plah!tiffis_prQhibite4 :frSlm ... 
recovery in tort for purely economic losses absent an accompanying physical injury to persons or 
property, unique circumstances, or a special relationship. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement 
Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007--08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200--01 (1995)." In the instant matter, Donna 
Taylor's loss is purely economic. Therefore, her claims in tort will only survive if they fall 
within one of the exceptions to the economic loss rule. 
The first exception occurs when economic loss accompanies, or is parasitic to, physical 
injury to persons or property. This exception is clearly not applicable to the instant matter, as 
Donna Taylor asserts no injury to her person or property. The second exception occurs when 
unique circumstances require re-allocation of the risks. Donna Taylor has presented the Court 
with no facts that would place her economic loss into this second exception. The third exception 
occurs when there is a special relationship between the parties. Defendants contend the 
relationship of shareholder with the corporation or its corporate officers is not a special 
relationship as defined by Idaho case law. Plaintiff counters by arguing the economic loss rule 
bars only tort claims for negligent acts or omissions, not intentional torts as asserted by Donna. 
Addressing the type of special relationship that must exist to trigger the third exception to the 
economic loss rule, Idaho's Appellate Courts have stated, 
The 'special relationship' exception generally pertains to claii:ns for personal 
services provided by professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, architects, 
engineers and insurance agents. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P .2d 
984, 992 (Ct.App.1992). A special relationship may exist where a party holds 
itself out to the public as performing a specialized function and induces reliance 
on superior knowledge and skill Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d a:t 1201. 
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In Duffin, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a special relationship existed 
between an entity which ce:tified seed potatoes and a fam1cr who bought seed 
which was certified but defective. The seed ce:tification entity was the only such 
entity in the state. The entity held itself out rn the public as having expertise in 
seed certification and induced reliam.:e on that expertise. Furthermore, the farmer 
wa~gbligated to utilize the entity. Due to this specialization and induced reliance. 
on the ~eed certification entity's expei-lise; the Supreme Comi gave the farmer the. 
ability to recover for pure economic loss based upon a special relationship. 
However, the Supreme Court explained in its holding that this principle only 
applies to an "extremely limited group of cases" in wr..ich it is equitable to 
impose a duty to exercise due care to avoid the pure ec.onomic loss of another. 
Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
Nelson v. Anderson Lum!Kr Co., 140 IdaJ10 702, 710, 99 P.2d l 092 (Ct.App.2004). 
The issue of Vv"hether the econorr.ic loss ru1e bars inientional torts where damages are 
purc.ly et~onomic has nc,t been addressed by IdaJw's Appe1Jat~ Courts. Other jurisdiclions have, 
however, addressed the issue. 
Recognizing the shortcomings of the economic loss mle, the Eastwood court hdd 
that the more appropriate inquiry when determining if tort remedies a.rt:. 
recoverable when a contracmal relatiimshi.p aJso exists is whether an independent 
legal duty exists, outside the pa!"ties' contractual relationship,.imposing a duty on 
+.he tmifeasor. 170 Wash.2d at 389,241 PJd 1256. Thus, the court held, "An 
injury is remediable in tort if it traces back to i.he breach of a tort duty arising 
independentJy of the terms of the contra(;t." Ille court named this inquiry the 
"independent duty doctrine.» Eastwood, 170 Wash.2d at 398,241 P.3d 1256. 
Althou~h it reframed the app,ropri.3.te inquiry and renamed the rule, the court 
noted that when determining hov,- a court can distinguish between claims where a 
plaintiff is limited to contract remedies and cases where recovery in tort may be 
available[, a] review of our cases, on the .;;conornic loss rule shows that ordinary 
tort p1inciples have always resolved this question .... Ibe court determines whether 
there is an independent tort duty of care, and '<[t]he existence of a duty is a 
question cf law and depends on mixed considerations of logic, common sense, 
justice, policy, and precedent." E,:;stwood; 170 Wash.2d at 389, 24.1 P:3d 1256 
(internal quotation marks om.itte_d) (third alteration in original) (quoting Snyder v. 
Med. Serv. Corp. of E. Wash, 145 Wash.2c1 233, 243, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001 )). 
Hendrickson v. Tender Care Animal Hosp. Corp., 312 P.3d 52, 58, 176 Wash.App. 757. 76R 
(Wash.Ct.App.2013). 
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InMcCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809,815,275 P.3d 824,829 (2012), the Supreme 
Court reiterated the legal standard that a corporation and its directors owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholders. "This Court held that in a closely-held corporation, the corporate directors owe a 
fiduciary duty to one another, to the corporation and to the shareholders, including the minority 
shareholders." McCann, 152 Idaho at 815. Donna Taylor, as a shareholder, was owed fiduciary 
duties by the Defendant corporate directors, duties that are independent of any contractual duties 
she was owed. However, Idaho's Appellate Courts have not extended the definition of 'special 
relationships' beyond those relationships involving personal services provided by professionals 
who hold themselves out to the public as performing specialized functions. Any expansion of 
the definition must be left to Idaho's Appellate Courts. Therefore, the Court does not find the 
relationship between Plaintiff Donna Taylor and the Defendants to be one for personal services 
performed by professionals. As a result, Donna's claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, do not fall within the third 
exception to the economic loss rule. 
The Court finds none of the exceptions to the economic loss rule applicable to Plaintiff 
Donna Taylor's claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or aiding and 
abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, because Donna's claims are for purely economic 
loss, the economic loss rule bars her claims in tort as a matter of law. 
(C) PLAINTIFF'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM 
Plaintiff Donna Taylor asserts in her Second Amended Complaint filed November 6, 
2009 and in her 2013 Complaint, that the named individual Defendants were unjustly enriched 
when, after obtaining her approval in 2001 to defer her stock redemption payments for five 
months, Defendants transferred substantial amounts of AIA 's assets to CropUSA, Defendants 
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looted AIA to their benefit, Defendants then informed Donna AIA had insufficient.funds to-
continue making the promised redemption payments, and by their conduct Defendants have been 
unjustly enriched to the detriment of Donna Taylor. Defendants contend Donna has failed to 
make out a prima facie case for unjust enrichment. 
Unjust enrichment occurs when a defendant rec~ives a benefit that would be inequitable 
to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust. Beco Constr. 
Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). In order to set out a 
primafacie case for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must present facts on three elements: (1) there 
was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of 
such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for 
the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999). 
"However, the alleged recipient must also be the intended beneficiary. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 
126 Idaho 467,471,886 P.2d 772, 776 (1994). Accordingly, '[r]ecovery for unjust enrichment 
is unavailable if the benefits [to the recipient] were created incidentally by [the claimant] in 
pursuit of his own financial advantage.' Id." Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 897, 277 P .3d 
33 7 (2012). The party who has conferred the benefit and who is seeking the return of the full 
amount thereof has the burden of proving it would be unjust for the recipient to retain any part of 
the benefit. Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316,323,924 P.2d 217,224 (Ct.App.1994). 
Donna Taylor, by agreeing to allow AIA to defer five months of stock redemption 
payments in order to allow AIA to develop CropUSA, conferred a benefit on AIA, not on the 
named individual Defendants, nor is there any evidence Donna intended the individual 
Defendants to benefit. Any benefit enjoyed by the individual Defendants was incidentally 
10 
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· -- - treated as a result of Donna's pursuit of:hcr own financial advantage. Theref()J~_,.-1:ecovery {w ... 
unjust enriclunent against the individual Defendant's in unavailable to Donna. Rather, recovery 
is available through breach of contract claims against AIA, and against John Taylor and Reed 
Taylor as guarantors. 
(D) DONNA'S CLAIM UNDER THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT 
In February 2001, Donna Taylor received a letter signed by John Taylor and Reed Taylor 
seeking to defer payment on Donna's stock redemption for five months in order to facilitate the 
startup of Crop USA. 13 The letter ends with, "Reed and John will guarantee the deferred 
payments." Donna subsequently agreed to defer redemption payments for five months. 
However, in breach of the agreement between the parties, the deferred payments have never been 
made to Donna, who now seeks to recover the five deferred payments plus interest from John 
Taylor only. Defendants contend Reed Taylor is an indispensable paity and must be joined by 
Do1ma or, in the alternative, the Court should find Donna relieved Reed of his guaranty 
obligation, thus rendering John Taylor's guaranty void. 
Rule l 9(a)( 1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedures reads: 
Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process 
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition 
of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede 
the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not 
been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a 
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. 
13 Exhibit C to Donna Taylor's Motion for Partial Sununary Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof, filed 
October 1, 2009. 
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:,. --· -l.KC:ll:i 19(a)(1-). ·-:: -~ .:. :--- =-· __ -:_ ---
John Taylor and Reed Taylor became co-guarantors under the terms of the deferred 
payment agreement. Donna Taylor, as the creditor, may seek recovery from either or both 
guarantors. However, if one guarantor pays·more than his equal share of the debt; recovery-for . 
payment of more than his propositional share may be sought from the other guarantor. 
If a principal obligation is guaranteed by two or more persons, each must pay the 
proportional share of the liability, and a guarantor who has paid more than his or 
her share is entitled to contribution from the others and may sue to enforce that 
right. While an action for contribution may not be maintained unless the guarantor 
has paid more than his or her share of the obligation, or satisfied a judgment 
against that guarantor, it is not necessary that the guarantor have paid the entire 
debt. A guarantor may be entitled to interest on the contribution due, payable 
from the date of payment by the guarantor. 
The right to contribution among coguarantors arises from their implicit agreement 
that each would contribute his or her just proportion of any liability and, thus, is 
based on an implied contract That right is governed by equitable principles and is 
subject to equitable defenses. 
A guarantor is entitled to contribution regardless of whether the guarantors signed 
a single or separate documents, or the creditor released the coguarantors after the 
default on the underlying loan. 
38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty§ 100. 
The Court found no Idaho case law instructive on this issue. However, the Court rejects 
Donna's argument that Reed was somehow relieved of his liability as co-guarantor. Reed Taylor 
signed the letter that create the guaranty and has offered no evidence to the contrary. The Court 
also rejects John Taylor's theory that Donna Taylor, by executing a subordination agreement 
with Reed Taylor in 2006, relieved Reed of his obligation under the guaranty without John 
Taylor's consent, and as a result John Taylor is relieved of his obligation. Defendant offers the 
Court no legal authority in support of his theory, nor has the Court found any such authority. 
The Court finds the 2001 guaranty event and the 2006 subordination agreement event to be two 
12 
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distinct and unrelated events-that have no-effeet on-the-other-;::_Bas~d .on the ge~raLprincipals oL --- _ 
guaranty law and I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), the Court finds Reed Taylor is not an indispensable party, as 
Donna Taylor may obtain complete relief from only one of the guarantors. If full recovery is 
_ pbtained from John Taylor, he may ~1?:- bring an action ag~inst Reed_Ta)_'.lor,,as/h-~ ~Q:. __ _ 
guarantor, to recover Reed's portion of the liability. 
(E) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT 
Defendants contend the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement was illegal, thus 
making void any obligation to redeem Donna's shares. Plaintiff Donna Taylor argues that, even 
if the 199 5 and 1996 redemption agreements are void, there was a prior lawful agreement 
between Donna and AIA regarding redemption of her Series A shares, that agreement was 
memorialized in three letters that preceded the 1995 and 1996 agreements, and the 'letter' 
agreement is eof orceable, as it could not be superseded by an illegal agreement. Defendants 
contend the 1995 redemption agreement evidenced by the letters cannot be resurrected by the 
Court, as the intent of the parties in entering the 1995 and 1996 agreements would be thwarted 
and Donna Taylor would be allowed to receive the benefit of a higher interest rate and 
am01tization schedule. 
In the instant matter, the parties agree the 1995 and 1996 Series A Shareholder 
Agreements between Donna Taylor and AIA are illegal for the same reasons Reed Taylor's 
Promissory Note for redemption of his shares was illegal. 14 The parties also agree there was an 
earlier 1995 agreement memorialized in three letters15 th~t lawfully provided for the redemption 
of Donna Taylor's Series A shares. However, while Donna Taylor argues the 'letters' agreement 
is enforceable, Defendants argue it was superseded by the illegal agreements and, if enforced 
14 See Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011). 
15 See Exhibits C, D, and E to the Affidavit of Donna Taylor filed May 23, 2013. 
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···novr,-wm:ild-be·contrary to 1he intent of the p·arti~s, 1995-ariti:J 996·agreements, would-r!Zward---- -- --- ---
Donna for her 'misconduct' 16, and would give Donna ihe benefit of a higher interest rate and 
amortization schedule. 
The Court, .while unable-tQ find -a,ny instructive T.daho case law, finds the majority qf__ 
jurisdictions adhere to the rule that a legal and valid contract is not made void by a subsequent 
illegal contract regarding the same subject matter. 
A subsequent illegal agreement by the parties cannot affect a previous fair and 
lawful contract between them in relation to the same subject. The change is 
regarded as a mere nullity, and as such cannot scathe the original contract. 
Wilcoxon v. Logan, 91 N.C. 449; Britt v. Aylett, 11 Ark. 475, 52 Am.Dec. 282; 
McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746; Cain v. Bonner, 108 Tex. 399, 
194 S.W. 1098, 3 A.L.R. 874; 15 A. & E.Ency.Law 932; Teamey v. Maimiom, 
103 W.Va. 394, 137 S.E. 543; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, s 287; Page on Contracts, sec. 
2469. See also: In re Port Publishing Co., 231 N.C. 395, 57 S.E.2d 366, 14 
A.L.R.2d 842. 
Tillman v. Talbert, 93 S.E.2d 101,103,244 N.C. 270,272 (N.C.1956). 
The Comt finds the "no taint" holding by other jurisdictions persuasive. The Court also 
agrees that under Idaho law, "If a contract is illegal and void, the court will leave the parties as it 
finds them and refuse to enforce the contract." Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. # 401, 
147 Idaho 277,287,207 P.3d 1008, 1018 (2009). Where the Comt finds the parties in the instant 
matter is in the position they were just prior to the illegal agreements being entered into. The 
parties do not dispute that, prior to entering into the illegal agreements, the parties entered into an 
agreement with Donna Taylor for the redemption of her Series A shares, and that the agreement 
was memorialized in a series of three letters, with two of the letters being signed by the 
necessary parties. That agreement was a lawful and enforceable agreement establishing the 
16 Defendants argue Donna Taylor committed 'misconduct' in 2006 when she entered into a subordination 
agreement with Reed Taylor giving Reed priority over Donna relative to redemption payments. lt was within 
Donna's right to relinquish priority and to do so without the consent of AJA, who neither benefitted nor was harmed 
by the payment priority issue. 
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'·., .·.-:., -- ·tem1s forredernption of Donna Tayloi:'s·Series:A-shares,ti"nd, therefore,,the Court fmdscthe .·· .. -
'letters' agreement remains valid, enforceable, and unscathed by the subsequent illegal 
agreements. Contrary to the arguments put forth by the Defendants, AIA's amended articles are 
. not applicable to redemption of Donna) Series Ashar~s, as the amendments b~~rm; -~ff~tiYf! 
well after AIA entered into the 'letters' agreement with Donna. Redemption of Donna's share 
must be in conformance with the lawful and enforceable 'letters' agreement. 
(F) PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONFORPARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the following issues: (a) the 1995 'letters' 
agreement is legal and enforceable; (b) 41,509.69 of Donna Taylor's Series A shares have yet to 
be redeemed; (c) Donna Taylor is owed $415,096.86 for unredeemed Series A shares plus 
accrued interest; ( d) the controlling shareholders breached fiduciary duties to Donna Taylor; and 
(e) dismissal of AIA's counterclaim asserting Donna Taylor breached the 1995 and 1996 Series 
A shareholder agreement. The Court, in addressing the Motions of the Defendants, has already 
determined the 1995 'letters' agreement is legal and enforceable. Therefore, the Court will not 
re-address that issue. In regard to the number of Series A shares that are outstanding and the 
value of those shares, the Court has already determined the shares must be redeemed in 
conformance with the 1995 'letters' agreement. In addition, the Court finds the number of 
unredeemed shares still held by Donna Taylor is the amount shown by AIA's records on the date 
of the la'>t payment made to Donna Taylor. 
Next, the Court finds summary judgment on the issue of whether the majority 
shareholders breached fiduciary duties to Donna Taylor as a minority shareholder must be 
denied. Defendants have consistently maintained the legality of the business dealings involving 
AIA, CropUSA, and other entities. The parties dispute nearly every fact asserted by the other on 
15 
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··this issue; leavi11g the Court withgeiiuincissues· of.material fact"indispute that preventa·grant of -
summary judgment. 
Lastly, the Court finds there can be no breach of the 1995 and 1996 Series A Shareholder 
I' 
i, 
Agreements by Donna Taylor, as one cannot-breach an-illegal agreement. Defendants have ... ,. ·---·-- s··c .. · ._ ., ... .c.-.· 
asserted the illegality of those Agreements throughout this proceeding and Idaho's Supreme 
Court held the Agreements illegal in Taylor v. AJA, I 51 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011). Therefore, 
Donna Taylor cannot be held to have breached an illegal agreement by entering into a 
subordination agreement with Reed Taylor. In addition, the Court finds no breach of the 1995 
'letters' agreement based on the subordination agreement between Donna Taylor and Reed 
Taylor. The only beneficiary to the priority of payment was Donna Taylor and, as the only 
beneficiary, it was her right to waive and to do so without legal obligation to first obtain the 
consent of AIA. 
(G) COSTS Al'\JD ATTORNEY FEES 
Both parties seeks costs and attorney fees based on LC.§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
The Court denies an award of costs and attorney fees to either party, as the Court finds there is 
no prevailing party and that none of the motions were brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. 
ORDER 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in part. 
Defendants' Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED. 
Defendants' Motion for Swnmary Judgment is hereby GRANTED only as to Plaintiff's 
claim for unjust enrichment. Defendants' Motion is DENIED as to all other issues. 
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-- -,~,--. " ·Defendants' Mution te-Dismiss-·is'hereby.GRANTED as-to Plaintif:f-s·claimsfor fraud, -
constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. 
:Dated.this.~ day of July 2014. · ... 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO 
DONNA J. TAYLOR, 
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v. 
R JOHl\TTAYLORand CONNIE TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
and 
DONNA J. TAYLOR, 
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v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR; CONNIE 
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and MICHAEL CASHMAN, SR., 
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This matter is before the Court on Motions to Reconsider and to Clarify filed by both 
Plaintiff and Defendants1 and on Motion to Lift Discovery Stay and to Compel filed by Plaintiff. 
The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions on August 6, 2014. Plaintiff Donna Taylor was 
_ rep~~ented by attorney Roderick C. Bond. Defendant AIA Services Corporation was 
- . ·- . - . . .. . . . . --
represented by attorney Douglas J. Siddoway. Defendants John Taylor, Connie Taylor 
Henderson, James Beck, and Michael Cashman were represented by attorney David R. Risley. 
The Court, after reading the Motions, affidavits, and briefs filed by the parties, reviewing the 
record, hearing oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders 
its decision. 
I. DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
In its Second Amended Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification, Defendant AIA 
asks the Court to reconsider its earlier opinion that held the 1995 letters agreement between AIA 
and Donna Taylor regarding redemption of Donna's preferred A shares lawful and enforceable. 
Defendant AIA asserts the Court reached its finding based on a mistake of fact and should 
reverse its holding. Defendant AIA also seeks clarification that the Court's earlier opinion: (a) 
does not elevate Donna Taylor's from shareholder to creditor in regards to the failed redemption 
of her shares, (b) that redemption must comply with statutory law and AIA's 1987 amended 
articles of incorporation, and ( c) there are no triable issues remaining between the parties. 
The Court, after careful review of the record in this matter, continues to find the 1995 
letters agreement between the parties lawful and enforceable. While A1A contends the Court 
erred when it stated AIA's articles of incorporation were amended well after the 1995 letters 
1 Defendant AIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification, an A.mended Motion for Reconsideration and 
Clarification, and a Second Amended Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification. In its Second Amended 
Motion, Defendant AlA states, "This second amended motion supersedes and replaces AIA's motion for 
reconsideration and clarification, and its corrective amended motion for reconsideration and clarification, both of 
which were filed on JuJy 23, 2014." Therefore, the Court will address only the Second Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration and Clarification filed by Defendant AIA. 
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agreement was entered into, the Court's ~tatement was based on the record as it existed at the 
time the Opinion was penned. Prior to entry of the Court's July 14, 2014 Opinion and Order, the 
only amended articles of incorporation made part of the record were 1996 amended articles of 
incorporation, not 1987 amended articles of incorporation. 2 In its briefing and oral arguments, 
AIA at no time clarified that its reference to amended articles of incorporation was to 1987 
amended articles of incorporation. Only after entry of the Court's Opinion and Order did AIA, 
by way of affidavit, place into the record 1987 amended articles of incorporation and clarify that 
its earlier references were not to the 1996, but to the 1987 amended articles of incorporation. 
The Court continues to be of the opinion that the 1996 amended articles of incorporation 
are not applicable to the 1995 letters agreement. However, the Court agrees the articles of 
incorporation as they existed at the time the I 995 letters agreement was entered into are 
applicable to the redemption agreement. It appears, based on the current record before the Court, 
that in 1995, the 1987 amended articles of incorporation were the current and applicable articles 
of incorporation. However, while Defendant AIA asserts the letters agreement is unlawful 
because it provided for an interest rate greater than allowed by AIA's 1987 amended articles of 
incorporation, Defendant has presented the Court with no evidence the agreement was not voted 
upon by a majority of AIA shareholders or that by law, a majority of the shareholders cannot 
agree to pay an interest rate greater than that established in the articles of incorporation.3 
2 On October 15, 2009, Defendant John Taylor filed a brief and affidavit of counsel containing supporting 
documents. In that 2009 brief; John Taylor stated, "On May 8, 1996, AIA Services Corporation filed Articles of 
Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation. Under paragraphs 4.2.3(a) and (b ), the 
Series A Preferred stockholder (Donna Taylor) was given the right to require the corporation to redeem such stock, 
'from any legally available funds ... but only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares'." John Taylor's Memorandum 
Re" Motions for Summary Judgment filed October 15, 2009, p.2 [emphasis in the original]. 
3 For purposes of clarification, the Court's prior holding regarding the lawfulness of the I 995 letters agreement was 
not based on the inapplicability of the 1996 amended articles of incorporation, but was based on the Cowt's analysis 
that a subsequent unlawful agreement cannot supersede or invalidate a lawful agreement. 
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The lavmilness of the 1995 letters agreement is a relatively new issue in this long-running 
and convoluted matter. Since being raised as an issue, AIA has consistently argued the 1995 
letters agreement is unlaV\ful for the same reasons the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was 
held unlawful.4 However, Defendant AIA has failed to support its argument with any evidence. 
In Reed Taylor's lawsuit against AIA, this Court found, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, 
that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement between Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor, and AIA was 
unlawful because it failed to comply with then existing Idaho Code § 30-1-6, which stated in 
relevant part: 
A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive, or otherwise 
acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shares, but 
purchases of its own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the 
extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefore, and, if 
the articles of incorporation so pennit or with the affirmative vote of the holders 
of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and 
wrrestricted capital surplus available therefor. 
I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995). 
Under I.C. § 30-1-6, as it existed in 1995, a corporation could purchase its own shares if 
it had sufficient earned surplus or, if authorized by a vote of a majority of the voting shareholders 
or the corporation's articles of incorporation, by utilizing capital surplus. In Taylor v. AJA 
Services Corporation, 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011), the Supreme Court, in affirming this 
Court, found the parties both recognized AIA had no earned surplus in 1995, thus the agreement 
to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was not lawful under the earned surplus option in LC.§ 30-1-6. 
The Supreme Court then looked to the statutory alternative that allowed a corporation to redeem 
its own shares from capital surplus if its articles of incorporation allowed or "with the affumative 
vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon". In the case of Reed 
4 Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011). 
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Taylor, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's finding t"rat a shareholders' vote mt1st __ _ 
specifically authorize the use of capital surplus and, in voting on the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares, the vote lacked specificity that redemption could be made from capital surplus. 
In the instant matter, the parties agree AIA had insufficient earned surplus in 1995 to 
purchase Donna Taylor's preferred A shares. Thus, the 1995 letters agreement was not lawful 
W1der the first redemption option found in LC. § 31-1-6. AIA, however, has presented no 
evidence that the redemption of Donna's shares did not comply with the second option approved 
by I. C. § 31-1-6, express authorization by a majority of shareholders to utilize capital surplus. 
This Court will not assume, some twenty years after the fact, that any shareholder vote relative 
the 1995 letters agreement was flawed merely because a subsequent shareholder vote in regard to 
Reed Taylor's redemption of shares was flawed. The Court, finding no evidence in the record 
that the 1995 letters agreement did not comply with I.C. § 30-1-6 or with AIA's articles of 
incorporation, as both existed in 1995, continues to find the 1995 letters agreement lawful and 
enforceable. 
Next, A1A asks the Court to clarify that Donna Taylor's status is that of a shareholder, 
not a creditor, and that there are no triable issues remaining between the parties. As to the first 
issue, the Court has been presented with no legal authority that would elevate Donna's status 
from shareholder to creditor, nor should the Court's July 2014 Opinion be interpreted as 
implying such a change in status. In regards to whether there remain any triable issues between 
the parties, the Court is not in a position to make such a determination at this time, nor will the 
Court limit either party by making such a declaration. 
5 
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IL PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION 
Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its finding that the economic loss rule bars her 
claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duties. The Court, after careful reconsideration, reverses its earlier decision in part. 
The Court questions the viability of Plaintiff's claims for fraud and constructive fraud. 
Of first concern to the Court is whether Plaintiff's fraud claims are merely a regurgitation of her 
claims for breach of fiduciary duties. Despite considerable research. the Court found little 
federal or state case law that assisted the Court in making a determination on the issue. 
However, given the general legal principals of corporate relationships, the Court finds the fraud 
claims in the instant matter duplicative of Donna's breach of fiduciary duties claims. 
Plaintiff's allegation is that the directors of AJA committed fraud in order to avoid AIA's 
contractual obligation to Donna. 5 To determine whether tort remedies are recoverable when a 
contractual relationship also exists, a court mlli>i find an independent legal duty that exists 
outside the parties' contractual relationship. Hendrickson v. Tender Care Animal Hosp. Corp., 
312 P.3d 52, 176 Wash.App. 757 (Wash.Ct.App.2013). Under the facts as alleged by Donna, 
there is no duty independent of the contractual relationship that would support a recovery for the 
tort of fraud, only for the tort of breach of fiduciary duties. Therefore, reconsideration of the 
ruling on fraud claims is denied. However, upon reconsideration the Court does not reach the 
same conclusion on Plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duties. 
After careful consideration, this Court has concluded a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
will always be one for economic loss and, if barred by the economic loss rule, would be a 
5 Donna also appears to argue that the individual Defendants fraudulently diverted AIA assets to themselves or to 
entities from which only they benefited. This theory requires Donna to bring a derivative action, not a personal 
action. In Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, the Court quoted from its earlier holding in McCann, 138 Idaho at 233, 
"a stockholder may bring a direct action for an injury directly affecting him; however, if the gravamen of the 
complaint is injury to the corporation's assets orto the whole body of its stock, then the shareholder's action is 
derivative." 
6 
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recognized legal claim without a.remedy. Corporate .di.r~tors have long been h.elcl to owe 
fiduciary duties to shareholders, creating a relationship within the economic loss rule's special 
relationship exception. McCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809,815,275 P.3d 824 (2012) (In a 
closely held corporation, the corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to one another, to the .. 
corporation and to the shareholders, including minority shareholders.); Nelson v. Anderson 
Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 710, 99 P.2d 1092 (Ct.App.2004) (the special relationship exception 
applies where it is equitable to impose a duty to exercise due care to avoid the pure economic 
loss of another). Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duties is not 
barred by the economic loss rule. 
Next, Donna asks the Court to reconsider its ruling regarding her unjust enrichment 
claim. The Court, after additional consideration, finds its earlier analysis sound. The Court 
continues to be of the opinion that AIA, not the individual Defendants, gained a benefit by 
Donna's agreement to forgo five months of redemption payments. 6 In her brief for· 
reconsideration, Donna contends the Court addressed only her 2008 claim for unjust enrichment, 
but failed to address her 2013 claim. In her 2013 lawsui~ Donna contends she conferred upon 
the individual Defendants the benefit of operational and financial control over AIA by agreeing 
to defer her shareholder redemption payments by five (5) months. The Court finds Donna's 
theory unsupported by the facts, and therefore, the Court continues to find Donna failed to plead 
sufficient facts to make out a prima Jacie case for unjust enrichment against the individual 
Defendants. 
Lastly, Donna asks the Court to clarify that: (a) she holds 41,651.25 shares of preferred A 
shares; (b) she is entitled to 12% prejudgment interest; (c) AIA breached its contractual 
6 In her brief for reconsideration, Plaintiff contends the Court applied the economic loss rule to her unjust 
enrichment claim. Plaintiff is in error, as the Court did not apply the economic loss rule to her unjust enrichment 
claim and did not reach its ruling based on the economic loss rule. 
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obligation under the letters agreement;. (d) she is entitled to judgment against AIA fo.r h~i,: 
unredeemed shares; (e) the individual Defendants are liable for all sums owed to Plaintiff by 
AIA; and (f) she may pursue her claim against the controlling shareholders for aiding and 
abetting bre~ch of fiduciary duties. 
:: ... -;- . .-. 
The Court declines Plaintiffs invitation to make such 'clarifications'. Plaintiff's request 
is simply a request for grant of summary judgment on the issues. The Court previously denied 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment based on the existence of genuine issues of material 
fact in dispute. More specifically, in regard to the number of preferred A shares that remain 
outstanding, the proper amount of prejudgment interest, if any, and whether AIA breached its 
contractual obligation under the letters agreement, are issues that continue to have material issues 
of fact in dispute. As to Plaintiffs request for the Court to clarify that the individual Defendants 
are liable for all sums owed by AIA, genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute as to 
whether Plaintiff has mer her.burden of showing: (a) a unity ofinterest and ownership to a 
degree that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual Defendants is none 
existent, and (b) that an inequitable result would follow if the Court did not allow Plaintiff to 
pierce the corporate veil and reach the individual Defendants based on the theory of alter-ego. 
See Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586,329 P.3d 368, 2014 WL 
2765956. Such a finding would not be appropriate for summary judgment on the existing record. 
Lastly, Plaintiff asks the Court to clarify that she may proceed forward with her claim 
against the individual Defendants for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties. "To state a 
claim for aiding and abetting [breach of fiduciary duties] a party must show: '(1) the party whom 
the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act which causes an injury; (2) the defendant must 
be regularly aware of bis role as part of the overall or tortious activity at the time that he provides 
the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal 
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violation\''· Abrnms v. DLA Piper (US) LLP, Slip Copy, 2.014 WL 3361802 (N.D.lp.4.) ... '_[hy __ . _ 
Court, while fmding the facts supporting the claim to be weak and Plaintiff's burden of proof 
high, finds Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to allow the claim to move forward. 
ORDER 
The Court hereby enters the following Order: 
a) Defendants' Joint Motion for Reconsideration on the lawfulness of the 1995 
letters agreement is hereby DENIED. 
b) Defendant AIA's Motion for clarification is as set forth in the Court's Opinion. 
c) Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration on whether her tort claims are barred by the 
economic loss rule is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
i. Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED as to her claims for fraud and constructive 
fraud. 
ii. . Plaintiff's Motionrs GRANTED as-to her claims· for breach of fiduciary 
duties and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties. 
d) Plaintiffs Motion for reconsideration on her claim for unjust enrichment is 
DENIED. 
e) Plaintiff's Motion for clarification is as set forth in the Court's Opinion. 
Dated this z-t--- day of August 2014. 
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) _______________ ) 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant AlA Services Second Motion to 
Reconsider. The Court heard oral arguments on this matter June 4, 2015. Plaintiff Donna Taylor 
was represented by Roderick Bond. Defendant AIA Services was represented by Douglas 
1 
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Siddoway. Defendants Henderso~ Taylor, Beck, and Cashmen were represented by Shawnee 
Perdue. The Court, having read the motion, briefs and affidavits submitted by the parties, and 
having heard oral argument of counse4 and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its 
d~cision .. · 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This Court has previously articulated the material facts of this case in its Opinion and 
Order on Pretrial Motions to Amend and Supplement Complaint and to Order Separate Trials. 
For efficiency, the Court will only state the facts pertinent to the motion now before this Court 
Defendant AIA Services filed a motion for Summary Judgment on March 17, 2014 
arguing that AIA's Articles of Incorporation precluded Donna from being able to enforce the 
terms of her stock redemption agreement. On July 14, 2014, this Court issued an order denying 
that motion finding that AIA's Articles were inapplicable to Donna's stock redemption 
agreement, as they were adopted well after Donna's agreement On July 22, 2014, AJA filed a 
Motion to Reconsider. AJA provided information indicating that the Articles of Incorporation 
had actually been amended in 1987, at the same time Donna's Series A Preferred shares were 
created, and that those amendments controlled Donna's ability to redeem her stocks, including 
the interest rate to be applied if redemption occurred over time. 
In a ruling filed August 25, 2014, the Court stood by the original analysis that the "letters 
agreement" was valid and enforceable. The Court further held that Donna is entitled to the 
redemption of her remaining shares but her redemption must be in conformance with: (1) AlA,s 
amended articles of incorporation as they existed at the time she entered into the letters 
2 
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agreement.; (2) Idaho's Business Corporation Act as applicable. 1 On April 30, 2015, AIA filed 
the Second Motion to Reconsider that is presently before this Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
. A.motion to reconsider is an interlocutory order that may be reconsidered .. Agrisource. 
Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 912, 332 P.3d 815, 824 (2014). A motion for reconsideration 
allows the court to reconsider the correctness of an interlocutory order. Westby v. Schaefer, 157 
Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014). When considering a motion of this type, the trial 
court should take into accoW1t any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the 
correctness of the interlocutory order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank ofN Idaho, 
118 ldaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). 
ANALYSIS 
Despite the complete absence of earned surplus and at no time possessing assets in excess 
ofliabilities since 1993, AIA began making payments (presumably from capital surplus) to 
redeem Donna's 200,000 Series A Preferred shares in December of 1993. Initially, AIA paid 
Donna approximately $15000 monthly until 1995, when the amount increased to approximately 
$24000 per month until February 2001. Pursuant to the agreement with John Taylor to 
temporarily forego payments, no payments were made until October of 2001. Approximately 
$4000 monthly payments were made through May of 2004. Thereafter, Donna received 
approximately $10000 per month until June of 2008, when AIA discontinued payments based 
upon the pending litigation brought by Reed following the subordination agreement between 
Reed and Donna in December, 2006. 
1 Opinion and Order on Motion to Reconsider and Clarify 
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The parties -agree that the issue -of the appropriate interest rate to apply to the stock · - · -
redemption is one of law for the Court to determine. On April 20, 2015, AIA filed a declaration 
by Jolee Duclos, the corporate secretary for AIA Services.2 In that declaration, Duclos attested 
-. __ .. ___ . "• that_in a-r-eview,ofthe corporate rec,ords from 198.7- to presyn,t, no_recorcLwas founclofa-. 
shareholder vote which authorized either the use of capital surplus to redeem Donna's shares, or 
the increase of the interest rate over the rate allowed for by the 1987 amendments to the articles 
ofincorporation3• Duclos also provided copies of the minutes from AIA shareholder meetings 
dated March 7, 1995 and July 18, 1995 respectively, neither of which show that the interest rate 
in Donna's agreement was approved by the shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
Reconsideration of the Court's previous ruling is appropriate. It is now 
uncontroverted that AIA shareholders never voted to pay a higher interest rate than that 
authorized by the Articles of Incorporation. The door left narrowly ajar for Donna in the August 
2014 Opinion and Order on Motions to Reconsider and to Clarify has now closed. The only 
equitable remedy for the situation as presented in 2015 that this Court can conceive of is that 
suggested by AIA: Recalculation of the redemptions made for Donna's Series A Preferred shares 
at the only lawful interest rate- that established by the Articles of Incorporation to govern the 
stock redemption talcing place over time. 
2 Declaration by Jolee Duclos in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3 The parties disagree as to whether the Articles of Incorporation in effect in 1993 authorize the use of capital 
surplus to redeem shares but the court does not find it necessary to rule on this issue at this time. 
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· · The Courtthereforefo1dsthatD0nna has received $2,696,797.80 in payments to redeem:: - .. -:--
her Series A Preferred shares since December, 1993. The Court further finds that the only lawful. 
and appropriate interest rate at which redemption was pennitted is that established in the AIA 
l 
, __ .. --·-. _Articles of Incorporation; ,(ptjrru:~~pding.ratdess .one.an4,one-half percent). PursuanUo-the .,_ ·--- -'.~---- ,._. "·- .-. -,--- .J 
I 
l recalculation and reamortization as performed by AIA, the Court therefore finds that all but 7110 
Preferred A shares owned by Donna have been redeemed, and that interest continues to 
accumulate at the redemption rate established in the Articles of Incorporation. 
ORDER 
Defendant AIA's Second Motion to Reconsider is therefore GRANTED, 
Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED AIA to the extent of this Opinion and Order . 
.--
Dated this I-> day of June 2015. 
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R JOHN TAYLOR; and CONNIE. TAYLOR; 
Defendants. 
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DONNA J. TAYLOR, 
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v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR; CONNIE 
TAYLOR HENDERSON; JAMES BECK; 
and MICHAEL W. CASHMAN, SR, 
Defendants. 
ruDGMENT-1 




JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiff's breach of contract claims against defendant AIA Services Corporation based 
on the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement, the July 18, 1995 Letter Agreement, the August 10, 
.. 1995-Letter Agreement, andcthe JulyA ,.1996 .Series A PreferredcSh~~holder. Agreeme11t iµ,.Cas~ .. , .. , 
No. CV-13-0001075 are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
Plaintiff's aiding and abetting fraud and fraud claims against the defendants in Case No. 
CV-08-01150 are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims against the defendants in Case No. CV-08-01 I 50 and 
Case No. CV-13-0001075 are hereby DISMISSED WITII PREJUDICE. 
The Court hereby enters a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT that plaintiff Donna Taylor 
holds 7, I IO unredeemed Series A Prefen-ed Shares in AIA Services Corporation as of the date of 
this Judgment. 
Defendant AIA Services Corporation's counterclaim against plaintiff in Case No. CV-13-
0001075 is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATEDthisiz_dayof ~r , 2016. 
JUDGMENT - 2 
A-098 3439 
- . -~· . . 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above partial judgment it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.RC.P., that the court has determined that there is 
direct that the above partial judgment is a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an 
appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this _fi day of _ __,,,_s:;~p;?~~Z-_____ , 2016. 
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) _______________ ) 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The Court heard 
oral arguments on this matter November 10, 2016. Plaintiff Donna Taylor was represented by 
Roderick Bond. The Defendants were represented by Shawnee Purdue. The Court having heard 
the arguments of counsel, read the supplemental briefings, and being fully advised in the matter 
hereby renders its decision. 
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The Comt has reviewed its prior orders including its July 2014 order on summary 
judgment and its June 2015 reconsidered decision in light of additional facts and argument 
presented by Plaintiff. The Court finds no new information sufficient to change the_ Court's 
. -previous analysis that led-to the prior decision .. 
Accordingly, 1) the request to vacate the June 2015 ruling is DENIED; 2) the reque~t to 
reinstate Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is DENIED; and 3) the judgment as entered by the 
Court is appropriate, and the motion to amend the Rule 54(b) judgment is DENIED. 
Dated this Z::S 
2 
Taylor v. AJA 
Ruling on Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration A -102 
day of December 2016. 






CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION & ORDER was: 
__ !'_ hand delivered via court basket, or fax~ ~ 
,,·---, -. 1nailed, po.stage prepa~d, l>y 1he undersigned at Lewiston, J.daho.t. this ,;Z fJ. daX .o.f , 
December, 2016, to: · · · · · · ·. -·· ·· · 
Roderick Bond 




Wieland Perdue, PLLC 
Fax: (208) 401-9218 
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... ·· SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
_ This Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims ("Agreement") is made and 
.. .:· . ·- .· ... ; ·- ·-·· •;;;.-. ·- ... : . . . . . ·: .. 
effective as of the 15th day of September, 2014, by and between the undersigned parti~s 
hereto. Those parties include R. .l'ohn Taylor, in hls ind.ivldual capacity, <;:;ropUSA 
Insurance Agency, Inc,, CropUSA Insurance Services, LLC, AIA Insuranco, Inc., AIA 
Services Corporation, Reinsurance Partners, LLC, Greenleaf Reinsurance Partners, lLC, 
and all related affiliates and entities (coUectively, "Settling Defendants"), and Gem.Cap 
Lendfog I, LLC ("Settling Pialntlff"). Crop USA Insurance Age.ncy, Inc., and CropUSA 
Insurance Se.vices, LLC are collectively referred to as ("C!'Op Defendants;'). AJA 
rnsurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation are collectively referred to herein as ("AIA 
Defendants"). The parties are sometimes referred to collectively as the "Settling Paities." 
RECITALS 
. . 
This Agreement .ls made with reference to the following: 
A. On or about July 30, 2013, Settling Plaintiff initiated legal action against 
Settling Defendants in the United States District Court, Central District of California, 
Case No. 2:13-CV...05504-SJO-MAN ("District Court Case"). The allegations in the 
Com plaint were superseded on September I 5 J 2014 .by the· Court's Final Pre-Trial Order. 
B. The Final Pre-Trial Order, and each and every cause of action contained 
therein, with the exception of the causes of action for Misrepresentation and Fraud, which 
are hereinafter referred to as the Misrepresentation causes of action, are co[lectively 
refel'red to in this Agreement as "The Released Claims". 
C. On September 15, 2014, the parties reached 8 resolution whereby they 
agreed to settle and forever discharge all matters relating between them as to the 
"Released Clalms." 
Therefore, for good and valuable consideration, Including the conditions, 
covenants and agreement~ containc:d herein, the parties agl.'ce as follows: 
AGREEMEN,I 
l. For and in consideration of and subject to the promises and conditions and tbe 
considerati.on set forth below, Settling Plaintiff; on Its own behalf as well as its 








in interests, subsidiati.es, parents and affiliates, do hel'eby release and forever dischw·ge 
Settling Defendants, as well as their shareholders, employees, officers, dire.ctors, agents, 
· successors, predecessors;- assigns, subsidi11ries, affiliates.and parents of and from any and_ 
all actions, suits, proceedings, claims, demands, assessments, judgments, damages, 
deficiencies, liens, penalties, fines, costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney 
fees, e,-isting as of the date of the execution of this Agreemept that are claimed or alleged 
or that could have been claimed or alleged resulting from, based upon, or arising out of 
the Released Claims. Tho Settling Parties understand and agree that Settling Plaintiff is 
not releasing aoy claims for Misrepresentation against Settling Defendant_s, and Settling 
Plaintiff specifically reserves the right to pursue said Misrepresentation claims in the 
manner specified at Paragraph 5 below or for any rights that it may have for breach of 
this Agreement. Settling Defendants also are not releasing claims or waiving any rights 
they may have for breach of this Agree1nent. 
z. Settlement Amount. The Settling Parties agree that the Settling Defendants shall 
provide the following consideration in exchange for settling this Jawsult and executing 
this Agreement. lt is the intent of the Settling Defendants to pay Settling Plaintiff the 
principal sum ofS:8,140,165.82, plus $3,986,368.78, in interest, penalties and costs, for a 
total sum of $12,126,584.61 ("Minimum Settlement Amount'1, (subject to verification 
via in camera review by Judge Otero regarding the attorney fees claimed by Settling 
Plaintiff, or by another method of verification mutually agreed to by the parties), in 
exchange for a dismissal of the District Court Case, and funded as described in 
Paragraph 3, but that Settling Plaintiff shall be entitled to the total amount of recovery 
calculated as follows: the sum of the total recovery specified above, less the net of any 
amounts specifically and unambiguously stated to.be allocated to any Settling Defendants 
("Recovery Amount''). In the event that any aspect of the funding of the Minimum 
Settlement ~.mount l'equires cooperation by the Settling Defendants, and Settling 
Defendants do not cooper21te with Seitling Plaintiff in a reasonable fashion, then, at the 
Settling Plaintiff's sole discretion, it can either declare Settling Defenda~ts to. be in 
default of this Agreement, or Settling Plaintiff can modify the Collectlon of Settlement 
terms ·below so as to obtain the desired result of receiving the Minimum Settlement 
Amount as referenced above. 
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3. Collection of Settlement. The subsections refo1-cnced below nre each separately 
enforceable agreements between the Settling Defendants and Settling Plaintiff to ensure 
·· proinpt anU·effective payment· of,the'Minimurn:cSettlement Amount. .. Many of the _ 
delineated subsections set forth below will necessarily be eccompanied ·b;y Assignments 
fi·oin various Settling Defendants to Settling Plaintift It is an agreed condition precedent 
to this Agl'eement that Settling Defendants agree to, and will, promptly end properly 
execute all necessary Assignments that are sot forth below in order to allow and enhance 
Settling Plaintiff's ability to recover the Minimum Settlement Amount. 
19'105 
f. Real Pro:p_ertY; Main Street Building: AJA Defondarits shall transfer, 
assign, or otherwise pledge their entire interest, which constitutes their 
sixty-seven percent interest of the property, title, and rights, contingent or 
direct, directly or indirectly, in the mortgage on that real property 
commonly known as l I l Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho ("Ma.in Street 
Prope1ty"). The aforementioned assignment is !'efer.red to horein and 
attached hereto as Assignment L It is understood that the Main Street 
Pro~erty is subject to real estate taxes in the estimated amount of 
$120,000, a lien in favor of Syringa Bank in the estimated a~ount of 
$60,000 and legal fees and costs In the estimated amount of $81,000. 
associated with the pending Judicial foreclosure. AJA Defendants furthel' 
agree to execute any other necessary documentatlon, upon reasonable 
request, to memorialize the asslgrunent described herein. The Parties shall 
work cooperativoly to sell the Main Street Property so as to maxilnize its 
value, but the manner and tltning of the sale shall be done !n accordance 
with Settling Plaintiff's sole, ex.elusive and absolute judgment 
ii. Weskan Agency, Lg and/or Affiliated Entities: Settling Defendants 
shall assign and transfer to Settling Plaintiff all of their rights and 
e11tltlements to any and all essets, money and property, owed, or owing by 
COB Diversified Services, Inc., dba Diversified Crop Insurance Services 
and/or aay of their Affiliates (he.L'eafter "Diversified"), to Weskan, for the 
crop year 2013 through present time (as of the date of oxecution b~low). 

















hereto as Assignment 11. It is, in part, the intent of the undersigned, with 
respect to this subsection for Weskan Agency, LLC and .i1s Affiliates 
-- ... .·.·.·.: (bereaftel' "Weska11") tcrpayto Settling Plai-ntiffall monies nwed or owing 
--~~~ 
from Diversified to Weskan fol' !he crop year 20 l3 to the cun·ent. date of ! 
i 
execution of this Agreement. Settling Defendants agree to provide access 
1 
to any and all business records of Weskan upon reasonable request by I 
1 
Settling Plaintiff, including all documentation mllintained at the Weskan i 
offices ia the state of Kansas.. I 
iii. 1,>1·oceeds from Diversified: Settling Defendants shall mak.e their best I I 
reasonable efforts to·obtain, cooperate and otherwise assist in securing the I 
release of any and all commissions, management fees and/or other monies I 
due it by Diversified (as Diversified is defined in paragraph ii above}, for 
immediate payment to Settling Plaintiff. As used throughout this 
Agreement, ''best reasonable efforts" shall mean, with respect to a given 
goal, the efforts that e reasonable pet'son in the position of Settling 
i 
DefenQaDts would use so as to 11cbieve that goal as expeditiously as I 
' 
.;~i~ 
possible. Thls subsection is intended to include any and all commissions ! '[ \:;-~.// l 
subject to the Comt's Prelimin61')' Injunction Order ("Undisputed l ' 
I ! Commissions"). To this end, Settling Defendants will execute and agree to i I 
., 
the release of any Undisputed Commissions as soon as possible to Settling I 
! 
Plflintiff. The Settling Parties agree to the form of the Proposed Stipulation i I 
! 
and Order Releasing Bnjoined Proceeds attached hereto. i 
iv. Insurance Policies and Benefits: Crop Defendants shall provide their 
1- ii 
l f 
full cooperation and their best reasonable efforts ln securing the proceeds I ! 
I 
' 
ofany and all insurance benefits and proceeds being applied and/or paid to 
! 
~ 
Settling Plaintiff ("Policy Proceeds"}. Seid Crop Defendants (including R. j I 





obtain im.d preserve any and all policy proceeds so tbat the proceeds can ! 
be maximized for the benefit of payment to the Settling Plailltiff. i l I Defendant Taylor agrees that he will not change his position with. Crop I Defendants, i11c1u·ding, but not llmltcd to, refraining fl'OJll resigning from l e: 4 . ! i i. i i . ,' 19705 ! l ! 












any position as officer, director or other employment position with Crop 
Defendants during the pendoocy of the Judgment Collection efforts. 
v. · -!,egal Malpractice'::Clalmls;}~·:::Settling,Defondants .agree :to co~ate. 
assign, pledge, transfer (to the extent possible), and assist in tbe 
prosecution, in Settling Plaintiffs sole, ex.elusive and absolute judgment 
against any and all law firms that assisted Settling Defendants in the 
negotiation of and execution of the Loan Agreements that 1-csulted in and 
gave rise to the District Comt Case specified above. Settling Defcnd11nts 
acknowledge that they r.etained legal counsel to negotiate, advise, consult, 
and draft all Loao Documents and Loan Agreements that ultimately gave 
rise to the District Court Case referrod to above. Specifically, The 
Settling Defendants acknowledge that the law flrm of Quarles & Brady, 
LLP represented the Borrower in connection with the negotiation, 
execution and delivery of the Loan Documentll, including the Legal 
Opinion Letter, to Settling Plaintiff Paragraph 6.5 oftbe Loan Agreement 
required as a condl.tlon of the loan placement a legal opinion letter from 
Bon-ower's counsel addressed to GemCap (Settling Plaintiff), and that the 
Loan was placed in l'eliance upon receipt of said Legal Opinion Letter. 
Thus, it is hereby agreed that Settling Defendants will at all times, use 
their best reusona.ble efforts to cooperate in any and all efforts made by 
Settling Plaintiff to recover sums against said law fums, including but not 
limited to Qu.arles & Bl'ady. with respect to amounts owed by Settling 
Defendants to Settling Plaintiff uoder this Agreement. These efforts 
Include, but are not limited to, a full and complete Anignment of all rights 
against said law finns, including, but not limited to Quarles & Brady, in 
the District Court Case referred to above, and the following ac'ts within a 
reasonable time frame of Settling Plaintiff's l'equest: a production to 
Settling P 1.aintlff of all documentation relating to thc legal ser\lices In 
connection with the negotiation, exec'Ution and delivery of the Loan 
Documents provided by said legal profc:ssionals to Settling Defendants, 
providing any documentation upon demand to Settling Plaintiff. signing 
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declarat!ons, appearing for depositions, assisting in discovery, and 
pwviding trial testimony as necessary. Said Assignment ls attached hereto, 
aild -refetJ'ed':~.to 0 -herein~-Asl>-igrunent-.JIJ. ".Morc:9yer, nothing in this 
Agreement shall adversely affect or impact any and all direct rights that 
Settling Plaintiff has, or 1nay have, against said law finns, including, but 
not limited to Quarles & Brady. SeU!ing Defendants also agree to execute 
any other documentation necessary to reflect this Assignment. 
Divc;rsitied Litigation: Settling Defendants agree to assign. transfer, 
convey, cooperate, and/or otherwise enter into an agreement whereby any 
end all claims, rights, contentions, causes of action, or other forms of 
potential recovery ("Claims") against Diversified (as defined in paragraph 
ii above) shall be for the benefit of Settling Plaintiff; Said Assignment is 
incorpomted herein, and refurred 1o, end attached hereto as Assignment 
N. Settling Defendants l'epresent and warnmt that they have certain 
Claims against Diversified, and the right to said Claims shall be assigned 
to, and for the exclusive benefit of, Settling Plaintiff. Settling Defendants 
believe that the catain Claims they have against Diversified are estimated 
to be no less than the sum reflected in Scheduli, A attac~ed to Assignment 
N. Thls subsection is understood to require Settling Defendants to 
cooperate with Settling.Plaintiff; and vice versa, and that said cooperation 
by Settling Derendants is to include an Assignment of all rights that they 
have against Diversi lied, effective as of th.e execution of -this Agreement. 
Cooperation- also means that, within a reasonable time frame Settling 
Defendants shall, provide documentation on demand lo Settling Plaintiff, 
sign declarations, appear for depositions, assist in discovery, and provide 
trial testimony as necessary. Settling Defendants also agree to execute any 
other documentation necessary to reflect this Assignment. 
vii. ~ettling Deiendant John Ta.vlor: Stip11l11ted Judgment, Settling 
Defendant John Taylor shall confess a stipulated judgment which said 
judgment coinplles wlth applicable Federal Court rules and statutes, 
including Federal Rule of Civil 'Procedure. Rules 54 and SB, as wcU as 25 
6 
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U.S.C. 1961, in the amount of the Minimum Settlement Amount for the 
claims against him for brea.ching the Guarantee Agreement in the form 
attach«l hereto,C'Ia;ilor SrjJ?ul.~te.i..1.Y.druxiJmt''),,.TayJor agrees that if he 
seeks banlcruptcy protection, then he stipulates that Settling Plaintiff may 
initiate its lawsuit for Misrepresentation pursuant to the procodure 
specified at Pare.graph 5, below. The settling Defendant Taylor in his 
individual capacity and In bis capacity as representative of each Settling 
Defendant shall not take any action to initiate or cause the voluntary filing 
of any bankruptcy procei::dlng of any Settling Defendant. Settling Plaintiff 
agrees not to record or to execute on the Taylor Stipulated Judgment 
unless and until it has completed Judgment Collection effo1ts es specified 
he;ein, or in the event of default by any of the Settling Defendants in their 
obligations under this Agreement. Defendant R. John Taylor understands 
.and agrees that ln the event that judgment is en~ed, that post.judgment 
interest at the ibderal statutory rate shall accrne from September 15, 2014 
pul'suantto the Court's ruling ofJanuary 9, 2015. 
viii. SettI!]:ig Crop Defendants; ~timdated Judgm.ent Settling Crop 
Defendants shall confess· ll stipulated judgment in the amount of the 
Minimum Settlement Amount for the claims against them for breach of 
the Loan Agreement in the form attached hereto (Crop USA Defendants 
Stipulated Judgment). Settling Plaintiff agrees not to execute on the Crop 
Defendants' Stipulated Judgment until it has completed its Judgment 
Collection efforts, as specified herein, or in the event of a default of aoy of 
the Settling Defendants in their obligations under thls Agreement. Crop 
Defendants agree that post~judg1nent interest at the federal statutory rate 
shall accrue commencing on September 15, 2014 pursuant to the Court's 
rullng of January 9, 201S. 
Ix. Settling AIA Defendants: Stipulated Judgment; Financial Audit 
Settling AIA Defendants shall confess a stipulated judgment ln the amount 
of tbo Minimum Settlement .Alnount for the ola!ms against them for 
breach of the Guarantee Agrocment in the form attached hereto (AIA 
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Defendants' Stipulated Judgment). Settlill;g Plaintiff agrees not to execute 
on the AIA Defendants' Stipulated Judgment until it has completed its 
· : ·. · Judgment C,oUection ~ffo~ •. :a.s,,sl),ecJ.t.i!!.4. ~e\·~jll, ~r in fae c;vent of a 
default of any of the Settling Defendants in their obligations under this 
Agreement The Parties further agree that the Settling AJA Defendants 
have represented that they provided thdr most current fimmcial data, 
including but not limued to, all reported income sources, in a manner, 
consistent with the historical business practice and the Settling Plaintiff 
m.akes no claim at th.is time on the income sources of AIA. AIA 
Defendants agree that post-judgment interest at the federal statutory rate 
shall accrue commencing on September 15, 2014 pursuant to the Coiirt's 
ruling ofJanuary 9, 2015. 
x. Partieluatlo11 by Settling 'Defendants in Potential Recovery: After 
Settling Plaintiff obtains recovery of the then outstanding amount due 
punmant to the lending agreements at issue in the Lawsuit, plus all fees 
and costs and the maximrun amount of interest arising to or related to the 
Joan at issue In the Lawsuit ("Payoff Amount"), any recovery in excess of 
the Payoff Amount shall be divided with Settling Plaintiff receiving 50% 
and Settling Defendants receiving 50%, ("Participation Agreement''· 
This Paitlcipation Agreement shall not, and does not, create any 
obllgatioos, be it fiduciary or otherwise, in any manner, respect, or form, 
between the Settling Plalntiff 1111d Settling Defendants. The Settling 
Plaintiff can act or direct any aspect of the Judgment Collection efforts in 
any manner it sees fit In its sole 111\d absolute judgment Furthennore, this 
Agreement does not compel or require Settling Plaintiff to prosecub; 
continue, or maintain any lawsuits or other fotm of coileotlon activities. 
Waiver of Civil Code Sectlop. 1542. The Settling Parties expressly understand 
and acknowledge that it is possible tbat unknown losses or claims exist or that present 
losses may have been underestimated in amount or severity, and explicitly took that int.o 
account tn the making of this agreement. With respect to unknown claims or losses 































relinquish and waive all rights confe1·1·ed upon them by the provisions of Califomia Civil 
Code Section 1542, which provlcles as follows: 
1':A- GENERAL·· RELEASE- ·DOES-.0NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS 
WRICH A CREDITOR DOES NOT RNOW OR SUSPECT TO 
EXIST IN ms OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECOTlNG 
THE RELEASE, 'WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER MUST 
HA VE MA.TERIALLY AFFECTED ms OR HER SETILEMENT 
WITH THE DEBTOR." 
' 5. Misteptesentation Claims. Tho Settling Parties agree that the Settling Plaintiff 
wlll dismiss without prejudice the Misrepresentation Claims in the District Court 
Case. Settling Plaintiff has agreed to this dismissal because of the Tolling Agreement 
that the Settling Parties have signed which is attached hereto and incoipol'ated by 
J'eforcnce. The settling Defendant Taylor in his individual capacity and in his capacity as 
representative of each Settling Defendant shall not take any action .to initiate 01· cat\se the· 
voluntary filing of any ba11kruptcy proceeding of any Settling Defendant, 'The Settling 
Dofendants agree that Plaintiff's Misrepresentation Causes of Action are tolled, including 
if such claims are scheduled in any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, In the event of 
eithet· a default by any of the Settling Defendants of this Settle1nent Agremnont; or in the 
event of a bankruptcy proceeding involving any. of the Settling Defendants, Settling 
Plaintiff shall file its Misrq:iresentation claims in the United States District Court, Central 
District of California, and that the matter will be bee.rd by The Honorable S. James Otero 
without a JW'Y, The pa1ties specifically undersfand that an-y bankruptcy proceeding will 
not impede or affect the prosecution of the Misrepresentation claims at triai and will 
cooperate ll.S necessary to procedurally have such claims aqjudicatcd by The Honorable S. 
James Otero. 
6, [>lsmisstil ·with Prejndjce. Within five (5) days of execution of this Agreement 
Settllng Plaintiff's counsel shall ser~e a Stipulation and Order for Dismissal with 
· Prejudice with respect to th~ complaint in this matter on the S"ettling Defendant's counsel, 
subject to approval as to form by counsel for Settling Defendants. Within five. (5) days of 
the receipt of th~ approved by counsel Stipulation ond Order for Dismissal with 
Prejudice, Settling Defendants will sign the stipulation, and ,file with !his ooiut fur 
executiC>n of the Ordet·, 
19705 
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7. _No Admission. The Parties undorstand and agree that, with the exception of the 
Stipulated Judgments refe1red to above, this Agreement is not an admission of any 
.· :-li~bility wbiltsoever; btinhat'it>i:ni:cornpromlseofdisputed liability.· No.nction.talcen by 
the pruties hereto, or any of them, previously or in connection with this Agreement, shall 
be deemed or considered to be an admission of the truth or falsity or any claims hereto 
made or an acknowledgment or admission by any party of any fault or liability 
whatsocvcl' to any other pal'ty or to any third pa1~y. Settling Defendants he1dn expressly 
deny liability. 
8. Attorney Fees .and Costs. Except with respect to the Judgment Collection 
activities describod at Paragraph 3.(x.) above, each party shall bear its own costs, attorney 
foes and other fees incurred jn coonection with this Agreement aod in connection with the 
Released Claims. 
9. Future .Attorney Fees. If any legal or equitable action is necessary to enforce or 
interpret the tei.·ms of this agreement, the pl'evailing party shall be entitled to a reasonable 
sum of attornoy fees and costs which are actually incurred and paid, in addition to any 
other relief to which party l.118Y be entitled. 
10. Assignments. The Settling Parties agree that with respect to Paragraph 3 (i 
through x), delineated above, tbe1·e are various agreements and Assignments, It is a 
condition to this Agreement that the parties execute the Assignments delineated above, 
and Assigntncnts I through IV, are attached hereto and made a pait of this Agreement. 
11. Qonfldentiality. The Parties shall not disclose thls Agreement or its terms to any 
person or entity except as requh·ed by law or with the written consent of the others; 
provided, however, that nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the Parties from 
disclosing the terms of this Agreement (1) to any accountant or attorney in the collrse of 
the Parties' legal and or business affairs; or (2) in response to judicial process, in any 
judicial proceeding to enforce or construe this Agreement 
12. Anthoritv. Each party represents and warrants that the undersigned has the 
authority to act on behalf of and bind it and all who may claim through it to the terms and 
conditions ofthis Agreement. 
13. Ggvernlng LHw. This Agn,ement shall be con11trued under and governed by the 
laws oftbe state ofCaUfornia. 
10 
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14. Severabilify. If any provisions of this agreement or tbc application ihorcofto any 
person, place or circumstance shall be held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be 
in.valid,' Urienfot~-'iibfe," 01' 'voitl;-the,rcmmnder--0f fuis:agreement and_-such PJ'O:Vis\Q.!1 as . 
applied to other persons, places and circumstances shall reinain in full force and effect. 
15. Vohrnta,ry Execution of Agreement. This agreement is ex.ecuted voluntarily and 
without any duress or undue influence on the pa1t of on behalf of the parties hereto, with 
the full intent ofreleasing Released Claims. The parties f!Cknowledge that: 
(a) They have read this agreement; 
(b) They have been 1·epresented in the preparation, negotiation and execution 
of this Agreement by legal counsel of theh· own cholce or have had the opportunity to 
consult an attorney ofthei.r choice; 
(c) They understand the terms and consequences of this Agl'eement and of the 
release; 
(d) They are fully aware of the legal and binding effect of this Agreement 
16. Counterparts. This Agitement may be ~ecuted in one or more counterpaits. 
Each signed counterpart shall be deemed an origina~ and all together sh.all constitute one 
in the same lnstmment. For the purposes of this Agreement, si~aturcs transmitted by 
fucsim.ile, by electronic mail In "portable document format" fonn or by any other 
electronic means Intended to preserve tbe original graphic and pictorial appeal'ance of a 
document will have the saine legal effect as physical delivery of the paper docu1nent 
bearing an original signature. 
17. Remedies. This Agreement may be pleaded as a complete defense to, and may 'oe 
used llB a basis for an injunction against ~he bringing any claims for the matters released 
herein of this Settlement Agreement. 
18. Con tlnulng J urlsdiction. The pa1ties stipulate and agree that the United States 
District Court for the Central District of Califumia shall retaln continued jurisdiction over 
this Settlement Agreement to enforce the terms of this Agreement aud any potential 
ftlJ'thcr actions by and between Settling Plaintiff and Defendant John Taylor, or with 
respect to any futther actions by and between Settling Plaintiff and Settling Def?1dants. 
19. Rlspute Resolution. Any dispute which a1ises under or with respect to this 
Settlement Agreement shall in the first instance, be subject to informal negotiations 
11 
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between the parties in this dispute. Informal negotiations shall not exceed ninety (90) 
days from the time of tbe dispute shall be considered to have arisen, when one party 
.· seifds the other· party ,a written nm.!ce,Qt;,.tbe .. ~isp.u.te •.. Jn,_ th~ .event the p.311:les cannot 
. ···- . . ··-·.·· ;-.: ...... ---:-·-,, ·: __ · .. · 
resolve the dl~ute by nogotiations, the parties shall submit the matter to this comt for 
mediation by the Honorable S. James Otem, and, in the event that Judge Otero is 
un11vailable, by the assigned Magistrate Judge, and, in the event of unavailability, by a 
mutually agreed upon mediator. Each disputing patty shall bear its own attorney fees. If 
the dispute remains unresolve.d for more than ninety {90) days after the delivery of the 
notice of disp~te, any party can dispute and file an action in the United States Di~lct 
Cou11 with the Central District of California. In any courl action to enforce the terms of 
this Settlement Agl'eement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of 
reasonable attomcy fees and costs lnc1med. The Settling Parties understand and ag~ee 
that the Dispute Resolution pl'ocodure specified bt1rein shall not apply to eithel' Settling 
Plaintiff's fodgment Collection efforts, or to Settling Plaintiff's declaration of a defauh 
by fl!lY Settling Defendant. 
20. Joint Drafting. TWs Settlement Agreement has been jointly negotiated and 
drafted and the language of fu<t Settlement Agreement shall not be construed in favor of 
or against any of the parties based on the parties respective roles in the drafting process. 
21. Cooperation. The Settling. Defendants agree that they individually and 
colJectlvely shall coopente with Settling Plaintiff This cooperation i-equires Defendants 
to provide periodic reports on efforts to re90ver insurance proceeds from Navigators for 
the benefit of Settling Plaintiff, at il1tervals of not less than every 90 days. Defendants 
also agree to pl'Ovide full and complete financial documentation of assets to Settling 
Plaintiff; and to provide further info1matio1J. as demanded by Settling Plaintiff. The 
parties understand and agree that failure to provide fuU, complete and accurate financial 
infunnation may result in the scheduling of a debtor's examination at a location to be 
determined by Settling Plaintiff in the state of California. Settling Plaintiff shall request 
sole lllld absolute judgrnent and discretion in any manner and duration to further 
l'easonable_coUection efforts for Settling Plaintiff. 
22. ~tntus Quo, Reinsurance Partners, U.C, and Greenleaf Reinsurance Partners, 
LLC sball maintain status quo and are prohibited from making ll11Y substantive changes in 
19705 
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their business structures du.ring the pendency of the Judgment Collection procedure, that 
may prejudice Settling Plaint!~ without first obtaining the express writteo consent of 
Sett.lmg"Plaintiffherelm - ·· : . - .... --·· .. -: - - _, ,-_:c:.· 
23. Iwitire Agr!?(}ment. 1l1is Agreement contains the entire Agreement between the 
parties pertaining to the Released Cfaims and supersedes and replaces· all prior and 
contemporaneous agreements and discussions- among the parties with r~pec,t to the 
subject mattOJ' hereof, whether expressed or implied, OL'al OJ' written. The tenn$ of this 
Agreement en, contractual and not a mere recital, 1l1is Agreement may not be 
contradicted or amended by evidence or by contemporaneous oral agreements or 
discussions among the parties .. Any amendments or additions to this Agreement must be 
in writing and signed by the parties. 
24. Opportunity to Cure. Upon any alleged default by Settling Defendants, Settling 
Plaintiff agrees to pl'ovide Settling Defondants and its counsel of record with five {5) 
calenda1' days advance written notlce of its default. Notice shall be deemed given upon 
mailing of written notice by oettified mail return receipt requested to Settling Defendants 
' and their counsel as identified in this agreement. Settling Plaintiff shall also fax and e-
_ mail a copy of its written notice to the Settling Defendants and their counsel on the same 
day that it mails its written notice to them. Failure to provide written notice in the 
manner prescribed herein shall be deemed in6ffeotive and such notice shall have no legal 
effect and shall not subject Settling Defendants to the pC/lalties set forth herein. Upon 
getting proper written notice, Settling Defendants shall have three (3) calendar days to 
cure any alleged default of this Agreement. 
In witness of the fo!'egoing, the parties, through their duly authorized 























- --------- ---·~~-- - -----·------
Date: _____ _ 
. ·. ·. Date: .. ;.;_·. ~~~..c...--· ·--·.::..;.· . - - AJA ER .. CES co: 0 . ·troN·~----
,~ ~ Date: _____ _ 
Date: ______ _ 
Date: ______ _ 
iaifs cE~R'. ERS, LLC 
;fJL~( 
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ASSIGNM,ENTAGREEMENTI 
1'hisA.ssignmerit Agr(:eihctit is made by nnd beLween;- .... 
AIA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation (hereinafter "Assignors'), and 
Gem Cap Lending I. LLC (he1-elnafter "Assi~ee''). 
WHEREAS, the AssignorS are, and represent themselves to be, the owners of the 
mo1tgage of said real property commonly known as and referred to as 111 Ma.in Street, 
Lewiston, Idaho ("Subject Property''), 
WHEREAS, the Assignors have agreed to assign their owne!'ship interests ln the 
Subject Property, subject to real estate taxes, and a licm in favor of Syringa Bank in the 
estimated total of $60,000, pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement pertaining 
to that Federal District Court Case identified as GemCap Lending I. LLC v. Crap USA 
insurance Agency, Inc., el. al., case no. 2:13-CV-055040-SJO-MAN. In terms of the 
Settlement Agreement in the above Federal District Court Cese, 1his current document 
will be Assignment I: and 
WHEREAS, th~ Assignee is desirous of ncquil'lng the entire right, title and 
lnterest'in said property that is owned by Assignors. 
NOW THEREFORE, TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, be it known for 
good and valuable consideration, the parties hereby agree as set forth below. 
l. ASSIGNMENT: The Assignot·s hereby Irrevocably assign and transfer to 
Assignee all of its ownership interest in said Subject Property previously 
identified as 11 I Maln Street, Lewiston, Idaho effective as of the execution 
date below, an rights, title and interest In and to said property, together with 
all associative rights, for Assignee's own use, as well. as the use of any of 
(\sslgnee's successors, assigns or other legal representatives as fully and 
ent~ly as the same would have enjoyed by Assignor if this Agreement mid 
not been made, subject to the known and described Sytlnga Bank loan 
estimated around $60,000, and subject to real estate taxes estimated around 
$121,000 and legal fees and costs estimated around $81,000 AS$0clated with 
the pending judicial foreotosurc, subject to verification, A$sl!Plor l'cprcsents it 
only bolds a 67% ownership interest in sald Subject Property. 
















- .-- -,-. -
2. AUTHORlZATlON TO AS.SIGN: Assignors have the authoiity to transfer 
and assign their full and complete ownership interest, title and rights Cu the 
Subjeci 'P1·ope11y. this iluthorit'ylias· beeit ·cb11U~ngeJ bytertain-sharebolde1'S 
of AIA in two separate d~ivatlve suits filed by certain shareholders and in a 
third pending consollda.tod case filed by Donna Taylor. 
3. CONT[NUING OBLIGATIONS: Assignors agree to assist Assignee, upon 
request, by taking any reasonable acts that may be necessary for t\Jrther 
perfecting title, and completing this assignment. Assignee agrees to release tho 
Hens on the remaining real property of Al.A. 
4. APPLICATION Of PROCEEDS TO DEBT REDUCTION: The value of the 
11ssignment or any proceeds therefrom will reduce the debt owed to CropUSA 
Insurance Agency1 Inc, by AJA. 
5, BINDlNG EFFECT: The covenants lltld cond[tions contained in this 
Assignment sh11ll apply to and bind the parties hereto, as well as their parents, 
subsidiaries, legal representatives, successors in interest, and predecessors in. 
interest. 
6; GOVERNJNG LAW: This Assignment shall be governed and construed iri 
accordance wltli the Jaws of the State of Idaho. 
7. COUNTERPARTS: This Assignment may be signed in .any number of 
counterparts each of which shall be deemed to be an original and alt of it 
taken shall constitute one and the same instrument. 
8. "REPRESENTATION: Each signatory hereto acknowledges and agrees tbllt, 
(i) Such signatory has been l'Cpresented in the negotiations for and in 
preparation of this Assignment by counsel of signatory's own 
choosing, or that bolng advised to obtain counsel such same party has 
chosen not to obtain counsel; 
(Ii) Such signatory has read this Assignment; 
(iil)Suoh signatory is fully aware of the contents and legal effects of this 
Assignment. 














'I, • - .• .. : ···~· -- .• •·?;::· 
IN WlThlESS WHEREOF, the Assignors and Assignee have indicated their 
· · acceptance by executing thls Assignm~nt-effective:lanuary .~ 20 t ~ .. : 
Date: _______ _ 
GernCap Lending I, LLC 
Date:,~~~~----
AIA Services~ 
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ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT IT 
Th is Assignment Agreement is made by and between: 
Al.A lnsura~~; inc:, A[ICSc:i'vitesCot'pbfatioh~·c"ropl:JSA fosu11ance Agency. Inc.,. 
CropUSA lnsunmce Services, LLC, Reinsurance Partners, LLC1 Greenleaf Reinsurance 
P 1u1m:rs, LLC, and R. John Taylol' (hereinafter"Assig11ors'1, and Gem Cap Lending l, LLC 
(hereinafter "Assignee"). 
WHEREAS, the Assignors and Assignee have settled the litigation Issues in thut 
Federal District Court Case identified as GemCap Lending I, ~LC v, Crop f.!_SA Insu,-ance 
Agency, Inc., el. a-1., case no. 2: 13-CV-OS5040-SJ0-MAN ("District Court Case''). In tl1e 
tertns of the Settlement Agreement in the above District Court Case, this current 
assignmentdocuJ!lentwas referenced a11d will be referred to herein as Assignmentll; and 
WHEREAS, pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement In the District 
Court Case, Assignors and their affiliates agreed to assign and convey to Assignee all 
. monies owed or owing by CGB Diversified Services, Inc. dba Diversified Crop Insurance 
Services and/or its affiliates ("Diversified") to Weskan Agency, LLC or any oflts affiliates 
("Weskan") fotthe Crop year 2013 until execution of the currentAi;signment; an~ 
WiffilUj',AS;-the Assignee is desirous of obtaining and acquiring all monies, assets 
and properties owed by Diversified to Weskan. 
NOW THEREFORE, TO ALL WHOM IT l\1A.Y CONCERN, be it known for 
good tllld valuable consideration, the partlos hereby agree e.s set forth below. 
l. ASSIGNMENT: The Assignors hereby irrevocably assign and transfer to 
Assignee all of their rights and entitlements to any and all assets, money owed 
or owing by Diversified to Weskan witb respect to the Crop year 2013 until 
execution of the current Assignment Thus, lt is the intent of Assignors and 
Assignee to have Assignee now hold all of Asslgnor's rights to obtain any and 
all all monles, owed or owing Weskan is entitled to receive from Diversified. 
Pursuant to the Agreement of the undorsigned parties, "Affiliate" shall be 
defined as broadly as the law may allow and is h1tended to include any 
lndMdual and/or entity, including subsidiaries, parents, officers, dil'ectors, 
successors in interest, predecessors In 1ntct·est, or any other person or entity that 
could be broadly defined as an "Aff1llatc." 








































2. AUTHORIZATION TO ASS1GN: Assignors have the authority to transfer and 
assign their full and complete rights wlth respect to the money, assets and/or 
·. pl'6perty heing asslgn.c:d ano'tefercf1ccd above:-··-~ ..•.. ·,:· •· , -> ... 
3. CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS: Assignors agree to assist Assignee, upon 
request, by taking any reasonable acts that may be necessary for the purpose of 
completing this Assignment 
4. BINDING EFFECT: The covenants and conditions contained In this 
Assignment shall apply to and bind the parties hereto, as well as their parents, 
subsidiaries, legal representatives, successo111 In interest, and predecessors in 
interest, 
S. GOVERNING LAW: This Assignment shall be governed and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of California. 
6, COUNTBRPARTS: This A:isignment may bo signed in any number of 
counterparts each of which shall be deemed to be an original and all ofit taken 
shall constitute one and the-same- instrumcmt. 
7. REPRESmn' ATION: Bach signatory hereto acknowledges and agrees that, 
(i) · Suoh signatory has been represented in_ the negotiations for and in . 
preparation ofthi:; Assignment by counsel of signatory's own choosing, 
or that belng advised to obtain counsel such samo party has chosen not 
to obtain counsel; 
(Ii) Such signatory has read this Assignment; 
(fll) Such signatory ls fully aware of the contents and legal effects of this 
Asslgnment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Assigno1'S and Assignee have indicated thr:lr 
acceptance by executing this Assignment effoctive January __ , 2015. 
Dirte:. _______ _ 








---· - __ , -·-· --~---------
Date: _______ _ 
-11 1L1j( 
CropusW;uranoe en Inc. 
Date:. _______ _ 
Date: _______ _ 
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ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT Ill 
This Assignment Agreerrt~!}t .is made by and between: 
- . .. -·.:. ·.·;: -- . 
AIA Insurance, Inc., AIA Service.~ Corporation, CropUSA lnsurance Agency, 
Inc., CropUSA Insurance Services, LLC, .Reinsurance Partners, LLC, Greenleaf 
Reh1.:mrance Partners, LLC, and R. John Taylor (hereinllfter "Assignors'), and OemCap 
Lending I, LLC (horeinafter "Assignee"). 
WHEREAS, the Assignors are, ao.d represent themselves to he, the possible and 
potential owners, directly or indirectly, of any rights there may be against any and all law 
films that assisted Settling Defendonts in the negotiation. of and execution of the Loan 
Agreements that resulted in aud gave rise to the District Court C11se referenced herein. 
Tb.is Assignment-.!ncludes but is not limited to Assignments of any and all lights against 
the law firm of Quarles & Brady, who represented the bonower in connectiou with the 
negotiatiou, e1t:ecution and delivery of the loan documents referenced above, and who, 
pursururt to paragraph 6.5 of the Loan Agreement provided a legal opinion letter to 
Settling Plaintiff GemCap, who then relied on said letter and opinion; and, 
WHEREAS, the Assi~rs and Assignee were involved in the Federal District 
. . . 
Court Case identified as GemCap Lending I, LLC v. Crop USA Insurance Ageney, Inc., el. 
al., case no. 2:13-CV-055040-SJO-MAN ('·District Court Case"). The liti.gation of that 
case involved issues pertllinmg to the Loan Agreement referenced above. In the te11ns of 
the Settlei:nent Agreement in tbe above District Coi.trt Case, this current document is 
referenced and will be referred to as Assignment lll; and, 
WHEREAS, the Assignee is desirous of acquiring all rights and interest& that 
Aseignors have or may in the future have with respect to claims agairult Assignor's 
counsel including, but not limited to, QolU'les & Brady. 
NOW THKREFORE, TO ALL WHOMlT MAY CONCERN, be it known for 
good nod valuable consideration, the parties hereby agree as &et forth below. 
l. ASSIGNMENT: The Assignors hereby irrevocably assign and transfer to 
Assignee all righm and entitlements they now have or in the future may acquire 
against any and all law films th?rt. assisted Settling Defendants in the 
negotiation of and exocution of the Loan Agreemonts that resulted in and gave 
rise to the District Cou11 Case referenced hol'ein, Including but not limited to, 

































the law firm of Quarles & Brady with respect to said counsel's work on the 
Loan Documents and lhe Loan Agreement which were subject matters of the 
... Dis~rlct Court ·ea~ i-efefenced above. Specifically, Assignors and Assignee 
acknowledge that paragraph 6.5 of the Loan Agreement required, as a 
condition of the loan placement, a legal letter from Assignor's counsel 
addressed to GemCap, and that Assignee relie<l upon said legal opinion letter 
piior to entering into the Loan Agreement which was the subject matter oflhe 
District Court referenced above. This Assig11ment is effective as against all of 
Assignors' legal counsel who negotiated, designed, or drafted said Loan 
Agreements,_ including, but not limited to Quarles & Brady, and sholl be 
effective as of the date of the execution set forth below and includes all rights 
and interests that Assignors have or in the futnre m.ay obtain, together with all 
associative righ~, for Assignee's own use, as well ae the use of any of 
Assignee 'z; successors, Hsigns, or otber legal representatives as fully and 
entirel.Y as the same would have been enjoyed by Assignors if this Agreement 
had not been roede. Moreover, nothing in this A.s6'ignment shall detract from 
or minimi~ any direct rights that Assignee has or may in the future have 
against said law finns, including but not limited to Quarles & Brady. This 
agreement is not intended to relate to or convey 1ights regarding any attorneys 
of record or finns beyond those that assisted Settling Defendants in the 
negotiation of and execution of the Loan Agreements that resulted in 11nd gave 
rise to the District Court Case referenced herein. 
2. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSiGN: Assignors represent that they have the 
authority to trans.fer end assign lh.eir full a11d complete rights end interest 
agains~ any and all law firms that assisted Settling Defendants iJ?. the 
negotiation of and execution of the Loan Agreements that resulted in and guve 
rise to the District Court Case referenced herein, including but not limited to 
Quarles & Brady who were involved in negotiating and executing the Loan 
Agreements 1111d Loan Documents whioh were the subject matter of the 
Dlstrlot Cou1t Caso referenced above. 





























3. CONT.!NU!NO OBLIGATIONS: Assignors agree to assi_sl Assignee, upon 
request, by taking any reasonable acts that may be necessary for further 
· implementing arul- completing this asscgnmi;:nt .. _., .. _ .. 
4. BINDING BFPECT: The covenants and condjtioll8 contained in this 
Assignmcnt shall apply to and bind the parties hereto, as well as their parenb!, 
subsidiaries. legal representatives, successors in interest, and predecessors in 
interest. 
5. GOVERNING LAW: This A'>sigrunent shall be governed and construed in 
accordance with. U,e laws of the State of California. 
6. COUNTERPARTS: This Assignment may be signed in any number of 
countorpa.rts each of which shall be deemed to bo an original and all of it taken 
shall constitute one and the mnc instrumi:nt 
7. RBPltF.SEN'l'ATION: F.acb signatoi:y lweto acknowledges and agrees that, 
(i) Such signatory has been represented in the negotiations for and in 
preparation of 1his Assignm.Cllt by counsel of signatory's ow.o. 
choosing. or that being advised to obtain counsel 5uch same party has 
chosen not to. obtain. couusel; 
Qi) Such signatory has relld this Assignment; 
(iii)Such signatory is fully aware of tho contents and legal effccis of this 
Assignment. 
IN WI!'NBSS WHEREOF, the Assjgoors and ·Assignee have indicated their 
acceptance by cxocuting this Assignment o~ctlvc January_, 2015. 
Pate:-------
Date:~----~~ 




























Date:., . . _; .:. . .:· - :·:. - ~ -.. ....:. :: .. -
Date: 





ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT IV 
.. This AssiJrnment Agreement is made by and between: 
ACA lnsurance, foe., AtA Services- c°orp~ration: Ct-opUSA Jnsu1imce AgOilCy, 
Inc., CropUSA Insurance Services, LLC, Reinsurance Partners, LLC, Greenleaf 
Reinsurance Partners, LLC, and R. John Taylo1· (bereinaftel'"Assignors"), and GemCap 
Lending t LLC (hei·eln.after "Assignee"). 
WHER~AS, the Assignors and Assignee have 1-ecently resolved their differences 
pertaining to that Fedora! Dlstrict Court Case identilled as GemCap Lending I, LLC v. 
CropUSA lnmrarrceAgency, lnc., et. aL,case no. 2:13-CV-055040~SJO-MAN; and 
WHEREAS, Assignors are owed certain amounts by CGB Diversified Services, 
Inc., ll!ld/or any of their affiliates ("Dive1·sified'1, and the sum of these amounts owed by 
Diversified by Settling DefendH11ts Is estimated to be no less than the sum reflected in 
Schedule A attached to the Settlement Agreement, and 
WHEREAS, Assignors and Assignee have agreed that Assignors herein· have 
agreed to assist Assignee with respect to recovery of all amounts due e.nd owing with 
respect to the colleotion of the Minimum Settlement Amount, es referenced in paragraph 
3 of the Settlement Agreein~t and Release, and in recognition of the Agreement, 
Assignors will provide full ancl complete coopel'ation with respect to collecting said 
amounts. Assignors have agreed to assign all of their rights with respect to said amounts 
owed to them br Diversified as a condition to the underlying Settlement Agreement. 
NOW THEREFORE, TO ALL WIIOMIT MAY CONCERN, be it known for 
good and valuable consideration, th:: parties hereby agree as set forth below. 
I . ASSIGNMENT: The Assignors hereby irrevocably assign and transfer to 
Assignee all rights and entitlements they now bave or in the future may have 
with respects to amouots owed to the!ll by Diversified (as defined above). 
With 1-cspect to the Settlement Agreement, as well as this as this Assignment, 
AssigllOrs agree, that after execution, Assignee will have the full right to all 
said sums owed to Assignors by Diversified and that after execution Assignee 
owns these rights, together with all associative rights, as well as the rlgbts of 
Assignee's :iuccessors, 11Sslgns or other legal representatives as fully and 
entirely as the same would have been enjoyed by Assignors if this Agreement 





















had n?t been made. This Assignment is referred to heroin, and is attached and 
incorporated into tbe Agreement as Assignment lV. 
· 2. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIGN: Asslgnol's_heve the authority to transfer 
and assign their full and complete rights with respect to their claims against 
Diversified. 
3. CONTfNUING OBLIGATIONS: Assignors agree to asst.st Assignee, upon 
. request, by taking any reasonable acts that may be necessary for further 
implementing and oompletlog this ass_ignment. 
· 4. PARTICPATION AGREEMENT: After Assignee obtains recovery of the 
then outstanding amount due pursuant to the lending agreements at issue in 
the Lawsuit, plus all fees and costs and the maximum amount of interest 
arising from or related to the loan at issue in the Lawsuit ("Payoff Amount''), 
any recovery in ex.cess of the Payoff Amount shall be divided with the 
Assignee !'eceiving 50% and the Asslgnors receiving soc;., ("Participation 
Ag1-eement'). 
5, BINDlNG EFFECT: The covenants and conditlons contained in this 
Assignment shall apply to and bind the patties hereto, as well as their parents, 
subsidiaries, legal representatives, successors in interest., and predecessors in 
interest. 
6. GOVERNING LAW: This Assignment shall be governed and construed in 
accordnnce wtth the laws of tho State of California. 
7. COUNTERPAR'fS: This Assignment may be signed in any number of 
countetparts each of which shall be deemed to be an original and all of it 
taken shall constituto one and the same instrument. 
8. REPRESENTATION: Each signatory hereto acknowledges and agrees tbal, 
(i) Suoh signatoty has been represented in the negotiations fol' and ln 
preparation of this Assignment by counsel of signatory's own choosing, 
or that being advised to obtain counsel such same party has chosen not 
to obtain counsel; 
(ii) Such signatory has read this &'S!gnment; 
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(iii) Such signatory is fully awa,·e of the contents and legal effects of this 
Assignme11t. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Assignors and Assignee have indicated their 
acceptince by executing this Assignment effective January __ , 2015. 
Date: C.~ 
Gem~ 
Date: --+-'/I~~=----~~~~ AIAlnsurance, f£.-
Date: A ,/.4_ r:/)(__ 
AiftcrvicesCo.p~n 
Date: yf ~ 72/l_. 
erotmJAinsunmce~c. 
Date: ~ r(i/f_ 
Ci·~pUSAlnsurance i~ LLC 
Date: d/L m{ 
RelJsurancePartnj.ii.c 
Date: JI /J '7,:( 
Oreeo~ce $t:f;fs, LLC 
Date:. _______ _ 


















Schedule A to Assignment IV 
Assignors Al.A Insurance, Inc., AIA Services Corporation, CropUSA Insurance Agency, 
Inc., CropUSA Insmance Services, LLC, Reins~~e Partner;, LLC, Greenleaf Reinsurance 
Partners, LLC, and R. John Taylor are owed certain amounts by CGB Diversified Services, Inc., 
and/or any of their affiliates ("Diversified"). Settling Defendants believe that the certain Claims 
they have against Diversified are estimated to be: $1,292,907 claim for commissions due Settling 
Defendants, $4,323,400 claim for conversion of the policy expirations for the 2014 crop year; 
$12,SOo;ooo claim for failure to provide a reinsurance treaty for 2014 and damage to Settling 
Defendants, and, $8,640,000 claim for unjust enrichment. 
Exhibit • 11, p. 28 


























Conllent Resolution of' the Directors of 
AJA Services Col'poration 
Ai1 Idaho Corpot•ati~,j"' .·. -~ 
WHERK~S, CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. and CroplJSA Insurance Services. LLC 
(collectivcJy, the "Borrowers"), affillatcs of AJA Services Co:rporation (the "Corporation''), 
desire to jointly and severally borrow funds under a Joan facility (the ·'Loan Facility") with 
GemCap Lending T, LLC. a Delaware limited Habilhy company (the "Lende!'") as lender; and 
WHEREAS, it is a condition to Lende.1· making such loan facility available to Borrowers 
that the Corporat1on execute the Limited C011tinuing Guarantee (the ''Guar.autee") to guarantee 
the payment of the indebtedness of Borrowers to Le11der under tl1c Loan and Security Agreeme11t 
dated Novembe1· _. 2011 between Bon-owers and Lender; and 
WHEREAS, the Directors of the Corporation b~lievc tl)at it is in the best i_nterests of the 
Corporation to enter into the Guara11tec because Bon·owers are affiliates of the Corporation and 
provide products and/or services to the C()J1)0ration in the ordinary course of business; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT 
RESOLVED, that the Co1poration hereby ado_pts Md ratifies the tenns set forth in tbc 
Guarantee, which the Corporation will execute ns Guarantor, a uue co_py of which has been 
submitted to, and has been approved by, the Directors oftbe C011>oration; and be it fu1iher 
RESOl,VED, that the Coq)oration is hereby au1:ho1faed to enter into the transactions 
co11le.mp!ated in the Gt1arru1tee and to incur a11d pe1form the obligations contemplated therein, 
includfa1g without ]inritation, granting the security COl'l.templaL?:d therein; and be it fu1tbt.'l' 
RF.SOLVED, that the Corporation is hereby authoiized to execute and deliver to and in 
favor of lhe Lender tbe Guarantee ar.id ea.ch of the other documents 1:1nd certificates made in 
{00127823.00C; 1} 
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connectiou ttJerewith or as may be required from time to time pursuant to their terms 
(colleclively, the ''Transaction Documents''); and be it fu1ther 
IiESOLVF:D, that a11y officers of the Corpora.ti.on' be, and theyhei·eby are; authorized,-· 
empowered and directed to execute the Trau.c;action Docwnents in the name of and on behalf of 
the Corporation, and are permitted Lo incur fees and expenses on behalf of the Corporation: and 
be it further 
RESOLVI~D, that the signnture of any officer of the Corporation autho1ized to execute 
the Guarantee or any of the other Tra.1isactio11 Dl)Cl\ments or any other documents, instruments, 
imdcnakings. indemnities and certificates to be deJivcred to the Lender or any other person, as 
a11propriate, shall conclusively evidence their respective approvals thereof and the apptoval 
thereof by the Directors and the Corporation and its due authorization pursuant to the terms of 
this written appl'oval; and be it further 
RESOLVJW, that aii actions takeu prior to the date l1ereor by any oil'icer or other 
representative of the Corporatio11 in connection with tbe transactions con1e1npla1ed by the 
foregoing resolutions are, in all respects, hereby ratified and contim1ed. 
DA·, l~D November 21, 2011. 
C.onnie Taylor 
( ,::.-:· 
-·-·----------··--· -~· -~ .:~~-·---
;amcs Beck ) 
(00127823.DOC; 1} 
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connection therewith or as may be required from time to time pursuant to their tenns 
(collectively, the "Transaction Documents"); and be it further 
.·.-.-. '•. -~ , .. -~: ;-··.· ..... 
RESOLVED, that any officers of the Corporation be, and they hereby are, authorized, 
empowered and directed to execute the Transaction Documents in the name of and on behalf of 
the Corporation, and are permitted to incur fees and expenses on behalf of the Corporation; and 
be it further 
RESOLVED, that the signature of any officer of the Corporation authorized to execute 
the Guarantee or any of the other Transaction Documents or any other documents, instruments, 
undertakings, indemnities and certificates to be delivered to the Lender or any other person, as 
appropriate, shall conclusively evidence their respective approvals thereof and the approval 
thereof by the Directors and the Corporation and its due authorization pursuant to the terms of 
this written approval; and be it further 
RESOLVED, that all actions taken prior to the date hereof by any officer or other 
representative of the Corporation in connectlon with the transactions contemplated by tbe 
foregoing resolutions are, in all respects, hereby ratified and confirmed. 
DATED November 21, 2011. 
~:~--Connie Taylor R. John Taylor 
James Beck 
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$680,365.85 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
January 1 , 201 0 Lewiston, Idaho 
On or before the dates hereinafter mentioned and provided, for value received, 
Pacific l::.n:ipire_ Radio Co_rpc:>raticm pr9mtses to pay to the. order of AJA Services 
--COrporatit>n th-e sum . of SIX HtJNDREb. EfGHTY' -THOUSAND THREE . HUNDRED 
SIXTY~FIVE AND 85/100 DOLLARS ($680,365.85), with interest accrued thereon from 
the date of this Note, at the rate of Twelve Percent (12%) per annum, until paid in the 
following manner, to~wlt: Principle and accrued Interest shall be due on demand at any 
time; or upon sale and closing of any one of the radio stations of Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation; or June 30, 2010; whichever occura eartiest 
Maker reserves the right to prepay said sums In whole or In part without penalty. 
If suit is Instituted to collect the balance of principal and interest due at any time under 
the terms hereof, maker promises and agrees to pay, in addition to the costs and 
disbursements as provided by statute, such additional sum as the Court may adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such suit or action. 
The undersigned shall, to secure payment of this note, grant to AJA Services 
Corporation a security Interest (with a corresponding UCC-1 financing statement) in the 
property more specifically described in Exhibit A which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
Each and every person signing this note hereby waives presentment, demand, 
protest and notice of protest and of non-payment hereof. 










DEBTOR: Pacific Empire Radio Corporation 
SECURED PARTY: AIA Services Corporation 
. All tangible and intangible personal property and fixtures now owned or hereafter 
. a-cqiJired 'by the Debtor', or iri wlilch the Deb1or ma-y now have or hereafter acq·uire a-n --
interest, including without !imitation, au equipment, accoun1s, inventory, chattel paper, 
documents, general intangibles and all property described as follows: 
(A) all properties and assets of every type used or useful in connection with the 
ownership or operation of broadcast radio stations and any and all other communication 
businesses (collectively "Communication Businesses"); 
(B) all equipment (including, without limitation, all machinery, motor vehicles, tools, 
furniture, studio equipment, towers, transmitters, translators, antennas, microphones, 
audio equipment, video equipment, tape recorders, connectors, broadcasting and 
receiving equipment, and all other equipment relat!ng to the operation of Communication 
Businesses), Inventory (including, without limltatlon, all merchandise, raw materials, 
work In process, finished goods, and supplies) and goods, whether now owned or 
hereafter acquired by the Debtor or in which the Debtor may have or hereafter acquire 
an interest; 
(C) all accounts, accounts receivable and other receivables Oncludlng, without limitation, 
1ntercompany receivables, rights to receive payments of money under contracts, chattel 
paper and rights to receive payments of money under leases) and general intangibles, 
including without limitation: 
(i) distributions and other payments relating to all limited partnership Interests, 
partnership Interests and limited liability company member interests now or hereafter 
held by or issued to the Debtor; 
(Ii) all existing and future rights of the Debtor to any refund of any tax assessed 
against or paid by the Debtor, loss carryback tax refunds, insurance premium refunds, 
unearned premiums, insurance proceeds, choses in action, goodwill, going concern 
value, trademarks, service marks, tradenames, patents, blueprints, designs, product 
lines, and research and development, and all of the Debtor's rights to receive payments 
of money as a tenant under any and all leases; 
(ii!) aU of the Debtor's rights under a/I present and future authorizations, permits, 
licenses and franchises heretofore or hereafter granted or assigned to the Debtor by the 
Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") or any other public or governmental 
agency or regulatory body for the operation and ownership of broadcast radio stations 
and other Communications Businesses. {such authorizations, licenses, permits and 
franchises, together with any extensions or renewals thereof, being referred to 
collectively as the "Franchises") (excluding, however, such Franchises to the extent, and 
only to the extent, it is unlawful to grant a security interest in such Franchises), but 
including, to the maximum extent permitted by law, an rights Incident or appurtenant to 
such Franchises, Including, without limitation, the right to receive all proceeds derived or 
arising from or in ·connection wlth the sale, assignment or transfer of such Franchises), 
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whether now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, or in which the Debtor may 
now have or hereafter acquire an Interest; 
(iv) all of the Debtor's rights under all construction contracts and licenses, 
leases, permits, authorizations and other agreements; 
. {v} . all. management agreements,. programming agreements, network affiliate 
agreements and all other agreements for the provision of management, engineering or 
similar services; 
(vi) all other agreements relating to Communication Businesses, whether nor 
owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, in which the Debtor may now have or 
hereafter acquire an Interest; and 
(vii) all right, title and interest, if any, under any intercompany notes, obligations 
or agreements, whether now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor or in which the 
Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an Interest; 
(D) all investment property, securities, securities entitlements and other equity interests 
now or hereafter held by or issued to the Debtor, Including, without limltatlon, all shares 
of stock, warrants, options, notes, Investment contracts, partnership interests and 
member interests ln limited liability companies, Including without limitation (I) all rights of 
the Debtor as a limited partner, general partner or member to participate in the operation 
or management of any partnership or limited liability company In which the Debtor holds 
an equity interest; (ii) all rights of the Debtor to the property, assets, partnership 
interests, membership interests and distributions under the applicable partnership 
agreement, .. limited liability company agreement, operating agreement or · other 
organizational documents; (iii) all present and future rights of the Debtor to receive 
payment of money or other distributions or payments arising out of or in connection with 
any such equity interests of the Debtor and Its rights under such organizational 
documents and any and all other related agreements; and (iv) all other general 
intangibles relating thereto and proceeds resultlng therefrom; 
(E) all instruments, documents of title, policies and certificates of Insurance, securities, 
bank deposits, deposit accounts, checking accounts and cash now or hereafter owned 
by the Debtor, or in which the Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an interest; 
(F) all accessions, additions or improvements to all replacements, substitutions and 
parts for, and all proceeds and products of, and all distributions and dividends relating to, 
all of the foregoing, including, without limitation, proceeds of Jnsurance; and 
(G) all books, records and documents relating to all of the foregoing. 




September 20, 2011 Lewiston, 
On or before the dates hereinafter mentioned and provided, for value received, 
Pacific Empire Radio Corporation promises to pay to the order of AIA Services 
Corporation the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE 
HUNDRED NINETY NINE AND 07/100 DOLLARS ($788,599,07). with interest accrued 
thereon from the date of this Note, at the rate of Twelve Percent (12%) per annum, untl! 
paid in the following manner, to-wit: Prlnclple and accrued interest shall be due on 
demand at any tlme or September 20, 2016; whichever occurs earliest. 
Maker reserves the right to prepay said sums in whole or in part without penalty. 
If suit is instituted to collect the balance of prlnclpal and interest due at any time under 
the terms hereof, maker promises and agrees to pay, Jn addition to the costs and 
disbursements as provided by statute, such additional sum as the Court may adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such suit or action. 
The undersigned shall, to secure payment of this note, grant to AIA Services 
Corporation a security Interest (with a corresponding UCC-1 financing statement) In the 
property more specifically described in Exhibit A which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
Each and every person signing this note hereby waives presentmen~ demand, 
protest and notice of protest and of non-payment hereof. 
s:·~:~~~2 
K Luchs, President 
.. ;.:. ·.•. 
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EXHIBIT A 
DEBTOR: Pacific Empire Radio Corporation 
SECURED PARTY: AIA Services Corporation 
. .. All tariglble . ;;1r:id int8!ng1bl~ per~gnal pro~rty and .. tixtlJres nQw. owned or. ;J,,re!ifter ..... 
. •. . , .. "acquired by the Debtor; or ih whicli the Oebfor· may-now have Or hereafter acquire -an. 
interest, Including Without limitation, all equipment, accounts, Inventory, chattel paper, 
documents, general Intangibles and all property described as follows: 
(A) all properties and assets of every type used or useful In connection with the 
ownership or operation of broadcast radio stations and any and all other communication 
businesses (coJlectlvely "Communication Businesses"); 
(B) all equipment {Including, without !imitation, all machinery, motor vehicles, tools, 
furniture, studio equipment, towers, transmitters, translators, antennas, microphones, 
audio equipment, video equipment, tape recorders, connectors, broadcasting and 
receiving equipment, and all other equipment relating to the operation of Communication 
Businesses), inventory (including, without limitation, all merchandise, raw materials, 
work In process, finished goods, and supplies) and goods, whether now owned or 
hereafter acquired by the Debtor or in which the Debtor n,ay have or hereafter acquire 
an Interest; 
(C) all accounts, accounts receivable and other receivables Oncluding, wlthout l'rmitat1on1 
lntercompany receivables, rights to receive payments of money under contracts, chattel 
paper and rights to receive payments of money under leases) and general Intangibles, 
including without !imitation: 
(i) distributions and other payments relating to all limited partnership interests, 
partnership interests and limited liability company member Interests now or hereafter 
held by or issued to the Debtor, 
(10 all existing and Mure rights of the Debtor to any refund of any tax assessed 
against or paid by the Debtor, loss carryback tax refunds, Insurance premium refunds, 
unearned premiums, insurance proceeds, choses In action, goodwill, going concern 
value, trademarks, service marks, tradenames, patents, blueprints, designs, product 
lines, and research and development, and all of the Debtor's rights to receive payments 
of money as a tenant under any and all leases; 
OH) all of the Debtor's rights under all present and future authorlzations, permits, 
licenses and franchises heretofore or hereafter granted or assigned to the Debtor by the 
Federal Communication& Commission (lhe ·Fee•) or any other public or governmental 
agency or regulatory body for the operation and ownership of broadcast radio stations 
and other Communications Businesses (such authorizations, licenses, permits and 
franchises, together with any extensions or renewals thereof, being referred to 
collectlvely as the "Franchisesj (excluding, however, such Franctilses to the extent, and 
only to the extent, it is unlawful to grant a security interest in such Franchises), but 
including, to the maximum extent permitted by law, all rights Incident or appurtenant to 
such Franchises, Including, without rl~llation, the right to receiye all proceeds derived or 



















whether now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, or in which the Debtor may 
now have or hereafter acquire an Interest; 
(iv) all of the Debtor's rights under all construction contracts and licenses, 
leases, permits, authorizations and other agreements; 
. (v) .. ~ll managem~nt agreements, -progr~~~irig. Jgre~ments, network affiliate 
agreements and all other agreements for the provision of management, engineering or 
similar services; 
(vi) all other agreements relating to Communication Businesses, whether nor 
owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, In which the Debtor may now have or 
hereafter acquire an Interest; and 
(vii) all right, title and interest, if any, under any intercompany notes, obUgatlons 
or agreements, whether now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor or in which the 
Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an Interest; 
(D) all investment property, securities, securities entitlements and other equity interests 
now or hereafter held by or issued to the Debtor, including, without limitation, all shares 
of stock, warrants, options, notes, investment contracts, partnership interests and 
member Interests In limited liability companies, Including without limitation (i) all rights of 
the Debtor as a limited partner, general partner or member to participate in the operation 
or management of any partnership or limited liablllty company In which the Debtor holds 
an equity interest; (ii) all rights of the Debtor to the property, assets, partnership 
Interests, membership interests and distributions under the applicable partnership 
agreement, Umited liability company agreement, operating agreement or other 
organizational documents; (iii) all present and future rights of the Debtor to receive 
payment of money or other distributions or payments arising out of or in connection with 
any such equity Interests of the Debtor and its rights under such organizational 
documents and any and all other related agreements; and (iv) all other general 
intangibles relating thereto and proceeds resulting therefrom; 
(E) all instruments, documents of title, policies and certificates of Insurance, securities, 
bank deposits, deposit accounts, checking accounts and cash now or hereafter owned 
by the Debtor, or in which the Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an Interest; 
(F} all accessions, additions or improvements to all replacements, substitutions and 
parts for, and all proceeds and products of, and all distributions and dividends relating to, 
all of the foregoing, including, without lirnitation, proceeds of Insurance; and 










December 31, 2012 Lewiston, Idaho 
On or before the dates hereinafter mentioned and provided, for value 
received, Pacific Empire Radio _Corp_oration,promises_ to pay to the order ot AIA-: 
Services Corporation the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN AND SIX . 
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($457,650.00), with Interest accrued 
thereon from the date of this Note, at the rate of Twelve Percent (12%) per 
anriom, until paid in the following manner, to-wit: Principle and accrued Interest 
shall be due on demand at any time, but not later than September 20, 2016. -
Maker reserves the right to prepay said sums in whole or in part without 
penalty. If suit is instituted to collect the balance of principal and interest due at 
any time under the terms hereof, maker promises and agrees to pay, in addition 
to the costs and disbursements as provided by statute, such additional sum as 
the Court may adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such suit or action. 
The undersigned shall, to secure payment of this note, grant to AIA 
Services Corporation a security interest (with a-corresponding UCC-1 financing 
statement) In the property more specifically described in Exhibit A which Is 
att_ached hereto and Incorporated herein by reference. 
This note Is subordinate to the full and absolute payment of the Pacific Empire 
_Radio Corporat~on's senior.obligation to Washington Trust Bank, as amended; .. 
and the Subordination Agreement dated September, 29, 2011 (attached hereto). 
Each and every person signing this note hereby waives presentment. 
demand, protest and notice of protest and of non~payment hereof. 
AND CEO· 
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EXHIBIT A 
DEBTOR: Pacific Empire Radio Corporation 
SECURED PARTY: AIA Services Corporation 
. _ .... An. -~~ngibl~ and .. Intangible . p~r~on~!,; property ~nd Jb<tures ,11ow owned. or . hereafter 
acquired by the Debtor, or i'n which ·the Debtor may' now have or hereafter acquire an 
interest, including wlthout limitation, all equipment, accounts, inventory, chattel paper, 
documents, general intangibles and all property described as follows: 
(A} all properties and assets of every type used or useful In connection with the 
ownership or operation of broadcast radio stations and any and all other communication 
businesses (collectlvely "Communication Businesses"); 
(B) all equipment (Jncludlng, without limitation, all machinery, motor vehlcles, tools, 
furnlture, studio equipment, towers, transmitters, translators, antennas, mlcrophones, 
audio equipment, video equipment, tape recorders, connectors, broadcas1ing and 
receiving equipment, and all other equipment relating to the operation of Communication 
Businesses), inventory (including, wlthout llmltatlon, all merchandise, raw materials, 
work in process, finished goods, and supplies) and goods, whether now owned or 
hereafter acquired by the Debtor or in which the Debtor may have or hereafter acquire 
an interest; 
(C) all accounts, accounts receivable and other receivables [including, without limitation, 
lntercompany receivables, rights to recelve payments of money under contracts, chattel 
paper and rights to receive payments of money under leases) and general lntanglbles, 
including without limitation; · 
(i) distributions and other payments relating to all limited partnership Interests, 
partnership interests and limited liability company member Interests now or hereafter 
held by or Issued to the Debtor; 
(IQ all existing and future rights of the Debtor to any· refund of any tax assessed 
against or paid by the Debtor, loss carryback tax refunds, insurance premium refunds, 
unearned premiums, insurance proceeds, choses In action, goodwill, going concern 
value, trademarks, service marks, tradenames, patents, blueprlnts, designs, product 
lines, and research and development, and all of the Debtor's rights to receive payments 
of money as a tenant under any and all leases; 
(iii) all of the Debtor's rights under all present and Mure authorizations, permits, 
licenses and franchises heretofore or hereafter granted or assigned to the Debtor by the 
Federal Communlcations Commission (the "FCC") or any other public or governmental 
agency or regulatory body for the operation and ownership of broadcast radio stations 
and other Communications Bu.slnesses (such authorizations, licenses, permits and 
franchises, together with any extensions or renewals thereof, being referred to 
collectively as the "Franchises•) (excluding, however, such Franchises to the extent, and 
only to the extent, It Is unlawful to grant a security interest in such Franchises), but 
including, to the maximum extent permitted by law, all rights incident or appurtenant to 
such Franchises, Including, without !imitation, the right to receive a/I proceeds derived or 
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whether now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, or In which the Debtor may 
now have or hereafter acquire an interest; 
(iv) all of the Debtor's rights under all construction contracts and licenses, 
leases, permits, authorizations and other agreements; 
(v) a.II management ~g~~~~~~ts,. programrr1ing aEfreements, network°affiliate 
agreements and all other agreements for the provision of management, engineering or 
similar services; 
(vi) all other agreements relating to Communication Businesses, whether nor 
owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, in which the Debtor may now have or 
hereafter acquire an interest; and 
(vii) all right, title and interest, If any, under any intercompany notes, obligations 
or agreements, whether now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor or in which the 
Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an Interest; 
(D) all inveslment property, securities, securities entitlements and other equity interests 
now or hereafter held by or issued to the Debtor, Including, without limitation, all shares 
of stock, warrants, options, notes, investment contracts, partnership interests and 
member interests In limited liability companies, Including without limitation (I) all rights of 
the Debtor as a limited partner, general partner or member to participate In the operation 
or management of any partnership or limited liabibly company in which the Debtor holds 
an equity Interest; (ii) all rights of the Debtor to the property, assets, partnership 
Interests, membership interests and dlstribulions under the apptlcable partnership 
agreement, limited. liability company agreement, operating agreement or other 
organizational documents; (iii) all present and future rights of the Debtor to receive 
payment of money or other distributions or payments arising out of or in connection with 
any such equity interests of the Debtor and its rights under such organlzatlonal 
documents and any and all other related agreements; and (iv) all other general 
intangibles relating thereto and proceeds resulting therefrom; 
(E) all Instruments, documents of tlHe, policies and certificates of insurance, securities, 
bank deposits, deposit accounts, checklng accounts and cash now or hereafter owned 
by the Debtor, or In which the Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an interest; 
(F) all accessions, additions or improvements to aU replacements, substitutions and 
parts for, and all proceeds and products of, and all distributions and dividends relating to, 
afl of the foregoing, Including, without limitation, proceeds of Insurance; and 
(G) all books, records and documents relating to all of the foregoing. 









December 31, 2013 Lewiston, Idaho 
. . On or before the dates hereinafter mentioned and provided, for value received, 
Pacific Empire · Radio' Corporatio1f proinlseir' to pay to the- order of AIA Services .. 
Corporation the sum of THREE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND lWO HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($310,245.00), with Interest accrued thereon from the 
dale of this Note, at the rate of Twelve Percent (12%) per annum, until paid in the 
following manner, to-wit: Principle and accrued interest shall be due on demand at any 
time, but not later than September 20, 2016. 
Maker reserves the right to prepay said sums in whole or in part without penalty. 
If suit Is instituted to collect the balance of principal and interest due at any time under 
the terms hereof, maker promises and agrees to pay, in addition to the costs and 
disbursements as provided by statute, such additional sum as the Court may adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such suit or action. 
The undersigned shall, to secure payment of this note, grant to AIA Services 
Corporation a security Interest (with a corresponding UCC-1 financing statement) in the 
property more specifically described in Exhibit A which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
This note Is subordinate to the full and absolute payment of Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation's senior obligation to Washington Trust Bank, as amended, and the 
Subordination Agreement dated Sept~m~r 29,Jq11 (attached hereto). 
Each and every person signing this note hereby waives presentment, demand, 
protest and notice of protest and of n~m-payment hereof. 
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EXHIBIT A 
DEBTOR: Pacific Empire Radio Corporation 
SECURED PARTY: AIA Services Corporation 
All tangible and Intangible personal property and fi>5tures now . Q.Wned or hereafter. 
·· acqufred by the bebtor; or Iii" wliicli the Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an .. 
interest, including without limltatlon, all equipment, accounts, inventory, chattel paper, 
documents, general intangibles and all property described as follows: 
(A) all properties and assets of every type used or useful In connection with the 
ownership or operation of broadcast radio stations and any and all other communication 
businesses {collectively "Communication Businesses"); 
(B) all equipment {including, without limitation, aU machinery, motor vehicles, tools, 
furniture, studio equipment, towers, transmitters, translators, antennas, microphones, 
audio equipment, video equipment, tape recorders, connectors, broadcasting and 
receiving equipment, and all other equipment relating to the operation of Communication 
Businesses), Inventory (including, without limitation, all merchandise, raw materials, 
work In process, finished goods, and supplies) and goods, whether now owned or 
hereafter acquired by the Debtor or in which the Debtor may have or hereafter acquire 
an Interest; 
(C) air accounts, accounts receivable and other receivables (includlng, without fimitatlon, 
lntercompany receivables, rights to receive payments of money under contracts, chattel 
paper and rights to receive payments of money under leases) and general Intangibles, 
including without limitation: 
(i) distributions and other payments relating to all limited partnership Interests, 
partnership interests and limited llabllity company member interests now or hereafter 
held by or issued to the Debtor; 
(Ii) all existing and future rights of the Debtor to any refund of any tax assessed 
against or paid by the Debtor, loss carryback tax refunds, insurance premium refunds, 
unearned premiums, insurance proceeds, choses In action, goodwill, going concern 
value, trademarks, service marks, tradenames, patents, blueprints, designs, product 
lines, and research and development, and all of the Debtor's rights to receive payments 
of money as a tenant under any and aU leases; 
(iii) all of the Debtor's rights under all present and future authorizations, permits, 
licenses and franchises heretofore or hereafter granted or assigned to the Debtor by the 
Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") or any other public or governmental 
agency or regulatory body for the operation and ownership of broadcast radio stations 
and other Communications Businesses (such authorizations, licenses, permits and 
franchises, together with any extensions or renewals thereof, being referred to 
collectively as the "Franchises") (excluding, however, such Franchises to the extent, and 
only to the extent, It Is unlawful to grant a security interest in such Franchises), but 
Jncludlng, to the maximum extent permitted by law, all rights Incident or appurtenant to 
such Franchises, including, without llmlfatlon, the right to r~celve all proceeds deriv.ed or 
arising from or in connection wltti the sale, assignment or transfer of such Franchises), 














whether now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, or in which the Debtor may 
now have or hereafter acquire an Interest; 
(iv) all of the Debtor's rights under all construction contracts and licenses, 
leases, permits, authorizations and other agreements; 
M a11 management "agreetnents,- programming agreements, network affiliate 
agreements and all other agreements for the provision of management, engineering or 
similar services; 
(vi) all other agreements relating to Communication Businesses, whether nor 
owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, In which the Debtor may now have or 
hereafter acquire an interest; and 
(vii) all right, title and interest, if any, under any intercompany notes, obllgatfone 
or agreements, whether now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor or in which the 
Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an interest; 
(D) all investment property, securities, securities entitlements and other equity Interests 
now or hereafter held by or issued to the Debtor, including, without limitation, all shares 
of stock, warrants, options, notes, investment contracts, partnership Interests and 
member Interests Jn limited liabillty companies, Including without limitation (J) all rights of 
the Debtor as a limited partner, general partner or member to participate in the operation 
or management of any partnership or limited liability company in which the Debtor holds 
an equity interest; (10 all rights of the Debtor to the property, assets, partnership 
interests, membership interests and distributions under the applicable partnership 
. agreement, limited liability company. agreement, operating agreement or other 
organizational documents; (iii) all present and future rights of the Debtor to receive 
payment of money or other distributions or payments arising out of or in connection with 
any such equity interests of the Debtor and its rights under such organizational 
documents and any and all other related agreements; and (iv) all other general 
intangibles relating thereto and proceeds resulting therefrom; 
(E) all instruments, documents of title, policies and certificates of Insurance, securities, 
bank deposits, deposit accounts, checking accounts and cash now or hereafter owned 
by the Debtor, or in which the Debtor may now have or hereafter acquire an interest; 
(F) all accessions, additions or improvements to all replacements, substitutions and 
parts for, and all proceeds and products of, and all distributions and dividends relating to, 
all of the foregoing, including, without ffmitation, proceeds of Insurance; and 
(G) all books, records and documents relating to all of the foregoing. 




Form 668 (Y)(c) 
{Rev. February 2004) 
6788 
Department of the Treasury - Internal Reven1:1e Service 
Notice of Federal Tax Lien · 
Area: Serial Number 
SMM.L BOSINESS/SELF EMPLOYED AREA ff.6 
For Optional Use by Recordlnc:a Office 
Lien Unit Phone: (800) 913-6050 194209216 
A5 provided by section 6321, 6322, and 6323 of th( 
Code, we are gfvjng a notice that taxes (lndudlng Intel 
have been assessed against the following•named taxpa1. 
FILED: JAN 27, 2016 02:60 PM 
OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE 
. ~. c(~a.nd f~i: piillyment .. ~f .this liabi_lityll' b11t k remains j 
there is a Hen in favor of the United States on all pr~ 
property belonging to this· taxpayer for the amount o 
additional penalties, Interest, and costs that may accrl..._ IRS 
111111111111111-e . 
LIEN NO. 90703485 PACIFIC EMPIRE RAC>JO 
Name of Taxpayer PACIFIC EMPIRE RADIO CORPORATION 
a Corporation 
Residence 4 03 CAPITAL ST 
LEWISTON, ID 83501-1815 
IMPORTANT RELEASE INFORMATION: For each assessment listed below, 
unless notice of the lien Is refiled by the date given in column (el, this notice shall, 
on the day following such date, operate as a certificate of release as defined 
in IRC 6325(a). 
Tax Period Date of 
Kind of Tax Ending Identifying Number Assessment 
(al (b) (c) "(d) 
941 12/31/2012 XX-XXX-7865 06/17/2013 
94·1 03/31/2013 XX-XX.X7865 06/24/2013 
941 06/30/2013 XX-XXX786s· 09/16/2013 
941 09/30/2013 XX-XXX:7865 12/30/2013 
941 12/31/2013 XX-XXX:7865 03/31/2014 
941 03/31:/2014 XX-XX.X7865 06/16/2014 
941 06/30/2014· XX-XXX7865 09/08/2014 
941 09/30/2014 xx:..XXX7865 12/15/2014 
941 12/31/2014 XX-XXX7865 03/30/2015 
941 03/31/2015 .XX-XXX7865 06/15/2015 
941 06/30/2015 XX-XXX:7865 09/21/2015 
941 09/30/2015 XX-XXX:7865 11/16/2015 
Place of Filing 
OCC DIVISION,·ROOM 142 
SECRETARY.OF STATE 
SALEM, OR ·97310 
This notice was prepared and signed at 
the · 13th day of January 2016 
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30-1-4. General powers. - Each corporation shall have power: 
(a) To have perpetual succession by its corporate name unless a limited 
period of duration is stated in its articles of incorporation. 
(b) To sue and be sued, complain and defend, in its corporate name. 
(c) To have a corporate seal which may be altered at pleasure, and to use 
the same by causing it, or a facsimile thereof, to be impressed or affixed or 
in any other manner reproduced. 
(d) To purchase, take, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, 
improve, use and otherwise deal in and with, real or personal property, or 
any interest therein, wherever situated. 
(e) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and 
otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets. 
(0 To lend money and use its credit to assist its employees. 
(g) To purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, 
hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, 
and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests in, or 
obligations of, other domestic or foreign corporations, associations, 
partnerships, or individuals, or direct or indirect obligations of the United 
States or of any other government, state, territory, governmental district or 
municipality or of any instrumentality thereof. 
(h) To make contracts and guarantees and incur liabilities, borrow money 
at such rates of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its notes, 
bonds, and other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage 
or pledge of all or any of its property, franchises and income. 
(i) To lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its funds, 
and take and hold real and personal property as security for the payment 
of funds so loaned or invested. 
(j) To conduct its business, carry on its operations and have offices and 
exercise the powers granted by this act, within or without this state. 
(k) To elect or appoint officers and agents of the corporation, and define 
their duties and fix their compensation. 
(1) To make and alter bylaws, not inconsistent with its articles of 
incorporation or with the laws of this state, for the administration and 
regulation of the affairs of the corporation. 
(m) To make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific 
or educational purposes. 
(n) To transact any lawful business which the board of directors shall find 
will be in aid of governmental policy. 
(o) To pay pensions and establish pension plans, pension trusts, profit 
sharing plans, stock bonus plans, stock option plans and other incentive 
plans for any or all of its directors, officers and employees. 
(p) To be a promoter, partner, member, associate, or manager of any 
partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise. 
(q) To have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect its 
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189 GENERAL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 
30-1-5 
Compiler's notes. For words "this act" see 
compiler's notes, § 30-1-1. 
Cross ref. Inhibition against issuance of 
stock or bonds except for value, Const .• art. 11, 
§ 9. 
Limitation on transfer of franchise, Const., 
art. 11, § 15. 
Negotiable instrument, effect of 
indorsement by corporation, § 28-3-207. 




Capacity to sue or be sued. 
Liability. 
Limitations. 
Rights of corporation. 
Venue of actions. 
Alienation. 
Power of alienation was limited by Const., 
art. 11, § 15, prohibiting alienation of 
corporate franchise and property so as to 
release or relieve the same from liabilities 
incurred in operation. Towle v. Great 
Shoshone & Twin Falls Water Power Co., 232 
F. 733 (S.D. Idaho 1916), aff'd, American 
Wat.erworks & Elec. Co. v. Towle, 245 F. 706 
(9th Cir. 1917). 
Borrowing Money . 
Under former statutes, directors of a 
corporation were authorized to borrow money 
for corporation and to issue mortgages on 
corporate property to secure it, without 
submitting question to stockholders. Hobbs v. 
Twin Falls Canal Co., 24 Idaho 380, 133 P. 899 
(1913). 
Directors of irrigation company had power 
and authority to borrow money and execut.e 
bonds and mortgages therefor without 
submitting question to stockholders. 
Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 45 
Idaho 244, 263 P. 32 (1927). 
Capacity to Sue or be Sued. 
Where complaint alleged respondent was a 
legally organized corporation and disclosed no 
disability of any kind, the corporation had 
complete statutory and recognized capacity to 
sue or be sued. Payette Lakes Protective Ass'n 
v. Lake Reservoir Co., 68 Idaho 111, 189 P.2d 
1009 (1948). 
Liability. 
Judgment for personal injuries inflicted by 
corporation became a lien against franchise 
and property of such corporation in hands of 
purchaser or grantee, and was superior to any 
subsequent bonds, mortgages or 
encumbrances placed thereon by such 
purchaser or grantee. Towle v. Great 
Shoshone & Twin Falls Wat.er Power Co., 232 
F. 733 (S.D. Idaho 1916), atrd, American 
Waterworks & Elec. Co. v. Towle, 245 F. 706 
(9th Cir. 1917); Seymour v. Boise R.R., 24 
Idaho 7, 132 P. 427 (1913). 
Privat.e hospital is liable for negligence of 
employees- resulting in injury to patient 
caused by burns from hot water bag. Corey v. 
Beck, 58 Idaho 281, 72 P.2d 856 (1937). 
Limitations. 
While every corporation as such is granted 
power to purchase, own, vote, sell or 
hypothecate stock and bonds of other 
corporations, this was not an unqualified 
grant of power, but must always be construed 
in the case of any particular corporation with 
reference to purposes for which corporation 
was organized as expressed in its articles of 
incorporation. Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 
28 Idaho 525, 155 P. 665 (1916). 
Rights of Corporation. 
A corporation is a person with the ordinary 
rights of a person. Payette Lakes Protective 
Ass'n v. Lake Reservoir Co., 68 Idaho 111, 189 
P.2d 1009 (1948). 
Venue of Actions. 
In the absence of any statutory provision 
fixing the place of trial in actions against 
foreign corporations in any particular county, 
such actions may be brought in any county in 
the state. Boyer v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 8 
Idaho 74, 66 P. 826 (1901), overruling Easley 
v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 4 Idaho 205, 38 P. 405 
(1894). 
30-1-5. Indemnification of officers, directors, employees and agents. -
(a) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is 
a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or 
completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative 
or investigative (other than an action by or in the right of the corporation) 
by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee or agent 











































191 GENERAL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 30-1-6 
(e) Expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred in defending a civil or 
criminal action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in 
advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding as 
authorized in the manner provided in subsection (d) upon receipt of an 
undertaking by or on behalf of the director, officer, employee or agent to 
repay such amount unless it shall ultimately be determined that he is 
entitled to be indemnified by the corporation as authorized in this section. 
(f) The indemnification provided by this section shall not be deemed 
exclusive of any other rights to which those idemnified [indemnified] may 
be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of shareholders or 
disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action in his official capacity 
and as to action in another capacity while holding such office, and shall 
continue as to a person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or 
agent and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and 
administrators of such a person. 
(g) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance 
on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent 
of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as 
a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, 
joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability asserted against 
him and incurred by him in any such capacity or arising out of his status 
as such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify 
him against such liability under the provisions of this section; provided that 
banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions chartered under the 
laws of the state of Idaho may provide indemnification only by insurance. 
(h) For the purposes of this section, the term "corporation" includes, in 
addition to the resulting corporation, all constituent corporations and their 
predecessors absorbed in a consolidation or merger, which, if separate 
existence had continued, would have had power and authority to indemnify 
its directors, officers, employees, or agents. [l.C., § 30-1-5, as added by 1979, 
ch. 105, § 2, p. 251.] 
Compiler's notes. The bracketed words "indemnified" in subsection (f) were inserted 
"indemnify" in subsection (b) and by the compiler. 
30-1-6. Right of corporation to acquire and dispose of its own shares. 
- A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or otherwise 
acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shares, 
but purchases of its own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made 
only to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available 
therefor, and, if the articles of incorporation so permit or with the 
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote 
thereon, to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus 
available therefor. 
To the extent that earned surplus or capital surplus is used as the measure 
of the corporation's right to purchase its own shares, such surplus shall be 
restricted so long as such shares are held as treasury shares, and upon the 
disposition or cancellation of any such shares the restriction shall be 
removed pro tanto. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation, a corporation may purchase or 
otherwise acquire its own shares for the purpose of: 
(a) Eliminating fractional shares. 
(b) Collecting or compromising indebtedness to the corporation. 
(c) Paying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment for their shares 
under the provisions of this act. 
(d) Effecting, subject to the other provisions of this act, the retirement of 
its redeemable shares by redemption or by purchase at not to exceed the 
redemption price. 
No purchase ofor payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when 
the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make 
it insolvent. [I.C., 30-1-6, as added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2, p. 251.] 
Compiler's notes. For words "this act" see 
compiler's notes, § 30-1-1. 
DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW 
ANALYSIS 
Insolvent corporation purchasing own stock. 
Reduction of capital stock. 
Insolvent Corporation Purchasing Own 
Stock. 
Purchase of its own stock by an insolvent 
corporation is void. Brown v. T.B. Reed & Co., 
31 Idaho 529, 174 P. 136 (1918). 
Reduction of Capital Stock. 
Purchase by corporation of its own stock 
amounted to a reduction of the capital stock of 
company in violation of former statute. 
Dietrich v. Copeland Lumber Co., 28 Idaho 
312, 154 P. 626 (1916). 
30-1-7. Defense of ultra vires. - No act of a corporation and no 
conveyance or transfer of real or personal property to or by a corporation 
shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was without 
capacity or power to do such act or to make or receive such conveyance or 
transfer, but such lack of capacity or power may be asserted: 
(a) In a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin the 
doing of any act or the transfer of real er personal property by or to the 
corporation. If the unauthorized act or transfer sought to be enjoined is 
being, or is to be, performed or made pursuant to a contract to which the 
corporation is a party, the court may, if all of the parties to the contract are 
parties to the proceeding and if it deems the same to be equitable, set aside 
and enjoin the performance of such contract, and in so doing may allow to 
the corporation or to the other parties to the contract, as the case may be, 
compensation for the loss or damage sustained by either of them which may 
result from the action of the court in setting aside and enjoining the 
performance of such contract, but anticipated profits to be derived from the 
performance of the contract shall not be awarded by the court as a loss or 
damage sustained. 
(b) In a proceeding by the corporation, whether acting directly or through 
a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, or through shareholders in 
a representative suit, against the incumbent or former officers or directors 
of the corporation. 
193 
(c) In a· 
dissolve tb 
enjoin the 


























one (1) o: 
such oth 
cornpete1 










































193 GENERAL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 30-1-8 
{c) In a proceeding by the Attorney General, as provided in this act, to 
dissolve the corporation, or in a proceeding by the Attorney General to 
enjoin the corporation from the transaction of unauthorized business. [I.C., 
§ 30-1-7, as added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2, p. 251.] 
Compiler's notes. For words "this act" see 
compiler's notes, § 30-1-1. 
DEcisIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW 
Estoppel. 
Doctrine of ultra vires when invoked for or 
against corporation should not be allowed to 
prevail where it would defeat the ends of 
justice or work a legal wrong; in such case the 
party was estopped from setting up defense of 
ultra vires. Meholin v. Carlson, 17 Idaho 742, 
107 P. 755, 134 Am. St. R. 286 (1910); First 
Nat'l Bank v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 
627, 155 P. 673 (1916). 
30-1-8. Corporate name. - The corporate name: 
(a) Shall contain the word "corporation," "company," "incorporated," or 
"limited," or shall contain an abbreviation of one of such words; provided, 
however, that if the word "company" or its abbreviation is used, it shall not 
be immediately preceded by the word "and" or by an abbreviation of or 
symbol representing the word "and." 
{b) Shall not contain any word or phrase which indicates or implies that 
it is organized for any purpose other than one (1) or more of the purposes 
contained in its articles of incorporation. 
(c) Shall not be the same as, or deceptively similar to, the name of any 
domestic corporation existing under the laws of this state or any foreign 
corporation authorized to transact business in this state, or a name the 
exclusive right to which is, at the time, reserved in the manner provided in 
this act, or the name of a corporation which has in effect a registration of 
its corporate name as provided in this act, except that this provision shall 
not apply if the applicant files with the Secretary of State either of the 
following: (1) the written consent of such other corporation or holder of a 
reserved or registered name to use the same or deceptively similar name and 
one (1) or more words are added to make such name distinguishable from 
such other name, or (2) a certified copy of a final decree of a court of 
competent jurisdiction establishing the prior right of the applicant to the use 
of such name in this state. 
A corporation with which another corporation, domestic or foreign, is 
merged, or which is formed by the reorganization or consolidation of one (1) 
or more domestic or foreign corporations or upon a sale, lease or other 
disposition to or exchange with, a domestic corporation of all or 
substantially all the assets of another corporation, domestic or foreign, 
including its name, may have the same name as that used in this state by 
any of such corporations if such other corporation was organized under the 
laws of, or is authorized to transact business in, this state. 
Nothing in this section shall abrogate or limit the law as to unfair 
competition or unfair practice in the use of trade names, nor derogate from 
















































217 GENERAL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 30-1-35 
purpose of conferring upon a trustee or trustees the right to vote or 
otherwise represent their shares, for a period of not to exceed ten (10) years, 
by entering into a written voting trust agreement specifying the terms and 
conditions of the voting trust, by depositing a counterpart of the agreement 
with the corporation at its registered office, and by transferring their shares 
to such trustee or trustees for the purpose of the agreement. Such trustee 
or trustees shall keep a record of the holders of voting trust certificates 
evidencing a beneficial interest in the voting trust, giving the names and 
addresses of all such holders and the number and class of the shares in 
respect of which the voting trust certificates held by each are issued, and 
shall deposit a copy of such record with the corporation at its registered 
office. The counterpart of the voting trust agreement and the copy of such 
record so deposited with the corporation shall be subject to the same right 
of examination by a shareholder of the corporation, in person or by agent 
or attorney, as are the books and records of the corporation, and such 
counterpart and such copy of such record shall be subject to examination by 
any holder of record of voting trust certificates, either in person or by agent 
or attorney, at any reasonable time for any proper purpose. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided in any such written voting trust agreement: 
(1) The trustees may vote in person or by proxy. 
(2) If there are two (2) or more trustees, the will of the majority shall 
control. If the trustees are equally divided, any court of competent 
jurisdiction may, upon petition filed by any of the trustees, or by any 
beneficiary holder of voting trust certificates, appoint an additional person 
to act with such trustees upon the matter on which the trustees are equally 
divided. 
(3) Vacancies among the trustees shall be filled by the remaining trustees. 
(4) A trustee shall incur no responsibility as trustee except for his own 
individual neglect or malfeasance. 
(c) Agreements among shareholders regarding the voting of their shares 
shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms. Such 
agreements shall not be subject to the provisions of this section regarding 
voting trusts. [I.C., § 30-1-34, as added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2, p. 251.] 
30-1-35. Board of directors. - All corporate powers shall be exercised 
by or under authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall 
be managed under the direction of, a board of directors except as may be 
otherwise provided in this act or the articles of incorporation. If any such 
provision is made in the articles of incorporation, the powers and duties 
conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this act shall be 
exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall 
be provided in the articles of incorporation. Directors need not be residents 
of this state or shareholders of the corporation unless the articles of 
incorporation or bylaws so require. The articles of incorporation or bylaws 
may prescribe other qualifications for directors. The board of directors shall 
have authority to fix the compensation of directors unless otherwise 
provided in the articles of incorporation. 
------------·--- --..... ___ _ 
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A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as 
a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in good 
faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would use under similar circumstances. In performing his duties, 
a director shall be entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or 
statements, including financial statements and other financial data, in each 
case prepared or presented by: 
(a) One (1) or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the 
director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters 
presented, 
(b) Counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters which the 
director reasonably believes to be within such person's professional or expert 
competence, or 
(c) A committee of the board upon which he does not serve, duly 
designated in accordance with a provision of the articles of incorporation or 
the bylaws, as to matters within its designated authority, which committee 
the director reasonably believes to merit confidence, but he shall not be 
considered to be acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning th~ 
matter in question that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted. A 
person who so performs his duties shall have no liability by reason of being 
or having been a director of the corporation. 
A director of a corporation who is present at a meeting of its board of 
directors at which action on any corporate matter is taken shall be presumed 
to have assented to the action taken unless his dissent shall be entered in 
the minutes of the meeting or unless he shall file his written dissent to such 
action with the secretary of the meeting before the adjournment thereof or 
shall forward such dissent by registered mail to the secretary of the 
corporation within three (3) days after the adjournment of the meeting. Such 
right to dissent shall not apply to a director who voted in favor of such action. 
[I.C., § 30-1-35, as added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2; am. 1979, ch. 282, § 2, p. 724.] 
Compiler's notes. For words "this act" see 
compiler's notes, § 3(}.1-1. 
Sections 1 and 3 of S.L. 1979, ch. 282 are 
compiled as §§ 30-1-29 and 3(}.1-47, 
respectively. 
DECISIONS UNDER Pru:oR LAw 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of trust. 
Contracts. 
Director and trustee distinguished. 
Duty of care. 
Fiduciary relationship. 
Fraud. 
Ratification of board's action. 
Sale of property. 
Stock purchase by director. 
Breach of Trust. 
Att.empt of officers and directors to divert 
use of corporat.e funds to their personal profit 
was a breach of trust. Nelson v. Jones, 38 
Idaho 664, 224 P. 435, 38 A.L.R. 85 (1924). 
Counterclaim by corporation against officer 
and director for loss of profits due to breach of 
fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant was not a suit for liability "created 
by law." Melgard. v. Moscow Idaho Seed Co., 
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219 GENERAL BUSINFSS CORPORATIONS 30-1-35 
General manager, who was also a director 
of corporation, owed a duty to devote his time, 
skill, knowledge and judgment for welfare of 
corporation, hence he was guilty of breach of 
trust in buying up peas in name of corporation 
and assigning same to partnership operated 
by himself and another, and was liable in 
damages to corporation for amount of profits 
earned in transaction. Melgard v. Moscow 
Idaho Seed Co., 73 Idaho 265, 251 P.2d 546 
(1953). 
Contracts. 
A director never enters into a contract for 
himself, but he enters into contracts for his 
principal: i.e., for the company of which he is 
a director and for which he is acting; he 
cannot sue on such contracts nor be sued, 
unless he exceeds his authority. State v. 
Cosgrove, 36 Idaho 278, 210 P. 393 (1922). 
Provision of charter of natural gas company 
permitting <tirectors to be pecuniarily 
interested in contracts with corporation and 
to vote for authorization of contracts was very 
questionable. In re Intennountain Gas Co., 77 
Idaho 188, 289 P.2d 933 (1955), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 801, 77 S. Ct. 20, 1 L. Ed. 2d 37 <1956). 
Director and Trustee Distinguished. 
The liabilities of a trustee and a director are 
not similar, neither are the mutual rights and 
obligations of unit holders in a pure trust and 
stockholders in a corporation in any sense the 
same. The stockholders control, through the 
board of directors, the business of the 
corporation. The unit holders of a pure trust 
have no mutual rights and obligations, and do 
not control the action of the trustees. State v. 
Cosgrove, 36 Idaho 278, 210 P. 393 (1922). 
It is apparent that the trust fund theory of 
the relation of directors and officers to the 
corporation had no applicability to an 
agreement whereby a director loaned the 
corporation an additional sum of money 
which was included in the note and mortgage 
with the amount of the open note and 
mortgage paid for his stock, such amount 
being sufficient consideration for alteration of 
the status of the existing debt and the 
preferred status of the amount paid in the 
stock repurchase. La Voy Supply Co. v. 
Young, 84 Idaho 120, 369 P.2d 45 (1962). 
Duty of Care. 
The duty of directors of a beneficial 
association to exercise care is not discharged 
by loaning trust funds on open account or 
unsecured notes. State ex rel. Taylor v. 
Beneficial Protective Ass'n, 60 Idaho 587, 94 
P.2d 787 ll939). 
Fiduciary Relationship. 
Relation of officers and directors to 
stockholders is a fiduciary one. Riley v. 
Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 P. 665 
(1916). 
Directors and officers of a corporation stand 
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation. 
Coeur d' Alenes Lead Co. v. Kingsbury, 59 
Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938). 
Officers and directors stood in fiduciary 
relation to stockholders in sale of hotel and 
were required to discharge their duties in 
good faith with diligence, care, and skill 
exercised by ordinarily prudent men in like 
positions under similar circumstances. 
McLeod v. Lewis-Clark Hotel Co., 66 Idaho 
584, 164 P.2d 195 (1945). 
Directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the 
corporation, and, hence, to the stockholders, 
and any attempt on the part of one of the 
directors to acquire property of the 
corporation for personal profit or interest 
would be in violation of this section. Hanny v. 
Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho 271, 353 P.2d 
406 (1960). 
Fraud. 
In transaction wherein directors and 
majority stockholders, over objection of 
minority, reorganized corporation changing 
stock to an assessable status thus forcing 
stockholders to pay debts of corporation, the 
larger portion of which were due its directors, 
such action constituted constructive fraud. 
Whicher v. Delaware Mines Corp., 52 Idaho 
304, 15 P.2d 610 (1932) . 
Ratification of Board's Action. 
Where private corporation receives and 
retains benefits of an unauthorized or illegal 
transaction on part of its board of directors, 
such conduct amounts to a ratification. 
Commercial Trust Co. v. Idaho Brick Co., 25 
Idaho 755, 139 P. 1004 (1913); Pettengill v. 
Blackman, 30 Idaho 241, 164 P. 358 (1917). 
Sale of Property. 
Where the reasonable value of property 
sold is not alleged, the court cannot determine 
whether there actually is a disparity between 
the price the property sold for and its 
reasonable value, or that there is such a 
disparity between that price and its 
reasonable value as to indicate that the 
directors acted with indifference or deliberate 
disregard of the interests of the whole body of 
stockholders. McLeod v. Lewis-Clark Hotel 
Co., 66 Idaho 584, 164 P.2d 195 (1945). 
Stock Purchase by Director. 
Where a director-stock.holder purchased 
treasury stock of a corporation without the 
shareholders of record having been given the 
right to purchase such shares in proportion to 
their holding of shares in the corporation, 
such sale was illegal and void especially 
where the articles and by-laws of the 
A-156 
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corporation limited the issuance of shares to 
stockholders to an amount equal to their 
holdings in pre-existing corporation and 
prohibited the issuance of further stock. 
Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho 271, 
353 P.2d 406 (1960). 
Collateral References. Purchase of claims 
against corporation by officer or director 
thereof. 13 A.L.R2d 1172. 
Purchase at public sale by officers or 
directors of corporation. 13 A.L.R.2d 1196. 
Right of corporate officer to purchase 
corporate assets from corporation. 24 
A.L.R.2d 71. 
Validity of security for contemporaneous 
loan to corporation by officer of director. 31 
A.L.R.2d 663. 
Validity of contract between corporations 
as affected by directors or officers in common. 
33 A.L.R.2d 1060. 
Validity of sales and leases between 
corporations as affected by directors or 
officers in common. 33 A.L.R.2d 1075. 
Self-dealing as affecting validity of stock 
option plan under which selected personnel of 
corporation may acquire stock interest 
therein. 34 A.L.R.2d 867. 
30-1-36. Number and election of directors. -The board of directors of 
a corporation shall consist of one (1) or more members. The number of 
directors shall be fixed by, or in the manner provided in, the articles of 
incorporation or the bylaws, except as to the number constituting the initial 
board of directors, which number shall be fixed by the articles of 
incorporation. The number of directors may be increased or decreased from 
time to time by amendment to, or in the manner provided in, the articles 
of incorporation or the bylaws, but no decrease shall have the effect of 
shortening the term of any incumbent director. In the absence of a bylaw 
providing for the number of directors, the number shall be the same as that 
provided for in the articles of incorporation. The names and addresses of the 
members of the first board of directors shall be stated in the articles of 
incorporation. Such persons shall hold office until the first annual meeting 
of shareholders, and until their successors shall have been elected and 
qualified. At the first annual meeting of shareholders and at each annual 
meeting thereafter the shareholders shall elect directors to hold office until 
the next succeeding annual meeting. Each director shall hold office for the 
term for which he is elected and until his successor shall have been elected 
and qualified. [I.C., § 30-1-36, as added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2, p. 251.] 
Cross ref. Cooperative marketing asso-
ciations, directors, § 22-2612. 
Stockholders may vote in person or by 
proxy for the number of shares owned by 
them for as many persons as there are 
directors or managers to be elected, or may 
cumulate the shares in favor of one or more 
candidates, Const., art. 11, § 4. 
Water and canal corporations and water 
users' associations, §§ 30-801 - 30-806. 
30-1-37. Classification of directors not allowed. -All directors shall be 
elected annually in accordance with the provisions of section 30-1-36, Idaho 
Code. There shall be no classification of directors or staggering of their 
terms. [J.C.,§ 30-1-37, as added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2, p. 251.] 
30-1-38. Vacancies. -Any vacancy occurring in the board of directors 
may be filled by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors 
though less than a quorum of the board of directors. A director elected to fill 
a vacancy shall be elected for the unexpired term of his predecessor in office. 
The shareholders may elect his successor at the next annual meeting of 
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SEC'DON. 
30-1-127. Fees and charges to be collect.ed by 
Secretary of State. 
30-1-128. Fees for filing documents and issu-
ing certificat.es. 
30-1-129. Miscellaneous charges. 
30-l-129A- 30-1-133. [Repealed.] 
30-1-134. Forfeiture of corporations. 
30-l•l. Short title. 
Compiler's notes. Section 8 of S.L. 1979, 
ch. 105, as amended by§ 20 of S.L. 1980, ch. 
197, read: "(1) Sections l, 3, 4, 5, and 6 ofthis 
act shall be in full force and effect on and after 
July 1, 1979. 
"(2) Section 7 of this act shall be in full 
force and effect on and after July 1, 1981. 
"(3) Section 2 of this act shall be in full 
force and effect as follows: 
"(a) All parts of Section 2 of this act, except 
Sections 30-1-125, 30-1-126, 30-1-130, 30-1-
131, 30-1-132, 30-1-133, 30-1-134, 30-1-135, 
30-1-136, 30-1-137, 30-1-138, and 30-1-139, 
Idaho Code, shall be in full force and effect · 
on and aft.er July 1, 1979. 
"(b) The following parts of Section 2 of this 
act, Sections 30-1-130, 30-1-131, 30-1-132, 
and 30-1-139, Idaho Code, shall be in full 
force and effect for corporation income tax 
years ending on and after July 1, 1980. 
SECTION. 
30-1-137. Reinstatement of corporations. 
30-l-137A. [Repealed.] 
30-1-138. Dissolution of corporations ten 
years after forfeiture. 
30-1-139. [Repealed.] 
30-1-153. Liability for false statement. 
"(c) The following parts of Section 2 of this 
act, Sections 30-1-125, 30-1-126, 30-1-133, 
30-1-134, 30-1-135, 30-1-136, 30-1-137, and 
30-1-138, Idaho Code, shall be in full force 
and effect on and aft.er July 1, 1981. 
"(4) If the first taxable year of a corporation 
which filed its articles of incorporation or its 
application for certificate of authority in fiscal 
year 1981 ends prior to July l, 1981, it will 
pay the fiscal year 1982 franchise tax pursu-
ant to the provisions of section 30-1-130, 
Idaho Code, relating to short period taxable 
years. If its first taxable year ends after July 
1, 1981, it will pay the minimum franchise tax 
for fiscal year 1982." 
Sec. to sec. ref. This chapter is referred to 
in§ 30-1309Aand § 41-343. 
Cited in: Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974, 
739 P. 2d 273 (1987). 
30-1-2. Definitions. -As used in this act, unless the context otherwise 
requires, the term: 
(a) "Corporation" or "domestic corporation" means a corporation subject 
to the provisions of this act, except a foreign corporation. 
Cb) "Foreign corporation" means a corporation organized under laws other 
than the laws of this state. 
(c) "Articles of incorporation" mt::an the original or restated articles of 
incorporation or articles of consolidation and all amendments thereto, 
including articles of merger. 
(d) "Shares" mean the units into which the proprietary interests in a 
corporation are divided. 
(e) "Subscriber" means one who subscribes for shares in a corporation, 
whether before or after incorporation. 
(f) "Shareholder" means one who is a holder of record of shares in a 
corporation and is synonymous with the term "stockholder." If the articles of 
incorporation or the bylaws so provide, the board of directors may adopt by 
resolution a procedure whereby a shareholder of the corporation may certify 
in writing to the corporation that all or a portion of the shares registered in 
the name of such shareholder are held for the account of a specified person 
or persons. The resolution shall set forth (1) the classification of shareholder 
who may certify, (2) the purpose or purposes for which the certification may 
be made, (3) the form. of certification and information to be contained 
therein, ( 4) the number of days before or after any record date or date of 
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closing of the stock transfer books, by which time the certification must be 
received by the corporation to be effective for the record date or date of 
closing of the stock transfer books, and (5) such other provisions with 
respect to the procedure as are deemed necessary or desirable. Upon receipt 
by the corporation of a certification complying with the procedure, the 
persons specified in the certification shall be deemed, for the purpose or 
purposes set forth in the certification, to be the holders of record of the 
number of shares specified in place of the shareholder making the certifi-
cation. 
(g) "Authorized shares" mean the shares of all classes which the corpo-
ration is authorized to issue. 
(h) "Treasury shares" mean shares of a corporation which have been 
issued, have been subsequently acquired by and belong to the corporation, 
and have not, either by reason of the acquisition or thereafter, been 
cancelled or restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares. 
Treasury shares shall be deemed to be "issued" shares, but not "outstanding" 
shares. 
(i) "Net assets" mean the amount by which the total assets of a corpora-
tion exceed the total debts of the corporation. 
(i) "Stated capital" means, at any particular time, the sum of (1) the 
aggregate par value of all shares of the corporation having a par value that 
have been issued, (2) the amount of the consideration received by the 
corporation for all shares of the corporation without par value that have 
been issued, except such part of the consideration therefor as may have been 
allocated to capital surplus in a manner permitted by law, and (3) such 
amounts not included in clauses (1) and (2) of this paragraph as have been 
transferred to stated capital of the corporation, whether upon the issuance 
of shares as a share dividend or otherwise, minus all reductions from such 
sum as have been effected in a manner permitted by law. 
(k) "Surplus" means the excess of the net assets of a corporation over its 
stated capital. 
. (l) "Earned surplus" means the portion of the surplus of a corporation 
equal to the balance of its net profits, income, gains and losses from the date 
of incorporation, or from the latest date when a deficit was eliminated by an 
application of its capital surplus or stated capital or otherwise, after 
deducting subsequent distributions to shareholders and transfers to stated 
capital and capital surplus to the extent such distributions and transfers are 
made out of earned surplus. Earned surplus shall include also any portion 
of surplus allocated to earned surplus in mergers, consolidations, or acqui-
sitions of all or substantially all of the outstanding shares or of the property 
and assets of another corporation, domestic or foreign. 
(m) "Capital surplus" means the entire surplus of a corporation other 
than its earned surplus. 
(n) "Insolvent" m.eans inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they 
become due in the usual course of its business. 
(o) "Employee" includes officers but not directors. A director may accept 
duties which make him also an employee. 
(p) ''Nonproductive mining corporation" means a corporation whose spe-
cific purposes or objects are limited to mining, although its generally stated 
A-160 
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powers may extend beyond mining. To be classified as nonproductive in any 
one (1) fiscal year, the corporation must neither be actually engaged in any 
business other than mining nor own any producing mines at any time 
during the entire fiscal year. [I.C., § 30-1-2, as added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2, 
p. 251; am. 1980, ch. 197, § 1, p. 433.] 
Compiler's notes. Section 2 of S.L. 1980, 
ch. 197 is compiled as § 30-1-14. 
30-1-4. General powers. 
Cited in: Waters v. Double L, Inc., 114 
Idaho 256, 755 P.2d 1294 (Ct. App. 1987). 
DECISIONS UNDER PruoR LAw 
Lawful Purposes. 
The language of former section that gave 
corporations power to perform acts necessary 
to accomplish their lawful purposes including 
the power to enter into contracts and to con-
duct business in Idaho and other states was 
broad enough to include commodity trading 
and futures contracts as lawful purposes. 
Sinclair & Co. v. Gwule, 114 Idaho 362, 757 
P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1988). 
30-1-5. Indemnification of officers, directors, employees and 
agents. - (a) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who 
was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, 
pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, 
administrative or investigative (other than an action by or in the right of the 
corporation) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer,· 
employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of 
the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corpora-
tion, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, against expenses 
(including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement 
actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with such action, suit 
or proceeding if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably 
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, 
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause 
to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination of any action, suit or 
proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea ofnolo 
contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, create a presumption that 
the person did not act in good faith and in a manner which he reasonably 
believed to be in or not opposed to the best intere~ts of the corporation, and, 
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to 
believe that his conduct was unlawful. 
(b) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is 
a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or 
completed action or suit by or in the right of the corporation to procure a 
judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, 
employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of 
the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corpora-
tion, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against expenses 
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ration, or was not acting in good faith or for a proper purpose in making his 
demand. 
Nothing herein contained shall impair the power of any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, upon proof by a shareholder or holder of voting trust 
certificates of proper purpose, irrespective of the period of time during which 
such shareholder or holder of voting trust certificates shall have been a 
shareholder of record or a holder of record of voting trust certificates, and 
irrespective of the number of shares held by him or represented by voting 
trust certificates held by him, to compel the production for examination by 
such shareholder or holder of voting trust certificates of the books and 
records of account, bylaws, minutes and record of shareholders of a 
corporation. 
Upon the written request of any shareholder or holder of voting trust 
certificates for shares of a corporation, the corporation shall mail to such 
shareholder or holder of voting trust certificates its most recent financial 
statements showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the 
results of its operations. [LC.,§ 30-1-52, as added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2, p. 
251; am. 1980, ch. 197, § 6, p. 433.) 
Compiler's not.es. Sections 5 and 7 of S.L. 








The enforcement and penalty provisions of 
this section, through the provisions of a 
former section, supplemented the nonprofit 
corporation provisions of another former sec-
tion and were not inconsistent with it. Stueve 
v. Northern Lights, Inc., 118 Idaho 422, 797 
P.2d 130 (1990). 
Penalty. 
This section clearly provides for "a penalty 
of fifty dollars ($50.00) per day for each day 
that such refusal continues after" written 
demand from a shareholder. According to the 
record, the refusal of the corporation ended at 
the court trial. The five-day allowance 
granted by the district judge was reasonable 
and was not abused by the corporation. 
Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 
720, 838 P.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Post-Judgment Interest. 
Where the original judgment contained no 
award under this section that could be modi-
fied upward or downward, the judgment after 
remand was not a modification of the earlier 
judgment with regard to the awarding of 
post-judgment interest. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the order of the district court award-
ing post-judgment interest only from the date 
of the judgment after remand. Stueve v. 
Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 838 P.2d 
323 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Prejudgment Interest. 
Plaintiff/shareholder's recovery was not 
compensatory in nature; rather, the imposi-
tion of a penalty on corporation was a windfall 
for shareholder whose right of access to the 
corporation's books and records had been de-
nied. 'lb hold that prejudgment interest can 
be assessed to augment an award under a 
penalty statute such as this section would be 
to define the punishment differently than did 
the legislature. Stueve v. Northern Lights, 
Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 838 P.2d 323 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
30·1-54. Articles of incorporation. - (1) The articles of incorpora-
tion shall set forth: 
(a) The name of the corporation. 
(b) The period of duration, if other than perpetual. 
(c) The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized which 
may be stated to be, or to include, the transaction of any or all lawful 
business for which corporations may be incorporated under this act. 
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(d) The aggregate number of shares which the corporation shall have 
authority to issue; if such shares are to consist of one (1) class only, the par 
value of each of such shares, or a statement that all of such shares are 
without par value; or, if such shares are to be divided into classes, the 
number of shares of each class, and a statement of the par value of the 
shares of each such class or that such shares are to be without par value. 
(e) If the shares are to be divided into classes, the designation of each 
class and a statement of the preferences, limitations and relative rights in 
respect of the shares of each class. 
(f) If the corporation is to issue the shares of any preferred or special class 
in series, then the designation of each series and a statement of the 
variations in the relative rights and preferences as between series insofar 
as the same are to be fixed in the articles of incorporation, and a 
statement of any authority to be vested in the board of directors to 
establish series and fix and determine the variations in the relative rights 
and preferences as between series. 
(g) If any preemptive right is to be denied to shareholders, the provisions 
for such denial. 
(h) Any provision, not inconsistent with law, which the incorporators 
elect to set forth in the articles of incorporation for the regulation of the 
internal affairs of the corporation, including any provision restricting the 
transfer of shares and any provision which under this act is required or 
permitted to be set forth in the bylaws or in the articles of incorporation. 
(i) The address of its initial registered office, and the name of its initial 
registered agent at such address . 
(j) The number of directors constituting the initial board of directors and 
the names and addresses of the persons who are to serve as directors until 
the first annual meeting of shareholders or until their successors be 
elected and qualify. 
(k) The name and address of each incorporator . 
(2) The articles of incorporation may set forth a provision eliminating or 
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its 
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, 
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a 
director: 
(a) For any breach of the director's duty ofloyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders. 
(b) For acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law. 
(c) Provided for under section 30-1-48, Idaho Code . 
(d) For any transaction from which the director derived an improper 
personal benefit. 
No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any 
act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes 
effective. All references in this subsection to a director shall also be deemed 
to refer to a member of the governing body of a corporation which is not 
authorized to issue capital stock. 
(3) It shall not be necessary to set forth in the articles of incorporation 
any of the corporate powers enumerated in this act. [I.C., § 30-1-54, as 
A-163 
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added by 1979, ch. 105, § 2, p. 251; am. 1987, ch. 221, § 2, p. 471; am. 1995, 
ch. 126, § 1, p. 542.] 
Compiler's notes. Section 1 of S.L. 1987, Sec. to sec. ref. This section is referred to 
ch. 221 is compiled as § 30-1-5. in §§ 26-203, 26-204 and 41-343. 
Section 2 of S.L. 1995, ch. 126 is compiled 
as § 30-1-61. 
30-1-56. Effect of issuance of certificate of incorporation. 
Cited in: Weatherhead v. '!roll-Master, 
Inc., 123 Idaho 697, 851 P.2d 993 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
30-1-59. Procedure to amend articles of incorporation. - Amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation shall be made in the following manner: 
(a) If shares have been issued, the board of directors shall adopt a 
resolution setting forth the proposed amendment and directing that it be 
submitted to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may be either the 
annual or a special meeting. If no shares have been issued, the resolution 
and amendment may be adopted by all the incorporators or by the board of 
directors and the provisions for adoption by shareholders shall not apply. 
The resolution may incorporate the proposed amendment in restated 
articles of incorporation which contain a statement that except for the 
designated amendment the restated articles of incorporation correctly set 
forth without change the corresponding provisions of the articles of incor-
poration as theretofore amended, and that the restated articles of incorpo-
ration together with the designated amendment supersede the original 
articles ofincorporation and all amendments thereto. In lieu of the foregoing 
procedure, a resolution setting forth the proposed amendment may be 
submitted directly, by the holders of not less than one-tenth W10) of all the 
shares entitled to vote at the meeting, without directors' action, to a vote at 
a meeting of shareholders, which may be either the annual or a special 
meeting, in which event paragraphs (b) and (c) hereunder shall also apply, 
or the resolution and amendment may be adopted without any meeting if 
written consent thereto is given by all the shareholders entitled to vote 
thereon as provided in section 30-1-145, Idaho Code. 
(b) Written notice setting forth the proposed amendment or a summary of 
the changes to be effected thereby shall be given to each shareholder of 
record entitled to vote thereon within the time and in the manner provided 
in this act for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders. If the meeting 
be an annual meeting, the proposed amendment or such summary may be 
included in the notice of such annual meeting. 
(c) At such meeting a vote of the shareholders entitled to vote thereon 
shall be taken on the proposed amendment. Except as provided in section 
30-1-33(d), Idaho Code, the proposed amendment shall be adopted upon 
receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares 
entitled to vote thereon, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote thereon 
as a class, in which event the proposed amendment shall be adopted upon 
receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of 
r 
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